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     ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis seeks to systematically examine the contributions made by the dispute settlement 
bodies established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to 
the development of the law of the sea. The two main research questions to be answered are: (i) 
what kind of contribution have UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies made to the development 
of the law of the sea? and (ii) what are the factors that impact the performance of UNCLOS 
dispute settlement bodies in developing the law of the sea? To that end, Chapter 1 provides a 
working definition for the concept of ‘judicial development of international law’ in order to 
establish a framework for an assessment of the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals. Based on 
this working definition, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine the significance of UNCLOS tribunals’ 
decisions in the development of three main areas of the law of the sea, respectively the law on 
fisheries, the law on the outer continental shelf and the law on marine environmental protection. 
Based on the findings of these chapters, Chapter 5 analyses the factors that help explain the 
contributions of UNCLOS tribunals to the law of the sea as identified in the preceding chapters. 
These factors include: (i) the jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals, (ii) the institutional 
design of UNCLOS, (iii) the interpretative method employed by UNCLOS tribunals in deciding 
their cases and (iv) the perception that UNCLOS tribunals hold regarding their roles. Chapter 
6 concludes by taking stock of the contribution of UNCLOS tribunal in these areas and offering 
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CHAPTER 1           INTRODUCTION 
 
I. THE GOAL AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
The dispute settlement system under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(‘UNCLOS’ or ‘the Convention’) constitutes an integral part of the Convention.1 Unlike the 
1958 conventions for the law of the sea, which relegate the settlement of disputes to an optional 
protocol,2 Part XV of UNCLOS on Settlement of Disputes sets out a compulsory dispute 
settlement system which is binding on a State once it becomes a party to the Convention. In 
that framework, UNCLOS establishes new tribunals, namely the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and ad hoc arbitral tribunals, and provide them with compulsory 
jurisdiction to settle disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the Convention.3 
The creation of new tribunals with specialised and compulsory jurisdiction to settle law of the 
sea disputes was hailed by one commentator as ‘one of the pillars of the new world order in the 
ocean space’.4 
To date, a total of around thirty cases have been initiated under the framework of the 
UNCLOS dispute settlement system. These cases have touched upon a variety of legal issues 
pertaining to both the law of the sea and more general international law. Despite this important 
body of jurisprudence, there has not been one single study which is devoted to assessing the 
role that UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies play in developing the law of the sea. Against that 
background, this thesis will be the first study to examine the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals 
to the development of the law of sea in a systematic manner. To that end, the thesis seeks to 
answer two main research questions: (i) what kind of contribution have UNCLOS dispute 
settlement bodies made to the development of the law of the sea? and (ii) what are the factors 
that impact the performance of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies in developing the law of 
the sea? 
While there has been a considerable amount of literature devoted to analysing the work 
of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies, most of this takes the form of journal articles and book 
																																																								
1 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December1982) 1833 UNTS 396. 
2 Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (29 April 1958) 450 UNTS 
169. 
3 Article 287 UNCLOS allows States to choose one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes: 
ITLOS, the International Court of Justice, ad hoc arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with Annex VII and 
ad hoc special arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with Annex VIII UNCLOS.  
4 OA Adede, ‘Settlement of Disputes Arising Under the Law of the Sea Convention’ (1975) 69 AJIL 798, 798. 
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chapters which concentrate on the dispute settlement function of UNCLOS tribunals.5 As such, 
they have focused largely on specific cases or specific legal issues arising from the decisions 
of these tribunals, in other words, the tribunals’ dispute settlement function. The number of 
studies on the law-development role of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies is limited. Those 
that have attempted to do so tend to revolve around ITLOS only, and given the limited space 
afforded in these types of academic contribution, have made only cursory examination of the 
issue.6  
Apart from journal articles and book chapters, there have only been two books which 
look at the UNCLOS dispute settlement system as a whole. The first, Natalie Klein’s 
monograph ‘Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’,7 was published 
more a decade ago in 2005 when UNCLOS tribunals had not had the chance to deal with many 
cases. Thus it does not, and naturally cannot, take into account recent important developments 
in the case law of UNCLOS tribunals. More importantly, the focus of this book (whether the 
dispute settlement system is necessary for the regulation of the oceans under the Convention) 
and the approach that it adopts to answering its research question (by examining the relationship 
between the dispute settlement provisions and the substantive provisions of UNCLOS, focusing 
particularly on the exceptions and limitations to compulsory jurisdiction) differ significantly 
from those featured in this thesis. The second monograph, Igor V Karaman’s ‘Dispute 
Resolution in Law of the Sea’ published in 2012,8 claims to offer a comprehensive study of 
dispute resolution in the contemporary law of the sea. However, its focus is on how UNCLOS 
dispute settlement bodies have dealt with disputes brought before them until 2012. This 
monograph drew a positive conclusion that the UNCLOS tribunals have functioned, and will 
continue to do so, efficiently. It is, thus, clear that the approach of Karaman’s monograph is 
																																																								
5 See, eg, Louis B Sohn, ‘Settlement of Disputes Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention’ (1975) 12 SDLR 
495; Shigeru Oda, ‘Dispute settlement prospects in the Law of the Sea’ (1995) 44(04) ICLQ 863; Thomas Mensah, 
‘The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Its Role for the Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes’ (1997) 
5 AfYBIL 227; Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘The Future of Compulsory Dispute Settlement Under the Law of the Sea 
Convention’ (2005) 36 VUWLR 683; Jillaine Seymour , ‘The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A 
Great Mistake?’ (2006) 1 Ind J Global Legal Stud 1; Bernard H Oxman, ‘A Tribute to Louis Sohn - Is the Dispute 
Settlement System under the Law of the Sea Convention Working?’ (2007) 39 GWILR 655; Sicco Rah and Tilo 
Wallrabenstein, ‘International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and its Future’ (2007) 21 Ocean Yearbook 
41. 
6 See, eg, Philippe Gautier, ‘The Contribution of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to the Rule of 
Law’ in Geert De Baere and Jan Wouters (eds), Contribution of International and Supranational Courts to the 
Rule of Law (Edward Elgar 2015); James Harrison, ‘Judicial Law-Making and the Developing Order of the 
Oceans’ (2997) 22(2) IJCML 283; Helmut Tuerk, ‘Contributions of ITLOS to International Law’ in Seoung-Yong 
Hong and Jon M. Van Dyke (eds) Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2009); Budislav Vukas, ‘Possible Role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 
Interpretation and Progressive Development of the Law of the Sea’ in Davor Vidas and Willy Østreng (eds), Order 
for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century (Kluwer Law International 1999). 
7 Natalie Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (CUP 2005). 
8 Igor V Karaman, Dispute Resolution in Law of the Sea (Brill 2012). 
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distinct from that set in this thesis. What both of these monographs share, in essence, is a focus 
on the dispute settlement role of UNCLOS tribunals. While each is enlightening in its own way, 
neither has addressed the issue that thesis purports to examine, which is their law-development 
role. 
Before answering the two main research questions, two caveats need to be made. First, 
it should be acknowledged that ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals are not the only dispute 
settlement bodies engaged in the interpretation and application of UNCLOS. In fact, law of sea 
disputes occupy a prominent place in the docket of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
enabling it to interpret and apply UNCLOS on a frequent basis. However, this thesis will only 
focus on the decisions rendered by ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as ‘UNCLOS tribunals’). The reason is that even though ICJ is indeed 
one of the four choices of fora under Article 287, none of the law of the sea disputes brought to 
the Court to date have been initiated within the framework of Part XV UNCLOS. 9 As the thesis 
purports to examine the contribution of the dispute settlement system established under 
UNCLOS to the development of the law of the sea, it will only focus on the tribunals which (i) 
were established by the Convention, (ii) operate according to the rules and procedures of the 
Convention and (iii) have in practice heard cases brought to them under the auspices of the 
Convention. That is not to say that ICJ judgments will be absent in the analysis. As will be seen, 
references will be made to ICJ decisions insofar as it is appropriate and relevant to the analysis 
of the role of UNCLOS tribunals.  
Second, the thesis will only examine the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals in three 
areas of law, namely: the law on fisheries, the law on the outer continental shelf regime, and 
the law marine environmental protection. The reason is that due to the limited space available 
in the thesis, it would be impossible to examine all the legal issues that UNCLOS tribunals have 
examined to date. Therefore, a choice has to made regarding the areas of focus. These three 
areas were chosen as they were the areas of the law of sea with which UNCLOS tribunals have 
had the opportunity to deal on a frequent basis. As the legal issues in these specific areas have 
been addressed in more than one case, this makes it possible to discern a trend or a pattern in 
the decisions of UNCLOS tribunals in order to make an assessment of their contribution to the 
development of the law of the sea in a systematic manner. The thesis uses the conclusions drawn 
from the analysis of each of these areas as materials to obtain a more general understanding of 
																																																								
9 Neither have any cases been brought to Annex VIII tribunals. For a list of the cases brought before ITLOS, see: 
<https://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/> accessed 25 September 2018. For a list of cases brought before Annex 
VII arbitral tribunals, see: >https://pca-cpa.org/en/services/arbitration-services/unclos/> accessed 25 September 
2018. In addition to the cases in this list, the Southern Bluefin Tuna case was also heard by an Annex VII arbitral 
tribunal, but for which the Permanent Court of Arbitration did not act as the Registry.  
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the different kinds of contribution that UNCLOS tribunals could and have made to the 
development of the law of the sea. It is acknowledged that a selection of only three areas may 
limit the generality of the conclusions to be drawn on the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to 
the law of the sea. However, it is also argued that the analysis of these three areas of law serves 
more than mere samples. Instead, as the cases in these areas make up the bulk of UNCLOS 
tribunals’ case law, they provide a rather clear indication of the ways the tribunals decide the 
cases and the kinds of contributions that they have made.  
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING ‘JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT’ 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As mentioned above, to date, only a limited number of studies have been devoted to critically 
examining the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to the development of the law of the sea. In 
these studies, the relevant authors have mostly concentrated on ITLOS and its decisions on 
specific legal issues. While such an approach is not unreasonable, the focus on concrete 
instances and the lack of consideration for a more systemised understanding of why and in 
which ways the tribunal’s pronouncements ‘develop’ the law leave the analysis incomplete. In 
order to avoid such loopholes, this Part seeks to outline the kinds of contribution which 
international courts and tribunals make to the development of the law, building on existing 
literature which examines the concept of ‘development of the law’ by various courts and 
tribunals. This will provide a framework for the analysis of the contributions of UNCLOS 
tribunals to the development of the law of the sea in the chapters to follow. 
To set the background for such a framework, it is appropriate to raise at this juncture 
two observations. First, while international courts and tribunals are set up to settle disputes, this 
alone does not sufficiently cover the whole picture regarding the function of international 
courts. As Fitzmaurice pointed out,  
There are broadly two main possible approaches to the task of a judge…There is the 
approach which conceives it to be the primary, if not the sole duty of a judge to decide 
the case in hand, with the minimum of verbiage necessary for this purpose, and to 
confine himself to that. The other approach conceives it to be the proper function of the 
judge, while duly deciding the case in hand, with the necessary supporting reasoning, 
and while not unduly straying outside the four corners of the case, to utilize those 
aspects of it which have a wider interest or connotation, in order to make general 
pronouncements of law and principle that may enrich and develop the law.10 
																																																								
10 Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Hersch Lauterpacht—The Scholar as a Judge’ (1961) 37 BYBIL 1, 14–15.  
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The second role performed by international courts and tribunals expounded in the above 
passage, that of developing international law, has been a subject of much interest to legal 
scholars and has been analysed from a variety of perspectives.11 This chapter does not wish to 
rehearse nor engage in a detailed discussion on these topics. Suffice to say that, despite the fact 
that dispute settlement by means of international arbitration has had a longer history than that 
through permanent courts, 12 legal scholarship on the role of international courts and tribunals 
in the development of international law primarily revolves around the ICJ, and its predecessor, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Thus the more conservative view that these courts 
have adopted, ie that the function of international courts cannot go beyond settling disputes ,13 
has frequently been used as the point of departure for much academic discussion.  
However, the past decades have witnessed the emergence of a large number of 
international dispute settlement mechanisms entrusted with the power to settle disputes in 
specific areas of law. Even though States still ‘[attempt] to circumscribe the judicial role rather 
narrowly by including safeguard clauses’ when establishing these new courts and tribunals,14 
the specialised—and in many cases, compulsory—jurisdiction conferred upon this new 
generation of international courts and tribunals means that they have the potential to play a 
																																																								
11 See, eg, Armin Von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Court 
and Tribunals’ in Cesare Romano, Karen Alter and Yuval Shany, Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication 
(OUP 2013); Rudiger Wolfrum, ‘Enforcing Community Interests through International Dispute Settlement: 
Reality of Utopia’ in Ulrich Fastenrath et al (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of 
Bruno Simma (OUP 2011); Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, In Whose Name?: A Public Law Theory of 
International Adjudication (OUP 2014); Tullio Scovazzi, ‘Where the Judge Approaches the Legislator: Some 
Cases Relating to the Law of the Sea’ in Nerina Boschiero et al (eds), International Courts and the Development 
of International Law: Essays in Honour of Tullio Treves (Springer 2013); Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness 
of International Courts (CUP 2014) (which does not consider law-development as an indicator of effectiveness 
for most courts and tribunals); Karen Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights 
(Princeton University Press 2014) (which focuses on the influence of international courts on international and 
domestic politics, rather than on the development of the law per se, but which acknowledges that the role of 
international courts go beyond settling inter-state disputes). 
12 Stephan W Schill, ‘The Overlooked Role of Arbitration in International Adjudication Theory’ (2015) 4(2) ESIL 
Reflections <http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Schill%20Reflection%20PDF_0.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2018. 
13 See, eg, Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226 [18]; 
Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion [1950] ICJ Rep 221, 229; Case Concerning Rights of Nationals 
of the United States of American in Morocco (France v United States) [1952] ICJ Rep 176, 199; South West Africa 
cases (Ethiopia v South Africa, Liberia v South Africa) (Second Phase) [1966] ICJ Rep 6 [91]; Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 3 [53]; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) [2005] ICJ Rep 168 [26]. Note, however, that the Court itself has 
acknowledged on some occasion that its decisions have implications for the relations between States other the 
parties to a dispute before it. However, this was in the context of a maritime boundary dispute. Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) [1978] ICJ Rep 3 [39]. 
14 For example, Article 3.2 and 19.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding state that the WTO dispute 
settlement system and in particular the panels and Appellate Body ‘cannot add to or diminish the rights and 
obligations provided in the covered agreements’. See also: Christian J Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, 
‘Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development’ (2010) 23(4) LJIL 781, 783.  
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significant part in shaping the law of those particular fields.15 Therefore, the conventional view 
regarding the role of international courts and tribunals in the development of international law, 
influenced by that long professed by the ICJ, seems no longer adequate to capture the changing 
landscape in international adjudication and arbitration. While not all States—or even 
international courts and tribunals themselves—accept that the latter have the task of developing 
the law, there has been a higher level of acceptance of the fact that international courts and 
tribunals may have a role to play the process in which international law develops. As one 
commentator observed, ‘the conception of international courts as actors in the development of 
the law has been a rather common theme in international legal thinking.’16 As a result, a 
growing number of studies have thus turned their focus away from the question of whether 
international courts have the power to develop the law, and instead to the question as to how 
and to what extent they have brought about such development.17  
Second, this thesis opts for the term ‘development of the law’ rather than other terms 
which have been used to describe the role international courts have in addition to dispute 
settlement, such as ‘judicial law-making’18 or ‘judicial legislation’.19 The reason behind this 
choice is that the term ‘create’ or ‘make’ gives the impression that international courts and 
tribunals are introducing new rules of law which did not previously exist; in other words, 
introducing legislation de novo. However, judicial decisions are not recognised as a primary 
source of law binding on States under Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. As a general rule, 
international judicial or arbitral decisions are binding only on the parties to the case.20 The 
																																																								
15 See, eg, Sivan Shlomo-Agon and Yuval Shany, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System’ in Yuval Shany (n 11); 
Richard H. Steinberg, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints’ 
(2004) 98(2) AJIL 247; Debra P. Steger, ‘The Appellate Body and Its Contribution to WTO Dispute Settlement’ 
in Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick, The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in 
Honor of Robert E. Hudec (CUP 2002); J G Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European 
Court of Human Rights (Manchester University Press 1998). 
16 Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: On Semantic Change and Normative Twists (OUP 
2012) 143–44.  
17 De Baere and Wouters (n 6); John Merrills, ‘The place of international litigation in international law’ in Natalie 
Klein (ed), Litigating International Law Disputes: Weighing the Options (CUP 2014) 15.  
18  See, eg, Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke, ‘Beyond disputes: International Judicial Institutions as 
Lawmakers’ in Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke (eds) International Judicial Lawmaking: On Public 
Authority and Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance (Springer 2012); Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, 
The Making of International Law (OUP 2007) 272; Kelsen, cited in Ingo Venzke, How Interpretation Makes 
International Law (n16) 31. 
19 See, eg, Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Stevens & Sons 
1958); Geir Ulfstein, ‘International Courts and Judges: Independence, Interaction, and Legitimacy’ (2013-2014) 
46 NYUJILP 849. 
20 See, for example, Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, Article 33 of the ITLOS Statute, Article 17(14) DSU of the 
WTO, Article 53 ICSID Convention. 
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majority of international courts also do not recognise the principle of stare decisis,21 so there is 
no obligation on the court in question—or others courts and tribunals for that matter—to follow 
the decision handed down previously even if in practice they generally do aim for consistency.22 
It follows that judicial decisions do not in and of themselves constitute binding law.  
Admittedly, the conventional understanding that judicial decisions are not a source of 
law but merely a source for recognising the law as Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute posits may 
no longer hold true. As will be argued in this thesis, judicial decisions do not stop at recognising 
the law, they also clarify and enrich it. However, in that capacity, it is more proper to regard 
international courts and tribunals, including UNCLOS tribunals, as ‘agency for developing the 
law’23 or ‘agents of legal development’.24 As Tams and Tzanakopoulos argue, in the context of 
the ICJ, ‘the Court does not make or develop the law single-handedly, it operates within the 
broader context of legal development’, 25  thus judicial decisions ‘are not per se relevant 
contributions to the process of legal development, but only to the extent that they are acceptable 
to the international legal community.’26 When and if accepted, international courts ‘exercise a 
normative pull that provides actors with incentives to adapt existing norms and adopt new 
ones’.27 Therefore, referring to international courts as ‘agents of development’ acknowledges 
the fact that international courts are not the sole driving force behind the creation of new rules 
of law. They are but merely a stimulating element in the process of development of international 
law, or a link in the chain of ‘communicative practice of international law’.28  
Turning then to the meaning of ‘judicial development’, it follows from the above 
discussion that the development of law is a process which involves various actors, each of 
whom exerts a different kind of influence on and brings about changes to the law by different 
																																																								
21  For an overview of the stare decicis doctrine and the practice of international courts and tribunals in 
implementing this doctrine, see: Guido Acquaviva and Fausto Pocar, ‘Stare decisis’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law (11/2007). 
22  For example, for the ICJ, former ICJ President Judge Stephen Schwebel contended that ‘the Court has 
characteristically followed its own reasoning, even though it is not bound by pprecedents’. See Stephen Schwebel, 
‘The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of International Law’ in Wybo Heere 
(ed), International Law and The Hague's 750th Anniversary (Sringer 1999) 407. For the WTO Appellate Body, 
see Rule 4 Working Procedures for Appellate Review of the WTO Appellate Body. See also: Jonathan I. Charney, 
Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 217 Recueil des Cours 101 (1998). Charney 
argued that there had been judicial dialogues and communications between the ICJ and other courts and tribunals 
in certain areas.  
23 Lauterpacht (n 19) 7. 
24 Franklin Berman, ‘The International Court of Justice as an “Agent” of Legal Development?’ in Christian J Tams 
and James Sloan, The Development of International law by the International Court of Justice (OUP 2013) 7.  
25 Tams and Tzanakopoulos (n 14) 784. 
26 ibid 785. 
27 Theresa Squatrito et al (eds), The Performance of International Courts and Tribunals (CUP 2018) 23. 
28 Ingo Venzke, ‘The Role of International Courts as Interpreters and Developers of the Law: Working out the 
Jurisgenerative Practice of Interpretation’ (2011) 34 Loy LA Int'l & Comp L J 99, 122. 
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means. When one says that the law has been ‘developed’ by an international court or tribunal, 
this implies that the law has advanced or changed compared to what it was before the decision 
is rendered. 29  The majority of the scholarly works equate judicial development with 
clarification of the law. Lauterpacht, in his seminal work on the development of international 
law by the International Court, argued that the wide recognition of the achievement of the ICJ 
was owed to the ‘tangible contribution to the development and clarification of the rules and 
principles of law’.30 Here, Lauterpacht used the terms ‘development’ and ‘clarification’ side by 
side, which could at first glance suggest that they are separate concepts. However, a closer 
examination of his book shows that he used these terms interchangeably. Other scholars echo 
the understanding that clarification of the law is a form of development of the law by 
international courts, noting that judgments ‘clarify difficult legal questions that were previously 
more or less left open’,31 or that ‘the clarification of international law goes hand in hand with 
its development’.32 But even when one accepts that international courts and tribunals develop 
the law through the clarification of the law, it still seems pertinent to determine further what 
sort of clarification contributes to the development of the law.  
In practice, States bring cases to international tribunals not only when they disagree on 
the facts, but more often when they disagree on the applicable law and the application of the 
law to the facts. Thus any changes to the law effected by international courts and tribunals—as 
dispute settlement bodies—can only be brought about through the identification, interpretation 
and application of the rules and principles applicable to the dispute brought before them. In so 
doing, international courts and tribunals contribute to the development of the law by clarifying 
whether a rule of a law exists within the corpus of international law and articulating what the 
normative content of the rule is.33  
More specifically, the identification and confirmation of the existence of a rule of law 
is apposite to customary international law. While the definition of customary international law 
is defined in a rather straightforward manner in Article 38(1), it is not at all easy in practice to 
ascertain whether the two constituent elements for the formation of a rule of customary law 
have been satisfied. The identification of international customary law has, thus, always been 
																																																								
29 Gregory Messenger, The Development of World Trade Organization Law (OUP 2016) 3. 
30 Lauterpacht (n 19) 5. 
31 Armin von Bogdandy and Marc Jacob, ‘The Judge as Law-Maker: Thoughts on Bruno Simma's Declaration in 
the Kosovo Opinion’ in Fastenrath et al (n 11) 818. 
32 Geert De Baere, Anna-Luise Chane and Jan Wouters, ‘The Contributions of international and supranational 
courts to the rule of law: A Framework for analysis’ in De Baere and Wouters (n 6Error! Bookmark not defined.) 
74.  
33 Merrills, ‘The place of international litigation’ (n 17) 17.  
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controversial and elusive. 34 Against such a backdrop, judicial decisions have widely been 
accepted as an authoritative and reliable source for identifying whether State practice in 
implementing a certain rule of law has ripened to reach the status of customary law. A judicial 
pronouncement on the existence of a particular rule of customary law thus provides an 
authoritative point of reference, and Pellet even regards it as ‘the final proof of it’.35 Such a 
confirmation then becomes a ‘focal point’ that inspires subsequent State practice and helps to 
harden a rule.36 
The clarification of the normative content of a particular rule occurs with regard to both 
treaty law and customary law. It goes without saying that ‘the legal rules need to be sufficiently 
clear in order to provide a reliable and predictable framework’.37 However, in reality they are 
not always so. It is perhaps not surprising that customary law can be indeterminate in scope and 
content, as the process in which customary law is formed is neither formal nor centralised. Yet, 
treaty law itself, while in black and white, can be equally ambiguous. When concluding 
international treaties, States sometimes fail to anticipate, or intentionally leave, legal gaps or 
uncertainties in the final provisions—UNCLOS being a fine example as will be analysed below. 
When an international court or tribunal is requested to apply such provisions to settle the 
dispute, it would likely have to fill in these legal gaps.38 In such circumstances, by expounding 
the rule or principle of law invoked by the parties to the dispute, international courts and 
tribunals shed light on the meaning of the terms that are nebulous in the treaty and elucidate the 
scope of rights and obligations that arise from the rule in question.  
Hence, through interpreting and applying the law to concrete cases, international courts 
‘channel it into a concrete form’ and ‘bestow it with meaning and authoritative weight’.39 As 
described by Judge Buergenthal, international courts’ engagement with international law is a 
process of ‘normative accretion’, through which law is not created with legislative processes, 
but rather in a more modest, incremental fashion, clarifying ambiguities and resolving 
																																																								
34 Scovazzi (n 11) 299. Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of Its Problems’ (2004) 15 EJIL 523, 524. 
35 Alain Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in Zimmermann et al, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary 
(2nd ed, OUP 2012) 864. See also: Christian J Tams, ‘Meta-Custom and the Court: A Study in Judicial Law-
Making’ (2015) 14 LPICT 51.  
36 Gleider Hernandez, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (OUP 2014) 91 
37 De Baere, Chane and Wouters (n 32) 70. 
38 One commentator contends that ‘judicial gap-filling seems an inescapable by-product of the application of any 
kind of law to fact’. See Jose Alverez, ‘What Are International Judges for? The Main Functions of International 
Adjudication’ in Romano, Alter and Shany (n 11) 158. 
39 Boyle and Chinkin (n 18) 272. 
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perceived gaps in the law.40 In so doing, international courts develop the law by thickening the 
corpus of the law and adding substance to it. In the words of Lauterpacht, development means 
making law ‘visible’,41 and the visibility of the law could be understood both in respect of its 
existence as well as its enriched content.  
As a corollary of the clarification of the law, international courts also ‘provide 
systemization to a question of law where there might be conflicting practice or ambiguity’,42 
thereby setting the direction for the rule subject to interpretation to develop.43 When hearing a 
case, a court or tribunal is normally presented with competing views put forward by the parties, 
usually supported by references to relevant scholarly arguments which may also align 
themselves into opposing camps. In the process in which actors demand and give reasons for 
or against a particular interpretation of a provision, the law gains shape and develops.44 The 
ICJ, for example, while keen to portray its practice as just applying the existing law, accepted 
that ‘in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its scope and 
sometimes note its general trend.’45 Judge Waldock similarly contended that in determining and 
clarifying what is conceived to be the existing law, the ICJ ‘threw fresh light on the 
considerations and the principles on which the law was based in a manner to suggest the path 
for future development’.46 In other words, international courts and tribunals develop the law 
not only by clarifying its status and normative content, but also by suggesting a particular 
direction for the law to develop.  
In short, the premise of this thesis is that, while international courts and tribunals may 
not be given the explicit competence to develop international law, they do in practice contribute 
to the development of the law through the clarification of the law in the course of settling 
specific disputes. Judicial decisions confirm the existence of the rules pertinent to the case, 
identify their scope of application and shed light on their normative content. By virtue of such 
clarification, the law takes a more defined form, becomes more enriched and detailed, and so it 
develops. It is through the prism of development by clarification of the law that the 
																																																								
40 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Lawmaking by the ICJ and Other International Courts’ in (2009) Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law 403, 403. 
41 Lauterpacht (n 19) 42–43. 
42 Gleidar Hernadez, ‘International Judicial Lawmaking’ in Catherine Brolmann and Yannick Radi (eds) Research 
Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International Lawmaking (Edward Elgar 2016) 201. 
43 Note, however, that Lowe argues that the settlement of international disputes by adjudication is undesirable 
when litigation is conducted ‘over rights that are in the process of rapid and fundamental change, where the law is 
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contributions of UNCLOS tribunals to the development of the law of the sea will be examined 
in the following chapters. 
III. UNCLOS TRIBUNALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE 
SEA 
1. The law-development role of UNCLOS tribunals  
In order to set the scene for a thorough examination of the question of whether and to what 
extent UNCLOS tribunals have developed the law of the sea, it is worth taking a step back and 
ask whether UNCLOS tribunals have the competence to develop the law of the sea in the first 
place. This exercise does not seem strictly necessary, in light of the conclusion reached in the 
previous section that international courts and tribunals in practice contribute to the development 
of the law, even in the absence of any explicit conferral of such competence. However, an 
answer to such a question is still pertinent it helps to strengthen UNCLOS tribunals’ legitimacy 
and authority in developing the law of the sea. It is argued that, despite the lack of an express 
provision to that effect, UNCLOS tribunals have implicitly been given the role of developing 
the law by the drafters of the Convention. This law-development role derives from: (i) the 
nature of UNCLOS, and (ii) the functions that drafters of the Convention expect UNCLOS 
tribunals to perform. Each will be analysed in turn. 
(i) The nature of UNCLOS 
UNCLOS is commonly referred to as ‘the Constitution for the Ocean’. According to Tommy 
Koh, the father of this phrase, UNCLOS was given that name because ‘it treats the oceans in a 
holistic manner. It seeks to govern all aspects of the resources and uses of the oceans’.47 The 
desire to introduce a comprehensive instrument for the law of the sea is also evident in the 
preamble of the Convention itself, which reads in part, ‘[t]he problems of ocean space are 
closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole’. As a result of the goal to ‘govern all 
aspects’ of the oceans in one single convention, as opposed to four separate conventions as had 
been done previously, UNCLOS became more comprehensive in scope and content than its 
predecessors. The large number of issues that eventually made their way into UNCLOS means 
that it is impossible for UNCLOS to regulate every legal issue with depth or specificity. Instead, 
the Convention could only aim to provide a normative framework for the regulation of ocean 
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space. 48 As a result, the provisions of UNCLOS are usually worded in general terms, with the 
details left to be worked out by resort to other means.  
Apart from its framework nature, UNCLOS is also characterised as a ‘package deal’, 
which underpinned the decision to adopt a convention dealing with all major question of the 
law of the sea.49 During the Third Convention on the Law of the Sea, the ‘package deal’ was 
accepted and implemented with the understanding that: 
[N]o delegation’s position on a particular issue should be treated as irrevocable until at 
least all the elements of the package had formed the subject of agreement and that, 
therefore, every delegation had the right to reserve its position on any particular issue 
until it had received satisfaction on other issues which it considered to be of vital 
importance to it.50 
The package deal was further reinforced by the consensus procedure in adopting the 
Convention.51 Consensus acted as ‘an “invisible hand” process’, which led States ‘to promote 
an end which was no part of [its] intention’.52 This combination meant that the final Convention 
had to be able, to the greatest extent possible, to accommodate all the demands of 160 States 
present at the negotiations which lasted for nearly a decade.53This inevitably resulted in a final 
Convention which was hinged upon extremely delicate compromise.54 This compromise was 
evident in the large number of UNCLOS provisions which were either deliberately kept vague 
or ambiguous so as to cater for the interests of as many States as possible, or worded in general 
terms due to States’ inability to reach an agreement on the matter.  
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In short, the preceding discussion shows that, in terms of substance, the Convention 
excels in breadth but lacks in depth. As a combined consequence of the attempt to regulate all 
activities in the ocean space and accommodate the interests of the negotiating States, the 
Convention is full of general provisions or nebulous terms whose meaning was left to be 
determined at a subsequent point in time.  
(ii) The expected role of the dispute settlement system 
It has been contended that the compulsory jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals ‘makes judicial 
interpretation a potentially important mode of change of UNCLOS’.55 While there is much 
merit in this contention, it is arguable that the ability of UNCLOS tribunals to develop the law 
of the sea stems from a deeper cause than just the existence of compulsory jurisdiction. 
Settlement of disputes was not a topic of substantial concern at the beginning of the law 
of the sea negotiations. It was not until 1976 that the topic attracted sufficient attention of the 
whole Third Conference to be considered in the plenary.56 By the end of Third Conference, 
States succeeded in establishing a dispute settlement system, contained mostly in Part XV and 
partly in Part XI of the Convention, which was considered to be ‘the most sophisticated and 
detailed system for international dispute settlement ever drafted’. 57  One of the most 
fundamental changes that States agreed upon was that, instead of remaining optional as was the 
case with the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea, the dispute settlement under UNCLOS 
became compulsory for all States parties. It should be recalled that the Third Conference took 
place in an era where traditional reluctance of States to accept compulsory dispute settlement 
was still prevalent. The change in States’ attitude toward the nature of dispute settlement was, 
therefore, a highly radical development. Such a progressive approach towards dispute 
settlement came about as the negotiating States realised that, due to the delicately balanced 
UNCLOS provisions, some sort of mechanism would be needed to ensure that the hard-fought 
compromises would not be tampered with and reduced to empty black letters.  
However, the negotiating texts of the Convention also show that the decision to put in 
place a compulsory dispute settlement system did not come about easily. The opponents of the 
system believed that compulsory jurisdiction was inappropriate, for it would affect State 
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(eds) Law of the Sea: UNCLOs as A Living Treaty (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2017) 
27. 
56 Myron H Nordquist (eds),United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 : A Commentary, Vol V 
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sovereignty. 58  Further, they argued that any judicial decision made on the basis of the 
Convention would be arbitrary because the law and the criteria on which dispute settlement 
would be based were so vague.59 As a result, many States preferred to retain the model of the 
1958 Conventions, which incorporated the compulsory settlement of disputes in an optional 
protocol.60 On the other hand, the proponents of the compulsory dispute settlement system 
argued that it was precisely because the substantive articles of the treaty were so vague, they 
would not be able to provide ‘a complete answer to the basic problems or issues on which 
disputes could occur’. Thus, there would be a need for means to ensure that the disputes that 
were bound to arise would be settled peacefully.61 More importantly, many States made clear 
that they would only agree to many of the proposals on the substantive issues in the Convention 
if ‘a general system of compulsory dispute settlement for ocean uses’ was to be included.62 
Here, ‘the package deal’ approach resurfaced, with the inclusion of a compulsory dispute 
settlement as the key condition for many States. 
 In the end, States reached an agreement to establish a compulsory dispute settlement 
system as an integral part of the Convention. The rationale for the establishment of a 
compulsory dispute settlement system is captured by the following statement made by the 
President of the Conference: 
Dispute settlement procedures will be the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium of 
the compromise must be balanced. Otherwise, the compromise will disintegrate rapidly 
and permanently […] Effective dispute settlement would also be the guarantee that the 
substance and intention within the legislative and language of the convention will be 
interpreted both consistently and equitably.63  
As is clear from this statement, the dispute settlement system was put in place with the primary 
aim to resolve any dispute that might arise between the parties in the implementation of the 
Convention. However, it is equally clear that UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies were 
expected to also (i) safeguard the delicate balance of rights and interests of States parties as 
recorded in the Convention and (ii) provide authoritative, consistent and equitable interpretation 
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of the law contained in the Convention. These two tasks show that, within the framework of the 
Convention, UNCLOS tribunals were expected to assume roles that transcend the confines of 
settling concrete disputes. More specifically, the tribunals, as the ‘pivot upon which the delicate 
equilibrium of the compromise must be balanced’, are expected to protect the integrity of the 
Convention as a whole and they should do so by virtue of providing consistent and equitable 
interpretation of its provisions. Put another way, UNCLOS tribunals should not interpret the 
law under UNCLOS merely to dispose of a disagreement between the parties to the dispute. 
Instead, given that UNCLOS is replete with provisions that are generally or vaguely worded 
thus that it constantly runs the risk of being subjected to contrasting reading on the part of 
States, UNCLOS tribunals are expected to clarify legal ambiguities and provide normative 
guidance to States in implementing the Convention in order to safeguard the uniformity and 
integrity of the Convention. In performing these tasks, the role of UNCLOS tribunals becomes 
that of an institutional guardian. In that capacity, UNCLOS tribunals have the ability to 
influence and shape the meaning and scope of the rights and obligations under the Convention 
and to become authoritative reference points in the legal discourse. 64  
In conclusion, the drafters of UNCLOS created a framework instrument built upon 
delicate compromises, resulting in a Convention which was both general and vague in its 
provisions. This necessarily meant that States accepted, and indeed expected, further 
interpretation and guidance to be provided in order for the Convention to be effective. Coupled 
with the fact that States made a conscious and innovative decision to establish a dispute 
settlement system with compulsory jurisdiction with the aim of ensuring the uniform and 
consistent application of the Convention, it is argued that UNCLOS tribunals were given the 
implicit authority to develop the law contained in UNCLOS.  
2. Ad hoc tribunal v permanent tribunal: is there a difference?  
This thesis uses the term ‘UNCLOS tribunals’ to collectively refer to both ITLOS and Annex 
VII arbitral tribunals. But of course, these two bodies—as a permanent court and as ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals, respectively—differ in several fundamental aspects. In general, ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals are constituted to settle the single dispute brought before them. Arbitrators are 
selected by the parties to the disputes, with a specified rule of procedure and a set of applicable 
law to decide the dispute.65 As a result, the conventional wisdom is that international arbitral 
tribunals would be more focused on settling the dispute before them and in a way that is most 
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acceptable to the parties to the case. Thus the orthodox belief is that arbitrators are less inclined 
to address issues that go beyond what is needed to settle the dispute. Moreover, as they operate 
on an ad hoc basis and thus there is no continuity in the decisions rendered, it is often assumed 
that it would be impossible to speak of a consistent arbitral case law. Ad hoc arbitral tribunals 
are, therefore, considered to be less likely to have an impact on the development of international 
law compared to permanent courts. As Merrills argues, ‘to the extent that the avoidance and 
settlement of disputes are assisted by the development of international law, a permanent body 
has the potential to contribute more to legal progress than intermittent arbitrations’.66  
 Leaving aside the fact that such a contention arguably no longer has any merits today 
considering the prevalence of international arbitral tribunals in many areas of international 
law,67 it is further argued that the presumed differences between standing courts and ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals do not play out in the case of ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals. 
Admittedly, Annex VI and Annex VII providing for the Statute of ITLOS and for arbitration 
respectively contain some procedural differences to cater for their standing and ad hoc nature. 
For example, ITLOS is the default tribunal for prompt release proceedings under Article 292 
and for provisional measures pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal under Article 
290(5), while Annex VII arbitral tribunal is the default tribunal for contentious proceedings 
should the parties fail to agree on the choice of procedures under Article 287(5). Moreover, the 
flexibility that is usually associated with arbitration still exists in the case of Annex VII 
arbitration under UNCLOS, for example, the parties can still appoint arbitrators, and the arbitral 
tribunal determines its own procedure. Nevertheless, as Article 4 of Annex VII makes clear, an 
arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII ‘shall function in accordance with this Annex and 
the other provisions of this Convention’. As dispute settlement bodies established by UNCLOS, 
ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals are conferred the same scope of jurisdiction over 
‘disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention’ as specified under 
Article 288(1) UNCLOS and operate under the same procedure stipulated under Part XV. In 
other words, when ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals decide cases brought to them under 
the Convention, they operate under the same jurisdictional framework, dealing with disputes 
arising out of the same convention and applying and having resort to the same body of law—
law of the sea and other relevant general rules of international law—as provided for under 
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Article 293. It follows that the disparities between these two bodies in terms of their ability to 
deal with the substantive issues and clarify the law may be more apparent than real. 
Furthermore, Annex VII arbitral tribunals are part of the dispute settlement system of 
UNCLOS. Thus while they are ad hoc bodies, they have been to a large extent institutionalised. 
For instance, according to Article 3(c), (d) and (e) of Annex VII, when the respondent fails to 
appoint its arbitrator or when the two parties are unable to agree on the remaining three 
arbitrators, the appointment of these arbitrators is made by the President or Vice-President of 
ITLOS. In practice, the majority of Annex VII arbitrators is or has been ITLOS judges. All of 
this not only highlights the close relationship between these two bodies but also the fact that 
Annex VII arbitral tribunals are deeply embedded in and assisted by the framework of 
UNCLOS. This should arguably alleviate any concerns regarding the lack of institutional 
continuity on the part of the arbitral tribunals stemming from their ad hoc nature. As Wood 
notes, ‘[u]nder Part XV of UNCLOS, arbitration and a permanent court may be mutually 
reinforcing; a permanent court may act in support of an arbitral process pending establishment 
of the tribunal, thus removing one disadvantage of ad hoc arbitration.’68  
The mutually reinforcing relationship between ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals 
further manifests itself in the fact that, as will become apparent in the subsequent chapters of 
this thesis, in deciding the cases, these two bodies frequently refer to and cite each other’s 
decisions. This denotes that in their view, there is little difference between the value of an 
ITLOS judgment and an Annex VII arbitral award, and that they ‘see themselves as serving the 
same international legal system’.69 The following chapters will show that it would be difficult 
to maintain that the contribution ITLOS as a standing court has been more significant than that 
of ad hoc tribunals in the development of the law of the sea. ITLOS might have had more cases 
but the number of cases is of course not determinative of the impact on the development of the 
law. While Annex VII arbitral tribunals have only dealt with fewer than ten cases, these cases 
touch upon some of the most important issues under UNCLOS. In such cases as Chagos MPA, 
Arctic Sunrise or South China Sea, it seems clear that the arbitral tribunals were not only 
concerned with disposing of the disputes in a way that was acceptable to the parties as would 
be expected of an arbitral tribunal, but went further to elucidate on issues which have more 
general implications for the development of the law. 
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In short, there is virtually no reason to distinguish between ITLOS and Annex VII 
arbitral tribunals when it comes to their contribution to the development of the law of the sea. 
The differences in the procedural rules relating to the composition of a standing court and the 
constitution of an ad hoc tribunal have little bearing on the value of their eventual decisions or 
on their potential impact on the development of the law of the sea. 
IV.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Having established that UNCLOS tribunals have implicitly been given a law-development role, 
the remainder of this thesis will be devoted to analysing and assessing the contributions of 
UNCLOS tribunals to the development of the law of the sea, built upon the framework to 
understand ‘judicial contribution’ set out in this Chapter. The following three Chapters will 
focus on three areas of the law of the sea. In particular, Chapter 2 will examine the contributions 
that UNCLOS tribunals have made to the development of the law on fisheries, Chapter 3 to the 
development of the outer continental regime and Chapter 4 to the development of the law on 
the protection of the marine environment. Based on the findings of these chapters, Chapter 5 
seeks to analyse the factors that impact the contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to the 
development of the law. More specifically, this chapter examines four factors, namely (i) the 
jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals, (ii) the institutional design of UNCLOS, (iii) the 
interpretative method employed by UNCLOS tribunals in deciding their cases and (iv) the 
perception that UNCLOS tribunals hold regarding their roles, in order to grasp the impact of 
these factors on the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals to the law of the sea. Chapter 6 
concludes by taking stock of the contribution of UNCLOS tribunal in these areas and offering 
some final observations on the performance of UNCLOS tribunals in the development of the 
law of the sea.   
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CHAPTER 2    DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON FISHERIES 
 
The entry into force of UNCLOS brought about an important development in the law on 
fisheries. UNCLOS introduced a new maritime zone, ie the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), in 
which coastal States have the exclusive rights to explore and exploit marine living resources, 
while at the same time, assuming the obligations to conserve and manage these resources.70 In 
the high seas, the principle of freedom of the high seas still applies to all activities, including 
fisheries. This freedom, is however, subjected under Article 87 to the obligation to conserve 
and manage living resources. It should be noted that the 1958 Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas also subjected the right to engage in 
fishing to provisions regarding the conservation of living resources.71 However, Article 2 of the 
1958 Convention defines conservation as ‘the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the 
optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and 
other marine products’ and requires conservation programmes to be formulated ‘with a view to 
securing in the first place a supply of food for human consumption.’ By contrast, Articles 61(4) 
on conservation of living resources in the EEZ and Article 119 on conservation of living 
resources in the high seas under UNCLOS require conservation measures to take into account 
‘the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species with a view to 
maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above levels at 
which their reproduction may become seriously threatened’. It can be observed that UNCLOS 
has clearly shifted the focus from exploitation of resources solely for the benefit of humans to 
placing emphasis on measures with a view to conserving the marine environment as a whole.72  
Before the UNCLOS dispute settlement system came into being, fisheries disputes that were 
brought before the ICJ were centred mainly on claims regarding the exploitation of fisheries 
resources and establishing special fisheries zones.73 In contrast, due to the evolution in fisheries 
law brought about by UNCLOS, the decisions of UNCLOS tribunals concerning fisheries have 
concentrated more on clarifying the scope of the rights and obligations of both coastal States 
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and flag States concerning the conservation and management of living resources. 74  As 
UNCLOS only serves as the legal framework for resource regulation,75 most of the relevant 
provisions are either general in scope or containing terms that are left open to interpretation. 
UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions have thus presented important contributions to developing the 
law on fisheries under the Convention. Fisheries disputes brought before ITLOS and Annex 
VII arbitral tribunals have touched upon the following core issues: (i) the rights and obligations 
of coastal States concerning fishing activities in the EEZ (ii) the rights and obligations of flag 
States concerning fishing activities in the EEZ and (iii) the obligations of coastal States in the 
conservation and management of transboundary fish stocks. The contributions of UNCLOS 
tribunals to clarifying each of these issues will be examined in turn.  
I.    COASTAL STATES’ RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OVER FISHING 
ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ 
The majority of fisheries disputes in the EEZ brought under the auspice of Part XV UNCLOS 
have been prompt release cases before ITLOS. Other than prompt release proceedings, ITLOS 
has only examined one contentious case concerning to fisheries-related activities in the EEZ, 
that is the Virginia G case. In these cases, ITLOS was engaged in the interpretation of and 
interaction between Articles 56, 58, 62 and 73 to clarify the extent of the coastal State’s 
regulatory and enforcement competences over fisheries matters. Furthermore, in the context of 
prompt release proceedings, discussions concerning the determination of a ‘reasonable bond’ 
also occupied a substantial part of the case law. As will be shown, ITLOS’ decisions have 
clarified the scope of the coastal State’s regulatory power over fisheries resources, and specified 
the criteria for a ‘reasonable bond’, but they could have provided more guidance on coastal 
States’ enforcement powers.  
1. Coastal States’ regulatory power  
Article 56 provides that coastal States have ‘the sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, whether living or non-living’ in the 
EEZ. Article 62(4) then provides a list of activities which coastal States, as part of the exercise 
of their sovereign rights over living resources in the EEZ, may regulate in order to conserve 
and manage their living resources. The list under Article 62(4) is, however, not exhaustive. 
Given that UNCLOS was negotiated in the 1970s, and thus that the drafters of the Convention 
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could not envision many of the activities which commonly take place in the EEZ today, the 
question has arisen regarding the scope of coastal States’ regulatory power, particularly 
regarding the extent to which it encompasses activities which are not expressly provided for 
under UNCLOS.  
A determination as to whether a particular activity which is not specifically provided for 
under UNCLOS could be regulated under the coastal State’s fisheries law is important for two 
reasons. First, from a practical view, it provides stability and transparency for States in 
conducting activities at sea. Second, such a determination clarifies the unique nature of the 
EEZ. It is to be recalled that the EEZ is a brand new concept introduced by UNCLOS aimed at 
ensuring a delicate balance between the rights and obligations of coastal States and those of 
flag States.76 In the EEZ, coastal States have exclusive sovereign rights in the EEZ but only 
insofar as living resources are concerned; while other States enjoy the freedom of the seas 
compatible with the Convention. Article 55 makes clear that the EEZ is a ‘specific legal 
regime’, a sui generis functional zone under which there is no presumption in favour of coastal 
States, as with the territorial sea, or flag States, as with the high seas.77 Scholars have, however, 
questioned this assumption, arguing that the history and rationale of the EEZ, 78 as well as the 
measures and control that coastal States are entitled to exercise in the EEZ,79 ultimately shift 
the balance in favour of  coastal States. Another contends that, given UNCLOS new focus on 
the conservation of the marine resources, the balance between the interests of the flag States 
and the sovereign rights of the coastal States ‘needs a new equilibrium’.80 A classification by 
an international tribunal one way or the other will shed light on where balance should be struck 
and provides new insights into the sui generis nature of the EEZ. 
ITLOS has only had the opportunity to deal with this question in relation to one activity—
the bunkering of fishing vessels in the EEZ. Under UNCLOS, bunkering activities in the EEZ 
are neither explicitly qualified as subject to flag State jurisdiction nor do they fall under coastal 
States’ regulatory power under Article 62(4). Given the prevalence of offshore bunkering 
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activities and their economic benefits nowadays,81 a definitive answer to legal nature of the 
activity was much needed.  
The question surrounding the bunkering of fishing vessels came up in the very first case 
brought to ITLOS, the M/V Saiga prompt release case.82 M/V Saiga—an oil tanker flying the 
flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines—served as a bunkering vessel supplying fuel oil to 
fishing vessels and other vessels operating off the coast of Guinea and was arrested by Guinean 
Custom patrol boats. The prompt release procedures under Article 292, read together with 
Article 73(2), can only be invoked if there is a violation of the coastal State’s law and 
regulations concerning fishing activities. Therefore, ITLOS was faced with the question 
regarding whether the bunkering of a fishing vessel within a coastal State’s EEZ could be 
considered a fisheries-related activity?83 While ITLOS eventually declined to offer a view on 
this question, deeming unnecessary to resolve the case before it,84 ITLOS still stated that ‘laws 
or regulations on bunkering of fishing vessels may arguably be classified as laws or regulations 
on activities within the scope of the exercise by the coastal State of its sovereign rights to 
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the EEZ’.85  
This position was not supported by all the judges. In his dissenting opinion, President 
Mensah noted that the classification of bunkering activities was an ‘issue of such fundamental 
importance’ that ITLOS should not have answered the question by implication and very much 
in the passing. 86 By the same token, Judges Wolfrum and Yamamoto also called on ITLOS to 
be cautious in interpreting Article 73 and making general pronouncements on the classification 
of bunkering in the context of a prompt release case, believing the arguments advanced ‘may 
prejudice future decisions of the Tribunal.’87 On the substance, the two Judges disagreed with 
the majority’s conclusion and contended that this activity should not fall under fisheries law 
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and regulations as the list under Article 62(4) is not meant to encompass activities of merchant 
ships just because they service fishing vessels.88  
ITLOS was again faced with this question in M/V Saiga (No. 2) in 1999 in which it was 
asked to deal with the merits of the aforementioned dispute between Saint Vincent and 
Guinea.89 However, as ITLOS was able to settle the case without having to address the broader 
question of the rights of coastal States and other States with regard to bunkering in the EEZ,90 
it declined to make any findings on the question of bunkering of offshore activities.  
It was not until Virginia G in 2014 that ITLOS managed to provide a definitive answer to 
the long-debated question of whether coastal States can regulate the bunkering of fishing 
vessels under their fisheries laws and regulations. 91 The M/V Virginia G, which was flying the 
flag of Panama, provided gas oil to foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ of Guinea-Bissau and 
was arrested for that activity by the authorities of Guinea-Bissau. The question that ITLOS had 
to address was whether Guinea-Bissau, in the exercise of its sovereign rights in respect of the 
exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of natural resources in its EEZ, had 
the competence to regulate bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in this zone.92  
ITLOS first identified that the legal basis for answering such question comprised Article 56 
read together Articles 61 to 68 of the Convention.93 Article 61 and 62 provide for measures that 
the coastal State must take to conserve and utilise living resources in the EEZ respectively, 
while the remaining articles mainly deal with the conservation and management of 
transboundary stocks. According to ITLOS, the term ‘sovereign rights’ in Article 56(1) 
encompassed all rights ‘necessary for and connected with’ the exploration, exploitation, 
conservation and management of the natural resources, ‘including the right to take the necessary 
enforcement measures’.94 The use of the terms ‘conserving’ and ‘managing’ in the same article, 
in the Tribunal’s view, indicated that the rights of coastal States went beyond conservation in 
its strict sense.95 On that basis, ITLOS found that Articles 56(1) and 62(4) were connected, in 
the sense that the measures listed under Article 62(4) were indeed management measures within 
the meaning of Article 56(1).96 ITLOS further noted that the wording of Article 62(4) of the 
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Convention, in particular, the use of ‘inter alia’, indicated that this list was not exhaustive.97 
However, in order for coastal States to regulate an activity as part of their fisheries laws, there 
must be a direct connection to fishing. ITLOS observed that such a connection to fishing existed 
for the bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ since this enabled them to continue their 
activities without interruption at sea.98 To support its conclusion, ITLOS also referred to the 
fact that the definitions of ‘fishing’ and ‘fishing-related’ activities in international agreements 
‘establish a close connection between fishing and the various support activities, including 
bunkering’99 and that the national legislation of several States regulated bunkering of foreign 
vessels in their EEZ as part of their fisheries law.100 
 Lastly, even though coastal States have sovereign rights over living resources, Article 58 
guarantees other States the freedom of navigation and other lawful uses of the sea. Thus, ITLOS 
had to establish whether the bunkering of foreign vessels was covered by the freedom of 
navigation provided for under Article 58.101 As ITLOS had already found the bunkering of 
fishing vessels to be closely related to fisheries and thus, coastal States’ competence to regulate 
bunkering of fishing activities in the EEZ derives from their sovereign rights in the EEZ, it 
concluded that Article 58 would not prevent coastal States from regulating, under Article 56, 
bunkering of foreign vessels fishing in their EEZs.102  This meant that the coastal States’ 
regulatory competence was limited only to the bunkering of fishing vessels; it did not extend 
to other bunkering activities.103  
For the above reasons, ITLOS held coastal States may regulate the bunkering of foreign 
vessels fishing in its EEZ to conserve and manage its living resources under Article 56 of the 
Convention read together with Article 62(4) of the Convention.104 ITLOS’ opinion presented a 
significant development compared to its previous decisions. ITLOS in the Virginia G case 
finally provided a definitive answer to the question. The fact that ITLOS interpreted Article 
62(4) broadly in light of recently adopted international instruments as well as contemporary 
State practice shows that ITLOS did not consider the Convention in a static mode but as an 
evolving instrument.  
																																																								
97 ibid [213]. 
98 ibid [215]. 
99 ibid [216]. 
100 ibid [217]. 
101 ibid [220]. 
102 ibid [222]. 
103 ibid [223]. 
104 ibid [217]. 
25 
 
As mentioned above, the nature of the EEZ would require ITLOS to carefully balance the 
rights of both coastal States and flag States when examining an activity taken place in the 
EEZ.105 Articles 56 and Article 58 impose on both the coastal State and other States operating 
in the EEZ the obligation to have due regard to each other’s rights and duties, which requires a 
balancing exercise between the rights and obligations of the States concerned.106 The ‘due 
regard’ obligation and the entailing balancing exercise meant that ITLOS would have to 
consider whether and to what extent the expansion of coastal States’ power under Article 56 to 
cover the bunkering of fishing vessels would affect the freedom navigation that foreign vessels 
normally enjoy in the EEZ under Article 58. ITLOS indeed took cognisance of this ‘due regard’ 
obligation in Virginia G. By holding that coastal States can regulate only regulate fisheries-
related bunkering and not bunkering activities in general, ITLOS gave due regard to the 
freedom of navigation of other States in the EEZ. At the same time, by giving coastal State the 
competence to regulate bunkering of foreign vessels engaged in the EEZ, it also gave due regard 
to their sovereign rights in the EEZ. 107 
However, it should be noted that in this course of this balancing exercise, ITLOS failed to 
take notice of Article 59 which is designed to deal precisely with situations in which UNCLOS 
does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to coastal States or to other States. 108 Article 59 requires 
that the conflict of interests should be resolved ‘on the basis of equity and in light of all relevant 
circumstances’. One could be tempted to argue that Article 59 would not be applicable to this 
situation, as the list under Article 62(4) is not exhaustive, thus it cannot be said that the 
bunkering of a fishing vessel is not regulated by the Convention. However, the fact that ITLOS 
completely ignored this important article was regrettable. At least, ITLOS should have 
acknowledged the existence of this article and explained why it was inapplicable. This would 
have made their conclusion more nuanced and provided better guidance for future cases.  
In short, ITLOS in Virginia G clarified the scope of coastal States’ ‘sovereign rights’ as 
provided for under Article 56(1) to encompass all measures to not only conserve but also 
manage marine resources in its EEZ. With regard to the scope of coastal States’ regulatory 
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power in the EEZ, it is now clear that in order for the coastal State to regulate an activity under 
their fisheries laws and regulations, such an activity needs not be explicitly mentioned in Article 
62(4). The key requirement is that there is a direct connection between fishing and the activity. 
On this basis, the long-debated question of whether the bunkering of fishing vessels falls within 
the scope of Article 62(4) has been settled in favour of coastal States. In his Dissenting Opinion 
to the Virginia G case, Judge ad hoc Sérvulo Correia acknowledged that the decision of ITLOS 
regarding bunkering of fishing vessel was an ‘important contribution’ and a ‘landmark 
decision’.109 Similarly, Judge Jesus hailed ITLOS’ findings on the bunkering of foreign fishing 
vessels and the confiscation of foreign ships involved in fishing activities as ‘important 
contributions to the development of international of the sea’.110 
ITLOS has adopted a broad understanding of what constitutes fisheries and fisheries-related 
activities, requiring only a direct connection with fishing activities. ITLOS’s interpretation of 
Article 62(4) stood in stark contrast with that of the arbitral tribunal in Gulf of St. Lawrence. In 
this case, the arbitral tribunal held that the coastal State’s sovereign right to manage the living 
resources of the EEZ did not extend to the processing of fish caught in the EEZ.111 Therefore, 
this arbitral tribunal concluded that Article 62(4) UNCLOS did not cover activities 
substantially different from those listed. Arguably, ITLOS’ approach is more desirable for two 
reasons. First, it reflects the nature of the Convention as merely setting up a legal framework 
for activities at sea: it should not be interpreted in a narrow, rigid manner. Second, it placed 
contemporary State fishing practices which were not envisioned by the drafters of the 
Convention, thus not reflected in the wording of UNCLOS, under the regulation of the 
Convention.  
From a broader perspective, ITLOS dealt with a right which was not assigned to coastal 
States nor to flag States under UNCLOS. The fact that ITLOS now placed bunkering of fishing 
vessels under coastal States’ regulation seems to suggest, at first glance, that the balance of 
rights has been tilted in favour of coastal States and that ITLOS has expanded the power of 
coastal States in the EEZ. However, it is worth remembering that ITLOS’ conclusion was based, 
to a large extent, on State practice regarding the activity of bunkering as recorded in subsequent 
international agreements or in States’ national legislations. These show a high level of 
acceptance of coastal States’ power to regulate bunkering of fishing vessels. The fact that 
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ITLOS conclusion reflected State practice indicates that it had not upset the balance of rights 
in the EEZ regime, but merely reaffirming a new balance.  
2. Coastal States’ enforcement power 
In order to enable States to exercise their sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and 
manage the living resources in the EEZ effectively, Article 73(1) allows coastal States to take 
measures ‘as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by 
it in conformity with the Convention’. By virtue of the phrase ‘to ensure compliance with the 
laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with the Convention’, UNCLOS establishes 
that the enforcement power of coastal States under Article 73(1) only extends to laws and 
regulations concerning fisheries-related activities prescribed under Article 62(4). Article 73(1) 
lists several measures, such as boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, which they 
are permitted to take to deal with foreign vessels illegally fishing in the EEZ. Article 73(3), 
however, only prohibits imprisonment and other forms of corporal punishment as penalties for 
violations of fisheries laws and regulations. This leaves open the question as to whether a 
coastal State is allowed to take a measure which is not specified in Article 73(1) but also not 
prohibited under Article 73(3). Confiscation of fishing vessels was one such measure brought 
before ITLOS. The issue of whether coastal State could legitimately confiscate foreign fishing 
vessels to ensure compliance with its fisheries law came up in three cases, namely in Grand 
Prince, Tomimaru and Virginia G. As ITLOS found that it had no jurisdiction in Grand Prince 
and thus did not deal with the issue, 112 the remainder of this part will focus on the latter two. 
In Tomimaru, ITLOS noted that Article 73 of the Convention made no reference to 
confiscation of vessels but that it was aware that many States provided for the confiscation of 
fishing vessels in their legislation relating to the management and conservation of marine living 
resources.113 Although ITLOS did not elaborate on the impact of such State practice on the 
interpretation of Article 73, it went on to say that ‘confiscation of a fishing vessel must not be 
used in such a manner as to upset the balance of the interests of the flag State and of the coastal 
State established in the Convention’.114 This indicated that ITLOS was not against confiscation 
per se, so long as it was done in a manner that was not prejudicial to the rights the flag State, 
including the rights to have recourse to the prompt release procedure under the Convention.115  
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ITLOS was able to consider the compatibility of the confiscation with UNCLOS in more 
detail in Virginia G. In examining whether confiscation of the bunkering vessel was in violation 
of Article 73(1), ITLOS observed that pursuant to this article, coastal States may take such 
measures ‘as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by 
[them] in conformity with this Convention.’116 Accordingly, ITLOS had to establish whether 
(i) the legislation promulgated by Guinea-Bissau with regard to confiscation of vessels in the 
EEZ was in conformity with the Convention and (ii) whether confiscation was necessary to 
ensure the compliance with the law and regulations adopted by the Coastal State.117  
In answering the first question, ITLOS held that a law providing for the confiscation of a 
vessel offering bunkering services to foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ of Guinea-Bissau was 
not per se in violation of article 73(1) of the Convention. Whether or not confiscation was 
justified depended on the facts and circumstances of a given case.118 As for the second question, 
ITLOS determined that Panama had breached the obligation to obtain written authorisation for 
bunkering and to pay the prescribed fee, and that this was ‘a serious violation’.119 However, it 
held that this breach was the result of ‘a misinterpretation of the correspondence’ between the 
fishing vessels and the authorities of Guinea-Bissau. 120  Therefore, ITLOS found that the 
confiscation of the vessel and the gas oil on board ‘was not necessary either to sanction the 
violation committed or to deter the vessels or their operators from repeating this violation’.121  
Arguably, the most crucial term in Article 73(1) that needed clarification was ‘necessary’ 
as this would determine whether confiscation was consistent with UNCLOS. ITLOS, however, 
did not consider what was meant by ‘necessary’ or how to evaluate it. Instead, it only 
determined the gravity of the offence in question then compared it with the penalty imposed by 
the coastal State. This meant that for ITLOS, the necessity test involved balancing between the 
gravity of the offence and the gravity of the sanction. Compared with how the term ‘necessary’ 
has been interpreted by other international courts,122 ITLOS’ application of the requirement of 
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‘necessary’, without setting out objective criteria to assess this requirement, was overly 
simplistic. As Judge Jesus observed, the lack of guidance as to how ‘necessary’ was to be 
interpreted and applied made ITLOS’ interpretation of Article 73(1) ‘arbitrary and 
subjective’, 123  creating serious difficulties for States in enforcing their fisheries laws and 
regulations, especially in the context of growing global concern for the conservation and 
sustainability of fishing resources.124  
ITLOS went on to hold that ‘the principle of reasonableness applies generally to 
enforcement measure under Article 73 of the Convention’ and concluded that the enforcement 
measure against the M/V Virginia G ‘was not reasonable’ in light of the circumstances of the 
case and the gravity of the violation.125 In so doing, ITLOS incorporated the requirement of 
‘reasonableness’ stipulated in Article 73(2) applicable to prompt release proceedings into 
Article 73(1) for a contentious proceeding. ITLOS’ introduction of a test of reasonableness into 
Article 73(1) was flawed as the requirement of reasonableness under Article 73(2) is applicable 
only to a bond to be posted by the flag State after its vessel has been detained by the coastal 
State in order to secure a prompt of its vessel. There seems to be no basis under the Convention 
for ITLOS to transfer the requirement of reasonableness intended for a payment to be made by 
the flag State to an enforcement measure of the coastal State. Moreover, it did not clarify what 
was meant by ‘reasonable’ or how to assess it. In any case, the threshold for the fulfilment of 
the test of reasonableness undoubtedly differs from that of necessity,126 and thus ITLOS erred 
in bringing in the test of ‘reasonableness’ to evaluate the confiscation action by Guinea-Bissau 
in the context of Article 73(1) without any explanation as to why and how this was warranted 
under the Convention.  
ITLOS’ failure to shed light on the term ‘necessary’ under Article 73(1) did not pass 
unnoticed by the individual judges and in fact, the majority of the declarations and separate 
opinions were devoted to scrutinising this term. These individual opinions added the much 
needed clarity that the judgment regrettably did not offer. Judge Paik, for example, argued that 
ITLOS should have considered both the extent to which the measure contributes to the 
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achievement of the objective sought and the degree to which the measure encroaches upon the 
protected rights of other States. In Judge Paik’s view, the greater the contribution and the less 
the encroachment, the more likely the measure will be considered to be necessary.127 This 
approach seems to be in line with the need to balance the rights of coastal States and those of 
flag States in EEZ. In a similar vein, Judge ad hoc Sérvulo Correia argued necessity meant 
when faced with two means ‘both equally suitable and efficient for attaining the end aimed by 
a competent authority, the means equally effective by less onerous or intrusive to other interests 
subordinate but also deserving legal protection, must be chosen’.128  
Judge Jesus followed a different line of argumentation and believed that ITLOS had 
exercised its power in an ultra vires manner. In his opinion, Article 73(1) ‘does not indicate, 
explicitly or implicitly, an exception to the measures that can be taken by the coastal State’ and 
that such exceptions ‘are to be found in paragraph 3’.129 As confiscation was not found in 
paragraph 3, ITLOS had in fact created a third exception to the general policy of paragraph 1.130 
Judge Jesus, however, seems to have misunderstood the majority’s decision. The majority 
expressly held that the confiscation of a vessel was not in itself and in all cases a violation of 
Article 73(1). In the specific context of the case, the measure did not meet the requirement of 
necessity, however that was defined, so it was inconsistent with Article 73(1). Therefore, Judge 
Jesus’ criticism that ITLOS added an extra exception not found under the Convention did not 
hold true, especially given the fact that Article 73(1) does not purport to establish an exhaustive 
list of measures available to coastal States. Adopting a complete opposite view to that of Judge 
Jesus, Judge Ndiyae contended that confiscation should be deemed lawful under Article 73(1) 
in light of the fact that it ‘is a perfectly lawful sanction from the point of view of international 
law and is expressly provided for in the national legislation of many countries’. 131  This 
statement suggested that, in his view, there was no need for any test of necessity, and that the 
measure of confiscation in itself should be permissible under into Article 73(1) in all cases.  
ITLOS’ decisions, particularly the Virginia G case, have shed light on the question of 
whether confiscation of foreign vessels could be taken by coastal States as part of their 
enforcement power under Article 73(1). ITLOS’ conclusion makes clear that Article 73(1) does 
not establish an exhaustive list of enforcement measures, and that coastal States can take 
enforcement measures not listed under this provision, so long as they are ‘necessary’ to ensure 
compliance with their legislation concerning fisheries. Nevertheless, ITLOS failed to provide 
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clear criteria to guide the determination of how a measure would be considered ‘necessary’. 
This arguably leaves the scope of Article 73(1) undefined, thus making it difficult for coastal 
States to grasp the exact extent of the enforcement power granted to them to conserve and 
manage their fisheries resources.  
3. Coastal States’ obligation to promptly release fishing vessels 
Coastal States have the right to arrest a vessel alleged of violating their laws and regulations on 
the exploitation and conservation of living resources under Article 73(1). However, they also 
have the obligation to release the vessel and the crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or 
other security under Article 73(2). Should the coastal State fail to do so, the flag State of the 
detained vessel may bring the question of release from detention pursuant to the prompt release 
proceedings pursuant to Article 292.  
Prompt release proceedings were introduced into UNCLOS with a view to balancing the 
rights of coastal States to take measures to ensure compliance with their fisheries laws and 
regulations on the one hand, and the interests of flag States to prevent their vessel and crew 
from prolonged detention, on the other.132 Coastal States have the discretion to set the bond at 
a level they deem fit in accordance with their respective domestic laws; but Article 73(2) 
requires that the bond must be ‘reasonable’. The term ‘reasonable’ is, however, not defined 
under the Convention, nor is there any indication in the Convention as to how this requirement 
should be applied in practice.133 In fact, this term was intentionally left open as a compromise 
for the diverging opinions expressed during the negotiation of UNCLOS regarding whether 
coastal States or flag States should have jurisdiction to prosecute violations of the coastal 
State’s sovereign rights in the EEZ.134 The founders of UNCLOS thus expected the competent 
courts and tribunals to give concrete content to the reasonableness criterion.135 As all prompt 
release procedures have hitherto been initiated only before ITLOS and prompt release cases 
make up nearly a third of ITLOS case law,136 the Tribunal has managed to develop over the 
years a list of criteria to provide guidance for the determination of ‘reasonable bond’.  
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In M/V Saiga, the first case in which ITLOS assessed the reasonableness of a bond, it stated 
that ‘the criterion of reasonableness encompasses the amount, the nature and the form of the 
bond or financial security. The overall balance of the amount, form and nature of bond or 
financial security must be reasonable’.137 It should be noted that in this case, no bond or other 
financial security was requested by Guinean authorities for the release of the vessel and crew 
nor was any offered by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.138 In such a context, ITLOS found 
that the discharge the gasoil carried by M/V Saiga, taking into account its commercial value, 
were to be considered a security to be held.139 There was no explanation as to how the ‘overall 
balance’ criterion that it had set out would be achieved when only the value of the oil on board 
of the vessel was taken into account. 
In Camouco, ITLOS for the first time provided a list of factors relevant in an assessment of 
the reasonableness of bonds or other financial security.140 In examining whether the bond 
required by French domestic court was reasonable, ITLOS stated that the relevant factors 
included the gravity of the alleged offences, the penalties imposed or imposable under the laws 
of the detaining State, the value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, the amount of 
the bond imposed by the detaining State and its form.141 Compared with Saiga, ITLOS added 
some more criteria to assessing the reasonableness of bond, including those beyond the bond 
itself.142 However, when applying these factors to the case, ITLOS only focused on two factors, 
namely the maximum penalty which could be imposed on the Master of the Camouco, and the 
value of Camouco and of the catch on board. ITLOS then came to conclusion that the bond set 
by the French court was ‘not reasonable’.143 Even though ITLOS drew up a list of factors 
relevant to the assessment of a reasonable bond, it actually did not apply all of these factors to 
the determination of the French bond, nor did it provide any explanation as to why only two 
factors were relevant in practice.  
ITLOS’ conclusion was heavily criticised by several dissenting judges. Judge Anderson 
was of the opinion that the determination of the bond could not depend solely on the monetary 
value of the vessel, its gear, catch or the monetary value of the penalties.144 The gravity of the 
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alleged offence, which was illegal fishing, should have been given more weight given the 
widespread problems of illegal fishing, flags of convenience as well as the problems faced by 
coastal States in ensuring the effective conservation of fish stocks in extensive and remote 
EEZs.145 In this case, while the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR) was applicable in the area in question and the CCAMLR Commission 
had adopted limits and closed seasons for Patagonian Toothfish, the Camouco was reported to 
have caught six tonnes of this stock.146 Therefore, Judge Anderson believed that the setting of 
a high bond and imposition of ‘swingeing penalties’ was particularly necessary to ensure 
effective law enforcement in extensive and remote EEZs.147 Pointing also to the CCAMLR, 
Judge Wolfrum argued that France—as a State party to the CCAMLR—had the obligation to 
take conservation measures stipulated under that Convention, and thus should have 
‘considerable discretion in laying down the content of laws concerning the conservation and 
management of marine living resources in their EEZ and of the corresponding laws on 
enforcement’.148 Coastal States’ discretionary powers ‘limit the powers of the Tribunal on 
deciding whether a bond set by national authorities was reasonable or not’.149 These statements 
showed that conservation and management of the resources occupied a more prominent place 
in the judge’s assessment of ‘reasonable bond’ than in that of the majority.  
The list of factors relevant for the determination of reasonable bond in Camouco was later 
adopted in the Monte Confurco case,150 but ITLOS held that ‘this is by no means a complete 
list of factors. […] the Tribunal did not intend to lay down rigid rules as to the exact weight to 
be attached to each one of them’.151 ITLOS stated instead that the balance of interests emerging 
from Articles 73 and 292 of the Convention provided the guiding criterion in the assessment of 
the reasonableness of the bond.152 In particular, Article 73 strikes a balance between the interest 
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of coastal States to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with their laws and 
regulations and the interest of flag States in securing prompt release of its vessels and their 
crews;153 while Article 292 reconciles the interest of the flag State to have its vessel and crew 
released promptly with the interest of the detaining State to secure appearance in its court of 
the Master and the payment of penalties.154  
Perhaps in response to the dissatisfaction shown by individual judges in the previous cases, 
ITLOS stated that it took note of the general context of unlawful fishing in the region, the threat 
posed by illegal fishing to the future resources and the measures taken under CCAMLR for the 
conservation of toothfish.155 However, in the final judgment, it is difficult to see how the 
‘balance of interests’ and the concerns about illegal fishing were taken note of, nor was it clear 
the extent to which they informed the final decision that ITLOS reached on the amount of the 
bond. In the end, ITLOS took into account the following factors: the range of penalties 
imposable for the alleged offences, which indicated that the offence was ‘grave’ under French 
law,156 the value of the Monte Confurco,157 value of the cargo,158 the value of the fish and of 
the fishing gear seized. 159  In essence, ITLOS adopted a similar approach to Camouco, 
comparing the penalty imposed based on the gravity of the offence on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, the monetary value of the vessel and its catch to determine whether the bond was 
reasonable. Judge Anderson was again critical of ITLOS’ approach, pointing out that Monte 
Confurco was fishing at a time when the parties to the CCAMLR had prohibited all directed 
fishing for toothfish in the relevant area. 160  Based largely on arguments similar to those 
apprehended in his Dissenting Opinion in the Camouco case, he concluded that coastal States 
should be able to fix the bond and the fines imposed on illegal fishing at as high a level as they 
deemed fit to serve as deterrent.161  
ITLOS used the same rhetoric in the subsequent Juno Trader case.162 In determining the 
reasonable bond, ITLOS stated that it took note of the Guinea-Bissau’s concern that IUU fishing 
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in its EEZ has resulted in a serious depletion of its fisheries resources.163 However, as in 
previous cases, it is at all not clear how this concern was taken into account in the deliberation 
of the case. ITLOS was again occupied only with the gravity of the offence by reference to the 
penalties imposed or imposable under the law of the detaining State, placing particular 
emphasis on ‘the need to avoid disproportion between the gravity of the alleged offences and 
the amount of the bond’. 164  Despite the call from the individual judges to consider the 
reasonableness of the bond in the wider context of illegal fishing and the need for deterrence of 
this phenomenon, ITLOS still only looked at the gravity of the bond in isolation from the 
context in which the vessel was seised.  
The Volga case in 2002, for its part, shed light on a different aspect of the bond under Article 
73(2), ie on whether a bond of a non-financial nature was permissible. 165 After detaining Volga 
and its crew, the Australian authorities imposed as condition for the release the Volga and the 
crew, among others, the carriage of a fully operational Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) on 
board.166 Russia maintained such a condition was unreasonable under Article 73(2) of the 
Convention;167 while Australia argued that the carrying of the VMS was necessary in order to 
prevent further illicit fishing once the ship was released,168 and to ensure ‘that the Volga 
complies with Australian law and relevant treaties to which Australia is a party until the 
completion of the domestic legal proceedings’.169 
Similar to previous cases, ITLOS acknowledged international concerns about IUU fishing 
and appreciated the objectives behind the measures taken by States, including the States Parties 
to CCAMLR, to deal with the problem of illegal fishing.170 However, ITLOS held that the 
inclusion of additional non-financial conditions, including a ‘good behaviour bond’ to prevent 
future violations of the laws of a coastal State, would defeat the purpose of Article 73(2) read 
in conjunction with Article 292 of the Convention, which was to provide a mechanism through 
which vessel and crew could be released promptly by posting a security of a financial nature.171 
On a more general point, ITLOS held that the reasonableness of the bond or other security 
should take into account ‘the terms of the bond or security set by the detaining State, having 
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regard to all the circumstances of the particular case’, 172  but this did not include the 
circumstances of the seizure.173  
Several judges not surprisingly expressed disappointment with ITLOS’ repeated disregard 
for the problem of widespread illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, and 
particularly in relation to the Patagonian toothfish in the Southern Ocean, in assessing the 
reasonableness of the bond. Judge ad hoc Shearer and Judge Anderson, the latter while 
applauding ITLOS for having gone further than in previous cases in acknowledging IUU 
problems,174 believed that the imposition of non-financial bond should have been considered 
reasonable in order for coastal States to fulfil their duties under UNCLOS and CCAMLR to 
ensure the conservation of fisheries resources in the EEZ.175 In contrast, Judge Cot, while 
acknowledging Australia’s right to take conservation measures in order to protect a common 
heritage,176 agreed with ITLOS that, in the context of a prompt release case, the bond or 
financial security provided for in Articles 73(2) and 292 was in fact of a purely financial 
nature.177  
Finally, Hoshinmaru could be seen as a turning point in ITLOS’ examination of the 
reasonableness of the bond.178 While still holding that ‘[t]he amount of a bond should be 
proportionate to the gravity of the alleged offence’,179 ITLOS no longer only assessed the 
gravity of offence in isolation from the wider context in which the offence was committed. 
ITLOS noted that the present case was different from cases it had previously dealt with, since 
this case did not involve fishing without a licence. The Hoshinmaru held a valid fishing licence 
and was authorised to be present and to fish in the Russian EEZ. However, it also found that 
between Russia and Japan, there existed a high level of cooperation in respect of fishing 
activities in the area in question, including the establishment of an institutional framework for 
consultations concerning the management and conservation of fish stocks.180  Within such 
cooperative framework, ITLOS was of the view that the offence committed by the Master of 
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the Hoshinmaru could not be considered a minor offence or an offence of a purely technical 
nature. ITLOS stated:  
Monitoring of catches, which requires accurate reporting, is one of the most essential 
means of managing marine living resources. Not only is it the right of the Russian 
Federation to apply and implement such measures but the provisions of article 61, 
paragraph 2, of the Convention should also be taken into consideration to ensure through 
proper conservation and management measures that the maintenance of the living 
resources in the EEZ is not endangered by over-exploitation.181  
In his Separate Opinion, Judge Yanai argued that the Hoshinmaru’s false recording of the 
catch would hardly cause damage to the conservation of salmon and trout resources in the 
Russian EEZ as the amount of salmon and trout caught was within the limits of licence held by 
the Hoshinmaru and these fish stocks were conserved at a high level in the Russian EEZ. Judge 
Yanai, thus felt that this offence was of a ‘low degree of gravity’.182 Judge Yanai’s assessment 
of the issue, however, overlooked the damage that unreported fishing, a part of the IUU 
phenomenon, may cause to coastal States’ conservation efforts.183 The fact that the fish stocks 
in question were not under threat hardly seemed to be a convincing reason for a flag State to 
fish without notifying the coastal State.  
The Hoshinmaru case presented a commendable development in ITLOS’ approach to 
determining a reasonable bond. In previous cases, ITLOS only assessed the gravity of the 
offence based on the penalty prescribed in the relevant domestic legislation and only paid lip-
service to concerns of IUU fishing. In contrast, in this case, ITLOS placed what might at first 
glance seem a minor offence in the wider context of IUU fishing, taking into account the rights 
of coastal States under UNCLOS and the cooperation framework between Russia and Japan to 
conserve and manage living resources in assessing the gravity of the offence. This is an 
extremely important step forward in recognising and reinforcing States’ obligations to combat 
IUU fishing.  
Interim conclusion 
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The clarification of the term ‘reasonable bond’ under Article 73(2) presents one of the most 
significant contributions of ITLOS. As mentioned above, the UNCLOS drafters deliberately 
left the term ‘reasonable bond’, which holds the key to the operation of both Articles 73(2) and 
292, open-ended. The consolidated factors emerging from prompt release judgments have filled 
the void left by the drafters and provided some guidance as to how reasonableness is to be 
determined. ITLOS progressed from setting out general criteria in the first case to elaborating 
on more specific criteria for determining the reasonableness of the bond. The factors that have 
most commonly been taken into account in the determination of reasonable bond include: 
gravity of the alleged offences, imposed or imposable penalties, value of the detained vessel 
and of the cargo seised, amount of the bond imposed by the detaining state and the 
proportionality between the alleged offence and the bond. By drawing up a list of factors 
relevant for the determination of reasonableness while still maintaining that this list is not 
exhaustive, ITLOS has clearly endeavoured to allow for both predictability and flexibility in its 
assessment of reasonableness.184  
On the other hand, while the list may be clear, there still exists a certain level of ambiguity 
when it comes to the application of the abovementioned factors to specific cases. As one scholar 
commented, ‘when all relevant factors have been discussed and applied in a case, the setting of 
the bond itself still resembles as much a deus ex machina as it did during the first case’.185 Even 
though ITLOS made clear in the Monte Confurco case that it did not wish to attach any weight 
to the factors, ITLOS had the tendency to only look at factors that could be quantified,186 paying 
particular attention the gravity of the offence. But ITLOS’ assessment of the gravity of offence 
has been in itself an evolving exercise. In earlier cases, the gravity of the offence was 
determined with reference almost exclusively to the penalty imposed under domestic law; 
whereas in subsequent cases, the broader context of the offence, including States’ international 
commitments and the community interests, started to creep into the examination.  
All prompt release cases brought before ITLOS to date stemmed from allegations of illegal 
fishing. Rothwell and Stephen contended that ITLOS prompt release cases ‘reflect the growth 
in IUU fishing carried out by significant commercial interests which exploit gaps in the 
international legal framework, domestic loopholes, and weak enforcement mechanisms in order 
to take illegal fishing operations in remote parts of the world’s oceans’.187 Yet, it was not until 
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Hoshinmaru that one started to see IUU fishing allegations and coastal States’ corresponding 
obligations to conserve their marine resources at global and regional levels have an impact on 
ITLOS’ decision. If ITLOS continues with this path, viewing coastal State’s international 
commitments to conserve living resources as a relevant factor in assessing ‘reasonable bond’, 
its decisions will arguably be more consistent with the shift under UNCLOS towards 
conservation and management of the marine environment as analysed above.188 Continued 
consideration of the problems posed by illegal fishing activities would also pay heed to the call 
that several individual judges have made in their separate and dissenting opinions for higher 
regards to conservation concerns. Moreover, taking into account coastal States’ rights and 
obligations will also allow ITLOS to better respect the nature of the EEZ. The EEZ regime 
places utmost importance on maintaining the balance of rights and interests of both the coastal 
State and the flag State. ITLOS itself acknowledged that the purpose of Article 73 was to 
identify ‘two interests, the interest of the coastal State to take appropriate measures as may be 
necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it on the one hand 
and the interest of the flag State in securing prompt release of its vessels and their crews from 
detention on the other'.189 However, until Hoshinmaru, the balance seems to have tilted in 
favour of the flag State when ITLOS adopted a restrictive interpretation of the factors to be 
taken into account in determining the reasonableness of the bond. 190 Coastal States’ rights and 
obligation to take measures to conserve and manage living resources in their EEZ under 
UNCLOS as well as regional agreements, such as the CCAMLR, were often treated lightly. 
Several scholars have argued that prompt release is not exactly the appropriate procedure 
to strengthen the legal framework for combating IUU fishing. One contended that as prompt 
release proceedings are geared towards securing speedy release of the vessel and the crew, ie 
ensuring humanitarian considerations within the UNCLOS regime, ‘ITLOS and, more 
specifically, the prompt release mechanism are ineffective at properly addressing the issue of 
regulating IUU fishing’. 191 Other commentators, pointing to the narrow approach that ITLOS 
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has adopted in interpreting a reasonable bond and the inherent jurisdictional limit under Article 
292 which prevents ITLOS from prejudicing to the merits of the case before domestic courts,192 
concluded that ‘it is wishful thinking to expect Herculean efforts by the Tribunal to address the 
general problem of IUU fishing’.193  
However, it appears that such contentions have adopted a rather pessimistic view of ITLOS’ 
power in prompt release cases. Although its jurisdiction is indeed only limited to examining the 
question of release, ITLOS made clear in the Monte Confurco, echoed in Hoshinmaru, that it 
‘is not prevented from examining the facts and circumstances of the case to the extent necessary 
for a proper appreciation of the reasonableness of the bond as set by the Respondent’.194 More 
importantly, the need to maintain the balance of rights of coastal States and flag States in a 
prompt release proceeding, which according to ITLOS provides the guiding principle for the 
assessment of the reasonable bond, requires ITLOS to take into account the obligation that 
UNCLOS imposes on the coastal State to take measures to conserve and manage living 
resources in its EEZ. Considerations of responsible fishing practices can, therefore, enter into 
prompt release procedures through the reasonableness test, without necessarily constituting any 
misuse of the procedure or abuse of the legal process. It would further allow ITLOS to stay true 
to the conservationist approach to marine environment enshrined under UNCLOS. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that since 2007, ITLOS has not received any requests for 
prompt release. This is a great contrast to the first ten years of its existence when the bulk of 
docket consisted prompt release cases. It is not exactly certain why this is the case, but one can 
speculate two reasons. First, the consolidated criteria for determining the bond as established 
in ITLOS case law have provided useful guidance for both coastal States and flag States to deal 
with prompt release cases out of court. Second, prompt release proceedings are initiated by flag 
States or owners of the vessel on behalf of flag States with a view to not only securing a rapid 
release of the vessel but also a lower bond than that set by the detaining State. In earlier cases, 
this was certainly true, but ITLOS is gradually paying more attention to coastal States’ rights 
and obligations to conserve fish stocks in the determination of the bond, and thus showing more 
deference to the bond set by the coastal State. A reasonable argument could be made, thus, that 
the amount of bond and the manner in which ITLOS decides on the bond no longer make 
prompt release proceedings an attractive option for flag States.  
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In conclusion, ITLOS’ decisions on coastal States’ rights and obligations concerning 
fisheries in the EEZ have clarified several provisions under UNCLOS. First, it shed light on the 
scope of coastal States’ regulatory power in the EEZ under Articles 56 and 62(4). Coastal States 
now have the competence to regulate under its fisheries law any activity which has a direct 
connection with fishing. In such a framework, the bunkering of fishing vessels is now firmly 
placed under coastal States’ regulation, ending decades of uncertainty surrounding this 
particular activity. Second, the scope of coastal States’ enforcement power under Article 73(1) 
is also made clearer. Coastal States are permitted to take enforcement measures which are not 
listed under this article, including confiscation of vessels, provided that such measures are 
necessary to ensure compliance with their fisheries laws and regulations. This allows coastal 
States to adopt more stringent measures than those explicitly contained in Article 73(1). Third, 
ITLOS’ prompt release judgments have given important guidance to the interpretation and 
determination of what constitutes a ‘reasonable bond’ under Article 73(2) for the release of 
foreign vessels arrested for illegal fishing activities.  
II.  FLAG STATES’ RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN FISHING ACTIVITIES IN 
THE EEZ 
1. Flag States’ rights in granting nationality to ships  
The determination of the nationality of vessels plays a crucial role in the effective exercise of 
jurisdiction of flag State in both the EEZ and high seas. UNCLOS explicitly deals with this 
issue in Article 91, which provides that ‘[e]very State shall fix the conditions for the grant of 
its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its 
flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist 
a genuine link between the State and the ship’. 
M/V Saiga (No. 2) was the first case, and perhaps the most important case to date, in which 
ITLOS clarified the issue of nationality of vessel as ITLOS’ findings are still followed in 
subsequent cases in which this issue arises. Guinea challenged the legal standing of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines to bring claims regarding the Saiga on the grounds that on the day 
of its arrest, the ship was not validly registered under the flag of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines.195 Evidence showed that on the date of the arrest, the Provisional Certificate of 
Registration issued by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had expired and the Permanent 
Certificate of Registration had not been issued. As a result, Guinea contended that Saiga only 
qualified as a ship without nationality.196 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, on the other hand, 
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argued that when a vessel is registered under its flag ‘it remains so registered until deleted from 
the registry’. It also noted that the conditions and procedures for deletion of ships from its 
Registry are set out in its domestic law, ie the Merchant Shipping Act, and none of these 
procedures was at any time applied to the Saiga.197 
ITLOS held that under Article 91, each State had exclusive jurisdiction over the granting of 
its nationality to ships and thus it was for the flag State to fix the conditions for granting its 
nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory and for the right to fly its flag in 
its domestic law.198 This means that in a dispute concerning the nationality of a ship, it is not 
for the tribunal, nor any other State, to determine the sufficiency of the State’s domestic law 
providing for this matter.  
Turning to the relevant part of Article 91 which requires the existence of a genuine link 
between the vessel and the State, Guinea contended that ‘there was no genuine link between 
the Saiga and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines’, thus Guinea was not bound to recognise the 
Vincentian nationality of the M/V Saiga.199 In response, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
argued that there was nothing under UNCLOS to support the contention that the existence of a 
genuine link between a ship and a State was a necessary precondition for the grant of nationality 
to the ship.200 ITLOS, for its part, first considered whether the absence of a genuine link 
between a flag State and a ship would entitle another State to refuse to recognise the nationality 
of the ship. It found that none of the UNCLOS articles, including Articles 91(1), 92 or 94, 
provided an explicit answer to this question. It then turned to the negotiating history of the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas on the question of nationality—whose approach UNCLOS 
follows—and found that a proposal to include ‘genuine link’ as a criterion not only for the 
attribution of nationality to a ship but also for the recognition by other States of such nationality 
was not adopted.201 More importantly, ITLOS pointed out that Article 94 set out the procedures 
to be followed when ‘a State has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control 
with respect to a ship have not been exercised’; it did not permit a State which discovered 
‘evidence indicating the absence of proper jurisdiction and control by a flag State over a ship 
to refuse to recognize the right of the ship to fly the flag of the flag State’.202 ITLOS, therefore, 
concluded that: 
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[T]he purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a genuine link between 
a ship and its flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag 
State, and not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of 
ships in a flag State may be challenged by other States’.203  
This marked the first time the meaning of the term ‘genuine link’ was clarified. In Virginia G, 
ITLOS recalled the above statement and reaffirmed that the requirement of ‘genuine link’ only 
comes into play ‘once the ship is registered’.204 
ITLOS’ findings on the exclusive power of the State in the granting of vessel nationality 
clarified that the nationality of a ship depends entirely on States’ registration procedures as 
provided in their domestic laws. In other words, compliance with domestic procedures for 
registration was the only criterion that mattered. ITLOS’ exposition of the meaning of ‘genuine 
link’ in Saiga, affirmed and applied in Virginia G, further made clear that this requirement does 
not play a role in determining the nationality of a vessel, but rather in understanding States’ 
duties over vessels flying their flags. 
The question of nationality came up in several prompt release proceedings, because one of 
the conditions for ITLOS to have jurisdiction in this type of proceeding was that the application 
was made by the flag State. In Grand Prince, ITLOS found that under Belize law, the right of 
a fishing vessel to fly the Belizean flag flowed from the act of registration.205  The only 
document issued to the Grand Prince by Belize was the provisional patent of navigation which 
had already expired before the institution of prompt release proceedings and had not been 
extended or replaced by another statutory certificate.206 Even though there was a letter and a 
certification from the International Merchant Marine Registry of Belize which asserted that 
‘despite the expiration of the Patent of navigation and Ship station license, the vessel is still 
considered as registered in Belize’,207 ITLOS was not satisfied that these communications could 
be treated as ‘documents’ within the meaning of Article 91(2) of the Convention.208 Moreover, 
Belize also sent an official communication in to France, which declared that it had de-registered 
the vessel as a punitive measure.209 In the light of the expiration of the provisional patent of 
navigation, and of the de-registration of the Grand Prince, ITLOS concluded that Belize was 
not the flag State of the vessel.210 Grand Prince thus reaffirmed the vital role of domestic 
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registration in determining the nationality of ships. It is the procedures that are provided in 
domestic law that are of legal value, and not administrative acts.  
In Tomimaru, the Tomimaru was confiscated by Russian authorities and one of the 
questions raised was whether confiscation may have an impact on the nationality of a vessel. 
ITLOS held that the nationality of the ship entailed a juridical link between a State and a ship, 
which, in turn, produced a network of mutual rights and obligations. 211  Because of this 
important function of the flag States, ITLOS concluded that confiscation only resulted in a 
change of ownership but the latter did not automatically lead to the change or loss of its flag.212 
ITLOS’ decision again strengthened the exclusive power given to the State in determining the 
nationality of a vessel.  
In conclusion, in dealing with the question of nationality of fishing vessels, ITLOS has 
consistently adopted the approach taken in M/V Saiga (No. 2). The most important factor to be 
taken into consideration is whether the ship has been registered in accordance with domestic 
law providing for ship registration. The requirement of a genuine link between the flag State 
and the ship does not establish a prerequisite or condition to be satisfied for the exercise of the 
right of the flag State to grant its nationality to ships.213 As other States are not entitled to 
challenge any decision to grant nationality based on ‘genuine link’, the ITLOS’ approach grants 
States the sole discretion in granting vessels the right to fly their flags.  
2. Flag States’ obligations over fishing activities in the EEZ 
UNCLOS does not explicitly provide for flag State obligations over fishing vessels operating 
in the EEZ of another State. Article 92 only provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of flag States 
on the high seas. Article 94 entitled ‘Duties of the flag State’, in turn, requires flag States to 
‘effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters 
over ships flying [their] flag’. By virtue of Article 58, the rules on flag State jurisdiction in the 
high seas are also applicable to the EEZ. This means that in the EEZ, flag States have the 
obligation to exercise their jurisdiction and control over ships flying their flag as required under 
Article 94. However, Article 94 only provides for flag States’ jurisdiction over a limited number 
of matters, namely ‘administrative, technical and social matters’. As a result, it is not clear 
whether and to what extent flag States have an obligation under UNCLOS to exercise 
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jurisdiction over their vessels engaged in fishing activities in the EEZ of another State.214 An 
answer to this question is particularly important given the increase in IUU fishing worldwide, 
facilitated by the exploitation of flags of convenience and the unwillingness on the part of flag 
States to exercise control over their vessels.215 
To date, only the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing has addressed this question.216 As 
ITLOS was the first international tribunal to deal with the issue, there was high hope for the 
Tribunal to clarify whether and, if so, how flag States’ obligations with regards to fisheries in 
the EEZ are regulated under UNCLOS.217 As will be shown, the Advisory Opinion helped to 
shed light on these questions. However, the legal basis which it invoked for its answer raised 
questions regarding the interpretive method that ITLOS employed, and from a broader 
perspective, the relationship between UNCLOS and other fisheries agreements. 
2.1.  The Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing 
The request for the Advisory Opinion was brought by the Sub-Regional Fisheries 
Commission (SRFC) on the basis of the Convention on the Determination of the Minimal 
Conditions for Access and Exploitation of Marine Resources within the Maritime Areas under 
Jurisdiction of the Member States of the SRFC (MCA Convention). The SRFC presented four 
questions to ITLOS, among which, the first questions concerned the ‘obligations of the flag 
State in cases where IUU fishing activities are conducted within the EEZ of third party 
States’.218 As the SRFC Member States explained, this question was triggered by the difficulties 
that they had encountered in securing the cooperation of flag States when the latter’s vessels, 
which were involved in an offence, escaped the former’s control. The SFRC thus sought a 
clarification on the nature and content of flag States’ obligation under Article 94, and on 
whether a flag State could be held responsible for illegal fishing activities committed by a vessel 
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flying its flag.219 As the MCA Convention only addresses matters relating to access to fisheries 
resources for fishing vessels belonging to non-Member States within the EEZ of the SRFC 
Member States,220 ITLOS did not examine the obligations of flag States and coastal States in a 
general manner. Instead it narrowed the scope of the question to ‘obligations of flag States not 
parties to the MCA Convention in cases where vessels flying their flag are engaged in IUU 
fishing within the EEZ of the SRFC Member States’.221 
ITLOS acknowledged that the issue of flag State responsibility for IUU fishing activities 
was not directly addressed in UNCLOS. However, it stated that the framework within which 
this question was to be examined was provided by the Convention. This framework consisted 
of two layers of obligations: first, general obligations concerning the conservation and 
management of marine living resources in Articles 91, 92, 94 as well as Articles 192 and 193; 
and second, specific obligations of the flag State in the EEZ of the coastal State.222 
With regard to the general obligations, Article 91 provides for the nationality of ships, 
Article 92 confirms the exclusive jurisdiction of flag State and Article 94(2) specifies the 
matters over which the flag State effectively exercises its jurisdiction as set out above. Even 
though none of these articles mention fishing activities, ITLOS interpreted the words ‘in 
particular’ contained in Article 94(2) to mean that ‘the list of measures that are to be taken by 
the flag State to ensure effective exercise of its jurisdiction and control over ships flying its flag 
in is only indicative, not exhaustive’.223 As a result, ITLOS held that the flag State, in fulfilment 
of its responsibility to exercise effective jurisdiction and control in administrative matters, 
‘must adopt the necessary administrative measures to ensure that fishing vessels flying its flag 
are not involved in activities which will undermine the flag State’s responsibilities under the 
Convention in respect of the conservation and management of marine living resources’.224 
ITLOS thus used the term ‘administrative measures’ as an anchor to interpret the scope of flag 
State duties under Article 94(2)(b) to include obligations over fishing vessels engaged in IUU 
fishing.  
Was ITLOS right to read Article 94(2)(b) so expansively as to include a flag State obligation 
to ensure that its vessels do not engage in IUU fishing? The Virginia Commentary interpreted 
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the matters provided in Article 94(2)(b) as those which are ‘not so much matters concerning 
“the ship” as concerning the activities of the ship, or more accurately, the person on board’.225 
On the other hand, the wording of this paragraph specifically stipulates jurisdiction ‘in respect 
of administrative, technical and social matters concerning the ship’. As this provision only 
refers to administrative matters concerning the ship itself, it arguably does not include flag State 
obligations over activities conducted by the ship, such as fishing. This argument is supported 
by the scope of sub-paragraph (a) of Article 94(2), which deals only with the particulars of the 
ship itself. The content of the article, thus, does not suggest such a broad reach of flag State 
obligation under the provision. From a policy point of view, a broad reach of Article 94(2)(b) 
is certainly desirable to secure a higher level of fisheries protection. However, given the 
different ways in which this proviso may be interpreted, it would have been more desirable if 
ITLOS had explained the basis on which the wording of Article 94(2)(b) could extend to fishing 
activities.  
ITLOS further supported its findings on flag State jurisdiction by invoking Article 192 
which provides for an obligation on all States to protect and preserve the marine environment.226 
Recalling the statement made in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Order that ‘the conservation of 
living resources of the sea was an element in the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment’,227 ITLOS held that flag States were under an obligation to ensure compliance by 
vessels flying their flags with the relevant conservation measures concerning living resources 
enacted by the coastal State for its EEZ.228  
Turning to specific obligations of flag States in the EEZ, ITLOS held that a reading of 
Article 58(3) together with Article 62(4) suggested that flag States were obliged to take 
necessary measures to ensure that their nationals and vessels flying their flag do not engage in 
IUU fishing activities.229 It is not at all clear how ITLOS reached this conclusion, as it merely 
recited the wording of these two articles without providing any actual analysis. 230  Some 
commentators have argued that ITLOS had adopted too narrow of an approach to interpreting 
these two articles, and that they could not form the basis for flag State obligations concerning 
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fishing activities. One author argues that, first, Article 58(3) UNCLOS applies only to 
situations in which flag States are ‘exercising their rights and performing their duties under this 
Convention in the EEZ’, which include only the rights and duties that are clearly defined in the 
first two paragraphs of Article 58. These two paragraphs, in turn, only provide for the 
application of high seas freedoms to the EEZ, which do not include the freedom of fishing in 
EEZ.231 Moreover, the wording of Article 62(4), which requires ‘nationals of other states 
fishing in the EEZ’ to comply with coastal State’s laws, does not confer an obligation on flag 
States but the State of the individuals on board of the vessel.232  
ITLOS’s cursory examination of the matter clearly did not address these concerns. It is not 
difficult, in any case to see that these arguments confuse flag States’ right to exploit living 
resources in the EZZ with flag States’ obligation over their vessels fishing in the EEZ. Although 
it is true that flag States do not enjoy the freedom of fishing in the EEZ, Article 58(2) makes 
clear that the rules pertaining to flag State exercise of jurisdiction over vessels in the high seas 
are applicable to the EEZ. Second, a reading of Article 62(4) as referring only to nationals on 
the ship overlooks the holding of ITLOS in M/V Saiga (No. 2) that ‘the ship, everything on it, 
and every person involved or interested in its operations are treated as an entity linked to the 
flag State’.233 Article 62(4), therefore, should be more properly read as a further confirmation 
of the obligation placed upon the flag State to comply with the coastal State’s fisheries law and 
regulations. 
Based on an examination of flag States’ general and specific obligations under UNCLOS, 
ITLOS concluded that flag States had an ‘obligation to ensure’ that vessels flying their flag do 
not conduct IUU fishing activities within the EEZ of the SRFC Member States.234 This was not 
the first time the ‘obligation to ensure’ appeared in ITLOS’ case law. The SDC had already 
expounded on the meaning and nature of this obligation in the Advisory Opinion on Activities 
in the Area.235 Following the approach of that Advisory Opinion, ITLOS also interpreted the 
‘obligation to ensure’ to be an obligation of due diligence and noted that: 
[T]he Convention is the key instrument which provides guidance regarding the content 
of the measures that need to be taken by the flag State in order to ensure compliance 
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with the ‘due diligence’ obligation to prevent IUU fishing by vessels flying its flag in 
the EEZs of the SRFC Member States.236  
On that basis, ITLOS specified that flag States had wide-ranging obligations, including the 
obligation to take necessary measures which comprises enforcement measures, to ensure 
compliance by vessels flying their flags with the laws and regulations adopted by the SRFC 
Member States;237 to adopt the necessary measures prohibiting their vessels from fishing in the 
EEZs of the SRFC Member States, unless so authorised by the SRFC Member States;238 to take 
the necessary measures to ensure that vessels flying their flag comply with the protection and 
preservation measures adopted by the SRFC Member States;239 to exercise effectively their 
jurisdiction and control in administrative matters over fishing vessels flying its flag, by 
ensuring, in particular, that such vessels are properly marked; 240  to include enforcement 
mechanisms to monitor and secure compliance with these laws and regulations.  
It is noteworthy that in relation to the obligation to include enforcement mechanisms as 
part of the due diligence obligation, ITLOS’ held that ‘sanctions applicable to involvement in 
IUU fishing activities must be sufficient to deter violations and to deprive offenders of the 
benefits accruing from their IUU fishing activities’.241 This stood in stark contrast with its 
earlier prompt release decisions on the reasonableness of the bond. To recall, in these prompt 
release decisions, ITLOS paid scant attention to coastal States’ emphasis on the deterrent 
purpose of high bonds. It will be interesting to see whether and how this holding will affect the 
consideration of reasonableness in prompt release proceedings should there be another one in 
the coming time. 
2.2. An appraisal of the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing  
The findings of ITLOS in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing made important contributions 
to clarifying the legal basis for flag States’ obligations concerning illegal fishing activities. 
First, ITLOS made clear that although the primary obligation to prevent IUU fishing rests with 
coastal States, this did not relieve flag States from the obligation to exercise due diligence over 
their vessels. Coastal States and flag States have concurrent obligations to prevent illegal 
fishing in the EEZ.  
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Second, the contours of the due diligence obligation were elucidated to a more detailed 
extent. ITLOS not only read into Articles 58(3) and 62(4) an obligation of due diligence on the 
part of flag States over their fishing vessels operating in the EEZ of other States, it also specified 
the content of this obligation and identified concrete obligations to be taken with in dealing 
with IUU fishing. This will arguably give more teeth to the Convention, requiring flag States 
to adopt more stringent measures in the fight against IUU fishing. It has been argued that the 
Advisory Opinion did not go far enough in clarifying the measures that must be taken to satisfy 
the due diligence obligation,242 leaving the content of the due diligence obligation open-ended, 
to be filled in through future practice and litigation. A closer look at the Advisory Opinion, 
however, shows that ITLOS did specify the obligations which flag States have to fulfil in order 
to satisfy the due diligence obligation.243 Even though the obligations and measures that ITLOS 
spelled out may still seem to be general, they at least provide a minimum standard and a 
yardstick to assess whether the due diligence obligation has been met. This is especially 
important given the fact that, in contrast to other areas such as marine pollution and sea safety, 
there are no globally agreed minimum standards of flag State responsibilities in the fishing 
sector.244 What is clear is that flag States now bear the burden of proof to show that they have 
taken the measures specified in the Advisory Opinion in order to discharge of their obligation 
to ensure over their fishing vessels. Whether or not a flag State can be considered to have 
satisfactorily implemented the measures specified would have to be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis taking into account the particular circumstances of the case. In the context of an advisory 
proceeding, it would have been impossible for ITLOS to go into much more detail. 
Third, even though ITLOS attempted to limit its answer to a specific group of flag States, 
ie States whose vessels were fishing in the EEZ of the SRFC Member States, there was no such 
spatial limit in the eventual answer that it provided. ITLOS based its interpretation of the 
‘obligations to ensure’ entirely on UNCLOS provisions, thus there is nothing in the Advisory 
Opinion that restricts the ‘obligation to ensure’ to flag States operating the waters of SRFC 
State Members. This means that the Advisory Opinion could have a much more general 
application than ITLOS made out to be; indeed it could be applicable to any other flag State 
whose vessels are engaged in fishing activities in any other States’ EEZ. What is more, as 
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Articles 94 and 192 are applicable to all maritime zone, flag States would also have to exercise 
due diligence with regard to fisheries in the high seas. The broad application of the Advisory 
Opinion on flag States obligations to areas beyond the EEZ may raise problems from a 
jurisdictional point of view,245 however it contributes to addressing the weaknesses that exist 
under UNCLOS relating to flag State jurisdiction in the high seas.246  
Finally, it is worth recalling that in earlier prompt release cases, ITLOS only paid scant 
attention to the obligations to conserve marine living resources for coastal States, much less for 
flag States. Even though in more recent prompt release cases, ITLOS started to take note of 
coastal States’ obligations with regards to the conservation and management of living resources 
in the EEZ, flag States’ obligations in this regard were not mentioned at all. The Advisory 
Opinion shows a welcome development in ITLOS case law and it is arguably much more in 
line with the broader emphasis that UNCLOS places on all States to protect the marine 
environment, including conserving marine living resources. The conclusion in the Advisory 
Opinion may well have a significant impact on the balancing exercise that ITLOS is to carry 
out in future prompt release cases.  
Notwithstanding the abovementioned important contributions, a close examination of the 
Advisory Opinion reveals a significant drawback in the interpretation method that ITLOS 
adopted. In clarifying the scope of flag State obligation over its vessels, ITLOS restricted itself 
to relying solely on the wording of UNCLOS provisions. It did not resort to any other means 
of treaty interpretation as stipulated under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).247 In particular, it did not make any reference to the ordinary meaning of the 
terms, nor the object, purpose or context of the provisions in which flag States’ obligations over 
IUU fishing were located. The UNCLOS Preamble, for example, makes clear that one of the 
objectives of the Convention is to ‘facilitate […] the conservation of the living resources and 
the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment’. ITLOS could have referred 
to this objective to support its decision to read the flag State obligation to ensure into the 
Convention in line with this conservationist spirit.  
More importantly, even though ITLOS insisted that the provisions of UNCLOS provided 
the basis for flag State obligations as enumerated in the Advisory Opinion, it is difficult to see 
how this was the case for all of these obligations. For instance, ITLOS held that flag States had 
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the obligation to include enforcement mechanisms to monitor and secure compliance with the 
coastal State’s laws and regulations, including the imposition of sanctions. However, nowhere 
in Article 58(3), 62(4), 192 or 193 of UNCLOS can one find any reference to or indication of 
enforcement mechanisms or sanctions. The requirement to put in place such mechanisms is 
instead found under Article 19(2) of the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the Convention relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks—commonly known as the United Nations Fish 
Stocks Agreement (UNFSA).248 Similarly, the obligation to ensure that vessels are properly 
marked finds no basis under UNCLOS, but rather under Article 18(3)(d) UNFSA. Therefore, 
ITLOS’ statement that UNCLOS provided the framework for flag State obligations did not hold 
true. Thus, instead of feigning that it was relying solely on UNCLOS to answer the advisory 
request, ITLOS should have acknowledged the relevance of other fisheries agreements and 
provided some explanation as to why and how these agreements were relevant to the 
interpretation of the ‘obligation to ensure’ under UNCLOS. 
In any case, even if ITLOS had genuinely intended to use UNCLOS as the grounds for its 
findings on flag States’ obligations over illegal fishing activities conducted by their vessels, it 
is argued that UNCLOS itself was both too broad and too narrow to serve as the basis for 
ITLOS’ answer to the SRFC’s question.  
On the one hand, the reliance on UNCLOS was too broad in light of the fact that ITLOS 
took pains at the outset of the Advisory Opinion to affirm that the question and the answer 
provided only related to ‘obligations of flag States not parties to the MCA Convention in cases 
where vessels flying their flag are engaged in IUU fishing within the EEZ of SRFC Member 
States’.249 In other words, ITLOS intended to limit the scope of the Advisory Opinion to a 
specified group of States in a specific area. However, as mentioned above, the answer provided 
betrayed this intention. Although fishing activities in the area under scrutiny, ie the EEZ of 
SRFC Member States, are regulated under the MCA as well as bilateral agreements between 
several SRFC Member States, the specific obligations contained in these instruments did not 
play any significant role in ITLOS’ consideration. Although ITLOS did briefly mention both 
the MCA Convention and bilateral fisheries access agreements concluded by the SRFC 
Member States, 250  it is not entirely clear whether or how these two instruments had any 
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substantive influence ITLOS’ findings. The flag State obligations were instead all based on 
UNCLOS. In the end, there were no spatial or normative limits in ITLOS’s final findings to 
show that the answers provided are only applicable to SRFC Member States in the context of 
the MCA Convention.251  
On the other hand, ITLOS’s reliance only on UNCLOS was too narrow in that it failed to 
take into account the developments in the law on fisheries that have taken place since UNCLOS 
was concluded in 1982. UNCLOS only establishes a framework to regulate flag State 
jurisdiction which does not sufficiently address all issues, including flag State obligation over 
fishing vessels engaged in illegal fishing. ITLOS itself admitted as much.252 Instead, the law on 
fisheries and specifically the rules on coastal States and flag States obligations over fishing 
vessels and fish stocks in both the EEZ and the high seas, have been developed to a large extent 
by post-UNCLOS instruments. In order to tackle the issue of ineffective flag State control over 
fishing vessels, several fisheries instruments have been put in place, including the Agreement 
to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas (the Compliance Agreement),253 the 1995 UNFSA, and a series of 
soft law instruments developed under the auspices of the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO), most importantly the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing.254 However, as was evident, ITLOS made no 
mention of these subsequent fisheries agreements in the Advisory Opinion in the process of 
interpreting UNCLOS provisions relating to flag States’ obligations over their fishing vessels.  
One explanation for ITLOS’ reluctance to expressly refer to the abovementioned 
subsequent agreements is that they are either non-binding documents or if they are binding, 
such the Compliance Agreement or the UNFSA, not all SRFC Member States are parties to 
these instruments.255 The imposition of obligations found under these agreements on States 
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parties to UNCLOS may thus raise objection as it violates the fundamental rule of international 
treaty law, the pacta tertiis rule. However, instead of pretending that they were of no relevance 
to the interpretation exercise that it was conducting, it would have been more transparent if 
ITLOS had considered employing and explaining the interpretative techniques which would 
allow it to better account for the development that it had brought about under UNCLOS.  
Judge Paik, in his Separate Opinion, proposed the use of ‘the rule of reference’ in order to 
take into account the UNFSA as well as other bilateral fisheries agreements in the interpretation 
of flag States’ obligations under UNCLOS. This rule, he argued, was already employed in the 
Convention, particularly in Part XII of UNCLOS and in Article 94(5) in regard to the exercise 
of flag State duties to ensure safety at sea.256 According to this rule, UNCLOS ‘first formulates 
a general duty, and then refers to and incorporates those rules or standards developed in other 
legal instruments into its ambit’ and these rules and standards will ‘give specific content to the 
general duty enunciated by the Convention’.257 The rule of reference can thus be employed to 
‘give effective content to the general yet rather vague obligations of the flag State in respect of 
IUU fishing’,258 and ‘to impose legal obligations on a State to apply certain rules and standards 
which it would otherwise not have been legally bound to apply’.259  
The ‘rule of reference’ that Judge Paik proposed has merits to the extent that, unlike the 
Advisory Opinion which completely failed to mention any subsequent fisheries agreements, it 
provided the basis for the incorporation of the rules contained in non-UNCLOS instruments to 
clarify the content of the obligations imposed on flag States under UNCLOS. This ‘rule of the 
reference’ approach is, however, not without problem. UNCLOS provides for the rule of 
reference in only few specific cases, mostly relating to marine pollution. The rules, standards 
and procedures to which the relevant UNCLOS provisions make reference are those which are 
implied or widely accepted by States.260 Therefore, although they are not mentioned explicitly 
in the Convention, States parties to UNCLOS have given their consent to incorporate these 
rules into the Convention and thus implicitly agreed to be bound by them. The fact that the 
Convention does not include the rule of reference for flag State obligations over illegal fishing, 
while expressly providing for them in other specific cases, weighs strongly against Judge Paik’s 
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approach. This is especially so, given that the Convention was very carefully negotiated to 
ensure the balance of rights of both coastal and flag States in the EEZ. The use of analogy to 
extend the rule of reference to flag State obligations in the field of IUU fishing activities may 
upset this balance in the Convention.  
It is instead argued that ITLOS could have considered the rules of treaty interpretation 
provided for under Article 31 of VCLT, in particular addressing whether post-UNCLOS 
fisheries instruments could be referred to on the basis of Article 31(3) of the VCLT to shed 
light on flag States’ obligations under UNCLOS.261  
Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 31(3) provide respectively that subsequent agreements 
and subsequent practice which establish the agreement of the parties regarding a treaty’s 
interpretation should be taken into account. While different in form, ie agreement and practice, 
courts and tribunals do not always draw a sharp distinction between subsequent agreement and 
subsequent practice, 262  leading the International Law Commission (ILC) to coin them 
collectively as ‘subsequent conduct’. Whatever its form, therefore, the key point of the two 
paragraphs is that the subsequent conduct must establish the agreement or common 
understanding between the parties regarding the interpretation and/or application of the treaty 
under scrutiny.  
Taking the aforementioned approach, without dwelling on the distinction between (a) 
and (b), the question is whether the UNFSA, the Compliance Agreement and other non-binding 
soft law fisheries instruments qualify as subsequent conduct for the purposes of interpreting 
UNCLOS? Article III, the core of the Compliance Agreement, specifies that flag States are 
responsible for vessels flying their flags, no high sea fishing should be take place without prior 
authorisation of the flag State, and no authorisation shall be given unless the flag State is able 
to exercise effective responsibilities.263 The UNFSA is, as its name makes clear, an ‘Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
																																																								
261 In order to interpret a treaty, Article 31(3) provides that: There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
262 Georg Nolte (ed), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (OUP 2013) 173; Irina Buga, ‘Between Stability and 
Change in the Law of the Sea Convention: Subsequent Practice, Treaty Modification, and Regime Interaction’ in 
Donald Rothwell et al (n 217) 49 (in which she argues that ‘the distinction between subsequent agreement and 
subsequent practice is a fluid one’.  
263 Erik J Molenaar, ‘Current Legal and Institutional Issues Relating to the Conservation and Management of High-
Seas Deep-Sea Fisheries’ (FAO Report for the FAO Expert Consultation on Deep Sea Fisheries in the High Seas) 
<http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/010/a1341e/a1341e02c.pdf> accessed 25 September 2018.  
56 
 
Sea’ which specifies on the fundamental obligation specified under UNCLOS to conserve and 
manage straddling stocks and highly migratory species. It elaborates at great length the duties 
of the flag State and makes more stringent the obligation of flag States to exercise control over 
vessels flying their flags in the high seas. Admittedly, the obligations imposed on flag States 
whose vessels are fishing in the high seas cannot be automatically transferred and imposed on 
flag States whose vessels are fishing in the EEZ, due to the concurrent coastal States’ sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ. However, ITLOS had already recognised that, by virtue of 
Article 58(2), flag State duties in the high seas are applicable to the EEZ insofar as they are not 
incompatible with coastal State obligations. The flag States’ obligations contained under the 
Compliance Agreement and the UNFSA, therefore, can provide guidance for the interpretation 
of flag States’ obligations over fishing vessels in the EEZ. As a result, an argument could be 
made that these instruments should be considered as a subsequent agreement for the purposes 
of interpreting UNCLOS, particularly its Articles 63, 64 and 116 to 119.  
Admittedly, such a categorisation encounters several potential issues. First, the UNFSA 
does not only give concrete content to otherwise general obligations under UNCLOS, it also 
introduces new principles and concepts that are not found under the Convention.264  With 
particular regard to flag States’ obligations over vessels flying their flags, the UNFSA expands 
under Article 18 the scope of obligations found under Article 94(1) of UNCLOS. Due to these 
novel elements, some have even argued that the UNFSA has undermined the basic principles 
of UNCLOS,265 while others contend that the UNFSA has modified—not merely interpreted 
UNCLOS.266 On the other hand, the dividing line between interpretation and modification is 
often ‘difficult, if not impossible to fix’.267  The ILC has also recognised that subsequent 
conduct could be to ‘result in narrowing, widening, or otherwise determining the range of 
possible interpretations’. This means that the fact that the UNFSA and other fisheries 
agreements may have constituted a modification of UNCLOS does not necessarily exclude 
them from having a role in the interpretation of the Convention in accordance with Article 
31(3).  
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Secondly, even if one were to adopt a loose understand of ‘interpretation’, 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) require the subsequent conduct to be ‘between the parties’. Here, the 
distinction between the two paragraphs may be of some importance. In relation to paragraph 
(a), not all parties to UNCLOS are parties to the UNFSA or the Compliance Agreement.268 The 
ICJ made clear in Whaling that the consent of all the parties involved to a subsequent instrument 
played a key role in determining whether an instrument constituted subsequent agreements 
within the meaning of subparagraph (a).269 In a recent ILC draft conclusion on ‘Subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties’, the Chairman 
of the Drafting Committee also explained that even though the ILC opted not to include the 
word ‘all’ before ‘the parties’, the agreement of all parties is required under subparagraph (a).270 
In the same vein, Boyle argued that ‘whether another treaty is regarded as an agreement on 
interpretation of UNCLOS […] the level of participation cannot be ignored’. 271  All the 
aforementioned fisheries agreements, therefore, may not strictly qualify as ‘subsequent 
agreements’ under Article 31(3)(a) given the SRFC Member States’ uneven subscription to 
UNCLOS and to UNFSA or the Compliance Agreement.  
When it comes to subparagraph (b), the requirement seems to be that not all States need 
to be engaged in the practice, so long as they are aware and acquiesce to it, to the extent that 
there is a common understanding between all parties regarding the application of the treaty.272 
The UNFSA came into being to address, inter alias, flag States’ lack of effective exercise over 
their vessels and the loopholes in the Convention regarding this issue. It is a global fisheries 
treaty which was negotiated and adopted by consensus, including by major distant water and 
coastal fishing states. 273 In a study on the non-participation of UNCLOS States parties in the 
UNFSA, one commentator suggested four reasons why a number of States have not become 
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parties to the UNFSA, none of which pertain to objections to flag States’ obligations over 
fishing vessels.274 This shows that the flag States obligations under UNFSA, reiterating those 
under the Compliance Agreement and echoed under other non-binding instruments, could be 
understood to represent the common understanding of flag States obligations over fishing 
vessels which are not clearly stipulated under UNCLOS.  
Furthermore, it is worth recalling that ITLOS has in fact referred to subsequent 
agreements, including the UNFSA and other non-binding fisheries agreements, in order to 
elucidate various UNCLOS provisions. For example, ITLOS in interpreting the requirement of 
‘genuine link’ under Article 91(1) took note of several international agreements such as the 
United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, the UNFSA, the 
Compliance Agreement,275 even though these agreements were not in force at the time.276 
ITLOS also resorted to a series of post-UNCLOS fisheries agreements in Virginia G in the 
interpretation and application of Articles 56 and 62(4). 277 Many of these agreements had not at 
the time entered into force or were regional agreements, thus they were not binding on all State 
parties to UNCLOS and the parties to the case. As ITLOS did not specify the grounds for relying 
on these instruments, it is not clear whether such reference was based on Article 31(3) and if 
so, whether ITLOS was forsaking the requirement of ‘all parties’.  
In a similar vein, ITLOS has also resorted to subsequent practice in interpreting various 
provisions under UNCLOS. In Virginia G, in interpreting the scope of the measures which 
coastal States may take in its EEZ to conserve and manage its living resources under Articles 
56 and 62(4) of the Convention, ITLOS sought guidance in ‘national legislation of several 
States, not only in the West African region, but also in some other regions of the world’, adding 
that ‘there is no manifest objection to such legislation and that it is, in general, complied 
with.’278 In M/V Saiga (No. 2), ITLOS also implicitly referred to subsequent practice in an 
earlier case when interpreting the principles of law enforcement at sea, without again 
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acknowledging this.279 The Annex VII arbitral tribunal in South China Sea was more explicit 
in acknowledging the relevance of subsequent practice pursuant to Article 31(3)(b) in 
interpreting Article 121(3) UNCLOS. Nevertheless, even then, the tribunal also did not engage 
in a detailed examination of this subparagraph. After stating that the threshold at which 
subsequent practice would come into the ambit of Article 31(1)(b) was ‘high’,280 it simply 
concluded that State practice on the interpretation of Article 121(3) did not differ from that 
adopted by the tribunal based on the interpretative canon found in Article 31(1) VCLT. There 
was no exposition of whose practice or what kind of practice was at stake. The tribunal appeared 
to use subsequent practice in this case to confirm an interpretation previously reached, thus 
much more in the sense of a supplementary means of interpretation as stipulated under Article 
32 VCLT.281 
The preceding discussion shows that UNCLOS tribunals have not been reluctant to resort 
to subsequent conduct in previous cases to interpret various provisions under UNCLOS, 
without referring to Article 31(3) VCLT or providing a clear explanation of the interpretative 
technique used. ITLO—perhaps not uniquely—also did not specify whether the certain acts 
were considered subsequent agreements or subsequent practice under subparagraph (a) and (b). 
Furthermore, ITLOS paid little attention to the fact that the subsequent agreements it cited were 
not binding on the parties to UNCLOS nor the parties to the case when using them to interpret 
the Convention. The fact that the eventual interpretation adopted in these cases was based on a 
combination of both international agreements and domestic legislation shows that in cases in 
which the interpretative value of subsequent agreements may not be immediately clear—as the 
case of the Compliance Agreement or UNFSA above—ITLOS has strengthened the cogency 
of its interpretation by further examining State practice relating to the issue at hand. It would 
have been desirable if ITLOS in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing had attempted to 
acknowledge subsequent agreements and practice in the same manner in interpreting flag States 
obligations. 
Alternatively, ITLOS could have examined whether Article 31(3)(c) could be used to read 
into UNCLOS flag States obligations found under other fisheries agreement. Article 31(3)(c) 
essentially provides for what the ILC terms as the principle of systemic integration in treaty 
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interpretation, in order to avoid treaties from being interpreted and applied in a vacuum, 
detached from the rest of the corpus of international law. Indeed, the ICJ has acknowledged in 
several cases that treaties are to be ‘interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’.282 Thus Article 31(3)(c) has been used 
by various courts and tribunals as a tool to resort to external rules in order to interpret certain 
terms or provisions in a particular convention.283 Following the same logic, it can be argued 
that flag States obligations over fishing vessels under UNCLOS cannot and should not be 
interpreted in isolation, without regard to relevant rules on the matter.  
The application of this subparagraph (c) turns on the question as to what could be considered 
‘relevant rules’ for the purposes of shedding light on a particular Convention? Case law seems 
to point to, with most authors in agreement, ‘rules’ as encompassing primary sources of law, 
including treaties, customary law and general principles of international law.284 While it could 
be argued that flag States’ exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying their flags is a rule of 
customary international law, the flag States’ obligations listed under UNFSA have not achieved 
this status, as Judge Paik acknowledged himself, 285  nor can they be regarded as general 
principles of international law. When external rules are in the form of international conventions, 
the same problem as in the case of subparagraph (a) and (b) resurfaces, ie whether all the parties 
to UNCLOS must also be parties to external conventions for interpretative purposes. Such a 
requirement would seem to severely restrict the applicability of subparagraph (c) as it is difficult 
to imagine a situation in which the membership of two multilateral conventions is exactly the 
same, so as to allow one to be a relevant rule to interpret the other. MacLachlan acknowledged 
that this understanding ‘precludes reference to treaties which represent the most important 
elaboration of the content of international law on a specialist subject matter’.286 Fisheries 
agreements are arguably specialist agreements in this sense. In any case, however, international 
courts and tribunals, when invoking Article 31(3)(c), did not seem to have adopted a stringent 
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threshold in regard of the parties requirement, as in some cases, they even referred to treaties 
to which only one of the disputing parties was party.287  
In the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, the reference to subsequent fisheries agreements 
would not necessarily mean that ITLOS was seeking to impose additional obligations on the 
SRFC Member or UNCLOS Member States in general. ITLOS’ finding that an obligation to 
ensure on the part of flag States can be read from the existing obligations under UNCLOS was 
not unreasonable. The resort to other fisheries agreements would come into play only to shed 
light on the contours of that obligation. Thus resort to those instruments should be more 
properly viewed as the interpretation of the flag State obligations under UNCLOS in light of 
the development of the rules on flag States’ obligations which has taken place since the adoption 
of UNCLOS, and which embodies the common understanding of flag States obligations by a 
large number of States. This approach is both in line with the object and purpose of UNCLOS, 
the framework nature of the Convention and the rules on treaty interpretation under the VCLT, 
and as one commentator observed, in the particular case of the WTO AB, in doing so ‘the 
tribunal is using other treaties not so much as sources of binding law, but as a rather elaborate 
dictionary.’288 
 In sum, ITLOS established that while coastal States are entitled take enforcement 
measures against foreign vessels fishing in their EEZ, flag States also bear the obligation to 
ensure that their vessels do not engage in IUU fishing in the EEZ of another State. This 
‘obligation to ensure’ is an obligation of due diligence requiring a hosts measures on the part 
of flag States. While there are arguably flaws in the method that ITLOS employed to reach the 
above conclusion, its answer provided an important development in the law on fisheries, 
particularly when UNCLOS itself is silent on this issue.  
III.  COASTAL STATES’ RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OVER 
TRANSBOUNDARY FISH STOCKS 
Articles 63 and 64 UNCLOS specify the obligations imposed on coastal States with regard to 
straddling stocks and migratory species respectively. To date, the rights and obligations of 
coastal States in the conservation and management of transboundary stocks were at issue in two 
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instances, namely the Southern Bluefin Tuna provisional measure case and the Advisory 
Opinion on IUU Fishing.289  
The Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitration concerned Japan’s unilateral experimental fishing of 
the southern bluefin tuna (SBT)—a highly migratory species under UNCLOS Annex I. 
However, as the Annex VII arbitral tribunal constituted to hear the cases decided that it did not 
have jurisdiction, the substance of Articles 64, 116(b) and 119(3) of UNCLOS, which are 
important provisions underpinning the regime for conservation and management of highly 
migratory stocks, were not addressed.290 In the provisional phase, as ITLOS was not allowed 
to make findings which may prejudice the merits of the case, it could only briefly address the 
abovementioned provisions and thus did little to throw light on the obligations contained in 
Articles 64 and 118. ITLOS stated that these articles required the parties to cooperate in the 
conservation and management of the SBT and noted that ‘the parties should intensify their 
efforts to cooperate with the other participants in the fishery for SBT’.291  
In the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, the question that ITLOS was asked did not directly 
mention transboundary fish stocks, nor did it employ the terms used by UNCLOS, ie ‘straddling 
stocks’ and ‘migratory stocks’. Instead, the SRFC asked ITLOS for an opinion on ‘the rights 
and obligations of the coastal State in ensuring the sustainable management of shared stocks 
and stocks of common interest’.292 ITLOS nonetheless determined that, based on the definition 
of ‘shared stocks’ in the MCA Convention and of ‘stocks of common interest’ provided by the 
SRFC in the oral proceedings, these two expressions referred to straddling stocks between two 
EEZs and between the EEZ and the high seas.293 This paved the way for ITLOS to examine 
two questions relevant to transboundary stocks: (i) does UNCLOS provide for an obligation for 
‘sustainable management’ of transboundary stocks, despite it not being found under UNCLOS? 
and (ii) what are coastal States’ obligations under Articles 63 and 64? ITLOS’ answers will be 
examined in the following sections.  
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1. ‘Sustainable management’ of transboundary fish stocks 
Although Article 63, which deals with transboundary fish stocks, does not expressly address 
sustainable management, only the ‘conservation and development’ of such stocks,294 ITLOS 
found that Article 61, which stipulates the obligations of coastal States to conserve living 
resources in general, provides guidance on the meaning of ‘sustainable management’.295 ITLOS 
then proceeded to cite Article 61 in full, before concluding that as ‘the ultimate goal of 
sustainable management of fish stocks is to conserve and develop them as a viable and 
sustainable resource’, 296  the term ‘sustainable management’ had the same meaning as 
‘conservation and development’ as used in Article 63(1).297  
ITLOS’ interpretation of the term ‘conservation and development’ of fish stocks under 
UNCLOS as bearing the same meaning as ‘sustainable management’ brought about a welcome 
development to UNCLOS. Although UNCLOS does not use the terms ‘sustainable 
management’ or ‘sustainable development’, ITLOS’ interpretation confirmed that these are the 
goals underlying the Convention’s obligations for coastal States to conserve and manage living 
resources in the EEZ. Such an interpretation placed UNCLOS within the move towards 
sustainable development under international environmental law. This was also in line with the 
expectation placed upon UNCLOS to provide ‘the international legal basis for pursuing the 
protection and sustainable development of marine and coastal environment and its 
resources’.298  
On the other hand, even though it seems reasonable to conclude that the term ‘sustainable 
development’ is implied in the use of ‘conservation and management’ under Article 63(1), the 
reasoning that ITLOS used to reach this conclusion was not persuasive. ITLOS relied entirely 
on Article 61 to link these two terms but did not explain which elements of Article 61 ‘provided 
guidance’ on the meaning of the term ‘sustainable development’. Article 61 provides in part 
‘States shall take conservation and management measures to ensure that the living resources in 
the EEZ are not endangered by over-exploitation’ and that ‘such measures shall be designed to 
maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce maximum 
sustainable yield’ (MSY). However, many have argued that the concept of MSY is inadequate 
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for the task of conserving fish stocks and minimising the broader ecological effects of 
fisheries.299 It is also worth noting that under Article 61, coastal States are free to determine the 
‘allowable total catch of the resources in their EEZ’. There is no obligation to promote 
sustainable use of the resources under Article 61. It is only under Article 62 that the obligation 
to promote the objective of optimum utilisation comes into play, albeit still ‘without prejudice 
to Article 61’. Thus, one commentator has argued that the principles to guide conservation and 
management of the EEZ in Article 61 are ‘at best, vague and ambiguous and, at worst, are based 
on precepts that are unworkable to maintain the sustainability of the living resources in the 
[EEZ] in the current environment’. 300 It seems therefore difficult to conclude that Article 61 by 
itself contains the idea of sustainable development of living resources under UNCLOS. ITLOS’ 
reliance on Article 61 as the sole basis for the interpretation of the term ‘sustainable 
development’ without engaging in a meaningful analysis of this article leaves its conclusion 
less than satisfactory.  
Again, similar to the interpretation of flag States’ obligations under UNCLOS, ITLOS 
could instead have taken into account post-UNCLOS instruments, in which States agreed to use 
the Convention as the legal foundation for sustainable use of the ocean, to help interpret the 
terms contained in Articles 61 and 63. For example, Agenda 21 entitled ‘Programme of Action 
for Sustainable Development’ adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992 clearly acknowledged in Chapter 17 on the ‘Protection, Rational Use, 
and the Development of the Living Resources in Marine and Coastal Areas’ that the measures 
for the sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources are in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of UNCLOS.301 The Rio+ 20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable 
Development in 2012 reaffirmed that UNCLOS ‘is an important tool for sustainable 
development’.302 These instruments, having been adopted by the majority of States in the 
international community, lend weight to reading the goal of ‘sustainable development’ into 
UNCLOS.  
The concept of sustainability also features prominently in the UNFSA. Article 2 
UNFSA defines the objective of the Agreement as ‘ensur[ing] long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks through the effective 
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implementation of the [UNCLOS]’. Moreover, Article 7(2) of UNFSA specifically sets out the 
compatibility principle which requires conservation and management measures for areas within 
national jurisdiction to be compatible with those in the high seas in order to ensure conservation 
and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their 
entirety.303 Barnes argues that this principle ‘may result in the principles contained in the 
UNFSA being more widely applied to fisheries within national jurisdiction’.304 It follows, 
therefore, that ITLOS could have referred to the concept of sustainability in the UNFSA in the 
interpretation of coastal States’ obligations with regard to transboundary fish stocks. 
It is arguable that ITLOS to be reluctant to resort to the UNFSA in the interpretation of 
UNCLOS because of the SRFC Members’ uneven party status to UNCLOS and UNFSA. 
However, the same arguments regarding the use of subsequent agreements as interpretive tools, 
as analysed above, apply in this situation. Moreover, as the UNFSA is an implementing 
agreement of UNCLOS and regulates the same stocks as those under Articles 63 and 64 of 
UNCLOS, it seems reasonable that conservation measures for transboundary stocks under 
UNCLOS and UNFSA share the same goals. ITLOS could have relied on subsequent 
agreements, particularly the compatibility and sustainability principles under the UNFSA, to 
read ‘sustainable management’ into Article 63, as opposed to merely relying on Article 61.  
2. Coastal States’ obligations under Articles 63 and 64 
Turning to the substantive content the question, ie coastal States’ obligation in ensuring the 
sustainable management of transboundary stocks, ITLOS identified three different regimes 
under UNCLOS applicable to the three different types of fish stocks. First, in respect of species 
which occur within the EEZs of two or more SRFC Member States, ITLOS found that under 
Article 63(1) these States have the obligation to seek to agree upon the measures necessary to 
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks. It observed that while 
‘conservation’ is provided for under Article 61, UNCLOS remains silent on ‘development’. 
ITLOS then proceeded to fill in this gap and held that the term ‘development of such stocks’ 
used in Article 63(1) of the Convention suggested that ‘these stocks should be used as fishery 
resources within the framework of a sustainable fisheries management regime’.305 Even though 
the clarification of the term ‘development of fish stocks’ was welcome, ITLOS did not elaborate 
on what constituted a ‘framework of sustainable fisheries management regime’. Since ITLOS 
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did not refer to any other international instruments, presumably, this framework was one 
contained solely under UNCLOS. Second, for stocks occurring in coastal States’ EEZ and 
adjacent areas, ITLOS stated the limited scope of the advisory request could only allow it to 
make observations concerning the State’s obligations insofar as the fish stocks were found in 
the EEZ.306 Accordingly, ITLOS held that coastal States have the obligation to cooperate 
through competent international organisations to ensure that the shared stocks are not 
endangered by over-exploitation.307  
ITLOS further held that both the duty to cooperate and the duty to seek to agree were 
‘due diligence’ obligations which required the States concerned to consult with one another in 
good faith, pursuant to Article 300 of the Convention.308  These obligations were thus an 
obligation of conduct and State parties have to consult each other with a view to reaching an 
agreement on measures to conserve and develop the fish stocks, but they are not under an 
obligation to reach such an agreement. ITLOS only required that consultation be meaningful, 
in the sense that substantial effort should be made by all States concerned.309 The obligations 
as interpreted by ITLOS thus have the nature of pactum de negotiando, implying a duty to enter 
into negotiation, not pactum de contrahendo, implying a duty to negotiate and to reach an 
agreement.310 Such an interpretation sets a rather low threshold for the fulfilment of Articles 63 
and 64. 
ITLOS also attempted to specify the conservation and management measures that coastal 
States should take to fulfil the obligation to cooperate. For example ITLOS stated that the 
measures should ensure that the shared stocks would not be endangered by over-exploitation or 
that they should be designed to maintain and restore stocks at levels which can produce MSY.311 
These requirements, however, were more focused on the objectives that conservation and 
management measures should achieve, not on what the measures should be. They were, 
moreover, just repeating what was already provided for more generally under the Articles 61 
and 62 on conservation and utilisation of marine sources. 
It is worth recalling that the purpose of the SRFC’s advisory request was to ‘bring 
clarifications on the rights and duties of the coastal State in the sustainable management of 
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shared stocks or stocks of common interest’ in light of the ‘lack of cooperation among SRFC 
Member States in managing sustainably the stocks of common interest or shared stocks’.312 
Thus, the request was aimed at asking ITLOS to shed light on the content of the obligation to 
cooperate in the conservation and management of straddling stocks, not on the objectives of the 
conservation measures to be taken. It is difficult to see how the fulfilment of the aforementioned 
objectives would help to address the lack of cooperation among SRFC Member States.  
ITLOS also failed to address the consequences of a SRFC member State failing to 
comply with the obligation to cooperate, or the obligation to seek to agree. The advisory request 
was triggered by the lack of cooperation between SRFC member States and thus, it would have 
been more helpful if ITLOS had clarified not only the nature of the obligations but also the 
consequences of non-compliance. Judge Paik’s Separate Opinion addressed this issue to a 
certain extent by looking at the relationship between coastal States’ duty to cooperate and their 
sovereign rights to conserve and manage living resources in the EEZ. While agreeing on the 
importance of the obligation to cooperate, Judge Paik pointed out that Article 63(1) made clear 
that the obligation to seek to agree under this article was ‘without prejudice to the other the 
provisions of Part V’. 313  As Part V includes Article 56 providing for the coastal State’s 
sovereign rights over living resources in its EEZ, Judge Paik came to the conclusion that: 
[T]he failure to comply with an obligation to cooperate under article 63, paragraph 1, 
of the Convention does not entail any constraint or restriction on the exercise of the 
sovereign rights of the SRFC Member State to conserve and manage the transboundary 
stocks within its EEZ such as the determination of the total allowable catch and giving 
other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.314  
In the event that any Member State refuses to cooperate in good faith, he argued that other 
States may ‘invoke the liability of that State for the breach of obligations under article 63, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention, but not to try to restrict the exercise of its sovereign rights in 
the EEZ.’315 Interestingly, in Chagos MPA, the Annex VII tribunal held that, by virtue of Article 
297(3)(a), disputes arising from the lack of cooperation between State parties to UNCLOS with 
regard to transboundary stocks under Articles 63 and 64 were to be excluded from the 
compulsory jurisdiction of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies, insofar as these stocks were 
found in the EEZ.316 Judge Paik’s opinion, read in conjunction with the decision of the arbitral 
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tribunal, meant that coastal States would be left with no means to challenge the failure to 
cooperate on the part of other coastal States under UNCLOS.  
Lastly, with regard to migratory stocks, particularly tuna in this case—a highly migratory 
species under Annex I of UNCLOS, ITLOS held that, SRFC Member States under Article 64(1) 
had the obligation to seek to agree upon the conservation and management measures in regard 
to stocks that occur both within the EEZ of the SRFC Member States and in an area beyond 
and adjacent to these zones.317  ITLOS required the measures to be taken pursuant to the 
obligation under Article 64(1) to be consistent and compatible with those taken by the 
appropriate regional organisation, for example the International Commission for the 
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas in the case of tuna. In its 2014 Whaling judgment, the ICJ held 
that States parties to the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) had a 
duty to co-operate with the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and the Scientific 
Committee, and thus should give due regard to recommendations of the IWC in implementing 
the Convention.318 Although the obligation to cooperate in this case was based on a different 
convention, ITLOS’ statement was reminiscent of the ICJ’s Whaling judgment, emphasising 
the important role of treaty bodies in the conservation of highly migratory species.  
What is interesting is that, apart from obligations, ITLOS held that SRFC Member States 
had the right to seek to agree with other Member States in whose EEZ these stocks occur on 
the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such 
stocks. This was based on the observation that ‘although the Convention approaches the issue 
of conservation and management of living resources from the perspective of obligations of the 
coastal State, these obligations entail corresponding rights’.319 In the same vein, under Article 
64(1), SRFC Member States had the right to require cooperation from non-Member States 
whose nationals fish for tuna in the region.320 These statements imply that the rights which 
ensue from the obligation to cooperate under UNCLOS are only available to those that have 
vested interests in the conservation and management of the fish stocks in question, and not to 
all other State parties to the Convention. In discussing the right to cooperate, in Southern Bluefin 
Tuna, Churchill raised a highly pertinent question concerning Article 64 that ‘[t]here is clearly 
a duty on Japan under Article 64 but whether this confers a correlative right on Australia and 
New Zealand is much less certain as is what the scope of such a right might be.’321 ITLOS’ 
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above statements seem to have answered Churchill’s first question, but leaves untouched the 
intriguing and important second one. 
In addition to cooperating with other member States of the regional fisheries organisation, 
ITLOS also held that States also had an obligation to cooperate with non-Member States. This 
is because, as ITLOS explained, UNCLOS imposes the obligation to cooperate on each and 
every State Party concerned to conserve and manage shared resources. As a result, it held that 
‘member States of the SRFC may also, directly or through relevant subregional or regional 
organizations, seek the cooperation of non-Member States sharing the same stocks along their 
migrating routes’.322 The term ‘may seek the cooperation’ clearly places no binding obligation 
on coastal States, but merely recognises their discretion to do so. ITLOS’ holding is reminiscent 
of its Order in Southern Bluefin Tuna, in which the Tribunal required Australia, New Zealand 
and Japan not only to make efforts to reach agreement with one another, but also to make efforts 
to reach agreement with other States and fishing entities engaged in fishing for SBT.323 
ITLOS’ lack of consideration for other international fisheries instruments applicable to the 
regulation of straddling and migratory stocks faces the same criticism as its analysis of flag 
States’ obligations over fishing vessels. In his Separate Opinion, Judge Ndiyae claimed that 
ITLOS was ‘strikingly mistaken about the extent of the law in force with regard to straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks’.324 He believed the question presented to ITLOS 
was not only governed by UNCLOS but also the UNFSA, as its provisions directly address the 
main concern of SFRC regarding sustainable management of shared stocks and gives substance 
to that obligation by establishing mechanism for international cooperation.325 Relying on the 
specifics of the obligation to cooperate under the UNFSA, Judge Ndiyae pointed out that in 
order to fulfil the duty to cooperate, the mere establishment of RFMOs was not sufficient, SRFC 
Member States also had to further undertake measures required of it as a RFMO under the 
UNFSA. 326  Given the key role that UNCLOS gives to RFMOs in the conservation and 
management of transboundary stocks, the list of measures that a coastal State should take as a 
member of the RFMO as drawn up by Judge Ndiyae gave substance to the obligation to 
cooperate under Article 63 and 64. It also provided a more direct response to what the SRFC 
Member States were searching for with the advisory request. However, his opinion was mainly 
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based on a reading of UNCLOS in conjunction with UNFSA and the 2009 Agreement on Port 
State Measures. The reliance on instruments other than UNCLOS to specify the obligations to 
be placed on member States of SRFC was not without issue, as analysed above.327  
In the same vein, Judge Paik was not impressed with the absence of clarification on the 
meaning and scope of the duty to cooperate in managing the shared resources laid down in the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, as well has the way in which it would be applied between 
the SRFC Member States.328 Having established that it was unclear under UNCLOS how the 
obligation to cooperate was to be performed, Judge Paik commented that: 
In addressing the problem arising from the lack of cooperation in this case, simply 
emphasizing the obligation of cooperation or repeating the relevant provisions of the 
Convention would hardly be sufficient. In a sense, it begs the question what specifically is 
required to discharge that obligation, a question this Opinion does not answer 
satisfactorily.329  
Similar to Judge Ndiaye, he thus turned to and sought guidance in the UNFSA, Article 7 of 
which contains several concrete obligations to give effect the duty to cooperate.330 
The Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing was the first time coastal States’ obligations over 
transboundary stocks under UNCLOS have been examined in detail. ITLOS attempted to shed 
light on various terms employed under Articles 63 and 64 which are central to the coastal State’s 
obligations in this regard, such as ‘management’ and ‘development’ of fish stocks. The 
Advisory Opinion brought about a commendable development in that it confirmed that coastal 
States’ obligations to conserve and manage living resources in the EEZ under Article 61 formed 
part of the sustainable development of ocean resources, placing UNCLOS firmly within the 
wider framework of sustainable development. However, the Advisory Opinion was limited on 
the substance of the two important obligations under Articles 63 and 64. Other than elucidating 
on the nature and objectives of the obligations, it did not provide in any detail on what these 
obligations entail or what was expected of States to fulfil the obligation to cooperate in 
conserving and managing transboundary stocks. 331  
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IV.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The evolution of the case law concerning the interpretation of Articles 56, 64 and 73 shows that 
ITLOS was prepared to progressively develop the law on issues which are vague or 
controversial under the Convention. At the beginning of its existence, ITLOS was more 
reluctant to take a stand on issues that are not clearly provided for under UNCLOS, such as the 
legality of bunkering or confiscation of vessels under UNCLOS. However, it became more 
willing to take a stand and provide guidance on these issues. As a result of ITLOS’ broad 
interpretation of Article 62(4) and Article 73(1), the scope of coastal States’ sovereign rights in 
the EEZ has now been expanded beyond the wording of the relevant provisions of the 
Convention.  
While ITLOS was comfortable with expanding coastal States’ regulatory and enforcement 
powers over fisheries activities in the EEZ, it paid little attention to coastal States’ rights in 
considering the reasonableness of the bond in early prompt release cases. In the bulk of the 
prompt release cases, ITLOS tended to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the factors to 
determine the reasonableness of the bond, essentially tilting the balance towards flag States’ 
right to be released promptly over coastal States’ rights and obligations to conserve the fish 
stocks in the EEZ under both UNCLOS and other international agreements. However, there are 
signs that ITLOS has become more aware of conservation concerns in the latest prompt release 
case.  
The Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing shows that ITLOS was prepared to embrace 
conservation concerns by incorporating flag States’ obligations over fishing vessels engaging 
in IUU fishing in the EEZ into UNCLOS, despite the Convention’s silence on this matter. 
ITLOS’ creative interpretation of UNCLOS provisions to establish flag States’ obligation over 
IUU fishing activities was extremely significant, making UNCLOS an authoritative legal tool 
in the fight against IUU fishing, and thus strengthened role that UNCLOS can play in the 
sustainable development of ocean resources. However, the legal reasoning and interpretative 
technique that ITLOS adopted in order to reach the above conclusion was not wholly 
satisfactory, giving the tribunal’s answer the impression of being overly contrived and 
formulated so as to reach a predetermined result. 
In sum, one of the most significant changes that UNCLOS and its implementing 
agreements brought to international fisheries law is the shift of focus from exploitation to 
conservation of marine living resources of living resources. UNCLOS tribunals’ interpretation 
of the States’ scope of rights and obligations over living resources has reflected this new focus 
and informed the balance to be struck in the Convention between coastal States’ and flag States’ 
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rights and obligations over living resources. UNCLOS tribunals’ clarification of relevant 
provisions Convention also ensured the latter’s applicability to the regulation of activities at 




CHAPTER 3  DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON THE CONTINENTAL  SHELF 
BEYOND 200 NAUTICAL MILES 
 
The concept of the ‘continental shelf’ is not new to UNCLOS. It was already the subject matter 
of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, and prior to that, the Truman Proclamation.332 
However, while the continental shelf under UNCLOS is still described as the seabed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas beyond the coastal State’s territorial sea similar to the 1958 
Convention,333 UNCLOS introduced fundamental changes in the criteria for determining the 
seaward limits of the continental shelf. According to Article 76(1) UNCLOS, the continental 
shelf can extend to: (i) a distance of 200 nautical miles (nm) from the baseline from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured (the distance criterion) or (ii) the limit of the outer 
edge of the continental margin (the geological criterion). If the outer edge of the continental 
margin extends beyond 200 nm, the limits of the continental shelf are determined in accordance 
with the technical requirements in paragraphs (4) to (6) of Article 76.  
When establishing the limits of the outer continental shelf, coastal States are required, 
under Article 76(8), to submit information relating to the limits of the continental shelf to a 
technical body established under UNCLOS called the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (‘CLCS’ or ‘the Commission’). The CLCS is comprised of experts in the 
fields of geology, geophysics or hydrography, and its main function is to consider data and 
other material submitted by coastal States and to make recommendations regarding where the 
outer limits are located. In this process of delineation, Article 76(10) UNCLOS, read in 
conjunction with Article 9 Annex II UNCLOS, makes clear that the CLCS shall not prejudice 
matters relating to delimitation of boundaries between States. Article 5(a) of Annex I of the 
Rules of Procedure of the Commission further provides that the Commission ‘shall not consider 
and qualify a submission made by any of the States concerned in the dispute, unless there is 
prior consent given by all States that are parties to such a dispute’. The different paragraphs of 
Article 76, which introduced the notion of ‘the continental shelf beyond 200 nm’ or ‘the outer 
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continental shelf’, have been described as combining ‘influences of geography, geology, 
geomorphology and jurisprudence’.334  
 Due to this interface between law and science, as well as the functions that the 
Convention assigns to the CLCS, the new legal regime governing the outer continental shelf 
under Article 76 becomes highly complex. Moreover, even though Article 83 UNCLOS relating 
to the delimitation of the continental does not distinguish between the continental shelf within 
and beyond 200nm, the delimitation of overlapping outer continental shelves undoubtedly 
raises complicated issues not only relating to the outer continental shelf regime but also 
delimitation issues not present in the delimitation of other maritime zones. Disputes concerning 
delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm have come before different international 
courts and tribunals, including the ICJ,335 ad hoc arbitral tribunals,336 ITLOS and Annex VII 
arbitral tribunals. To date, only ITLOS and an Annex VII arbitral tribunal have proceeded with 
delimiting the outer continental shelf in three cases, 337  namely Bangladesh/Myanmar, 338 
Bangladesh/India,339 and most recently, in Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire.340 The decisions of UNCLOS 
tribunals, therefore, have provided an important source of legal authority in clarifying the legal 
ambiguities concerning both the regime of the outer continental shelf and the delimitation of 
this particularly interesting portion of the shelf. The remainder of this Chapter critically 
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examines the significance of UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions, with references to the decisions of 
other courts where appropriate, in clarifying the following issues: (i) coastal States’ entitlement 
to an outer continental shelf, (ii) the relationship between UNCLOS tribunals and the CLCS; 
(iii) the delimitation method for the outer continental shelf and (iv) the grey area.  
I. ENTITLEMENT TO A CONTINENTAL SHELF BEYOND 200 NM 
Coastal States do not need to make an express claim to a continental shelf, unlike the EEZ, in 
order to enjoy the rights within this maritime zone. As the ICJ made clear in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, the rights of coastal States in the continental shelf ‘exist ipso facto and 
ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over land’.341 Article 77(3) confirms this by providing that 
‘the rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective 
or notional, or on any express proclamation’. UNCLOS tribunals have repeatedly stated that 
‘there is in law only a single continental shelf, rather than an inner continental shelf and a 
separate outer continental shelf’. 342  This statement would suggest that coastal States’ 
entitlement to an outer continental shelf beyond 200 nm also exists ipso facto and ‘by virtue of 
sovereignty over land’. Yet ITLOS itself in Bangladesh/Myanmar acknowledged that ‘not 
every coast generates entitlements to a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nm’.343 This 
raises the question as to what constitutes the legal basis of a coastal State’s entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Further, in cases of disagreement or uncertainty regarding 
whether a coastal State has entitlement to an outer continental shelf, what suffices as evidence 
of such entitlement? This Part examines these two issues in turn and considers whether the 
decisions of UNCLOS tribunals, and those of other international courts to the extent relevant, 
have satisfactorily provided an answer to these questions.  
1. The legal basis of entitlement to an outer continental shelf 
1.1. The meaning of ‘natural prolongation’ 
Since it was first introduced by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ‘natural 
prolongation’ has long been accepted as the basis of entitlement to a continental shelf.344 
However, in the establishment of a continental shelf that extends beyond 200nm within the 
UNCLOS framework, the concept of ‘natural prolongation’ is used alongside with that of ‘the 
outer edge of the continental margin’ under Article 76(1) UNCLOS, whose location is, in turn, 
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identified using the formulae provided for under Article 76(4). The emergence of the concept 
of the ‘outer edge of the continental margin’ raises two important questions: (i) what does 
‘natural prolongation’ mean under Article 76 and (ii) what is the relationship between ‘natural 
prolongation’ and the concept of ‘outer edge of the continental margin’? 
These were the issues that divided the parties in Bangladesh/Myanmar. Bangladesh 
interpreted the term ‘natural prolongation of its land territory’ as referring to the need for 
geological and geomorphological continuity between the land mass of the coastal State and the 
seabed beyond 200 nm.345 Myanmar, on the other hand, was of the view that the existence of a 
geological discontinuity in front of the coast of Myanmar was irrelevant to the case. Instead, 
Myanmar argued that the controlling concept was not natural prolongation but that of the ‘outer 
edge of the continental margin’, which is defined by the two formulae provided in Article 
76(4).346  
ITLOS agreed with Myanmar on this issue. It held that while Article 76(1) mentions the 
term ‘natural prolongation’, it is clear from the wording of this article that ‘the notion of “the 
outer edge of the continental margin” is an essential element in determining the extent of the 
continental shelf’.347 Moreover, while the notion of ‘the outer edge of the continental margin’ 
is elaborated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 76 UNCLOS,348 no such definition or elaboration 
of ‘natural prolongation’ could be found in any other paragraphs of Article 76.349 Finding 
further support in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases before the ICJ,350 the negotiating 
records of UNCLOS,351 and the test of appurtenance adopted in The Scientific and Technical 
Guidelines on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by the CLCS,352 ITLOS found that the notions 
of ‘natural prolongation’ and ‘continental margin’, under Article 76, paragraphs 1 and 4 
respectively, are closely interrelated and they refer to the same area. 353  This means that 
entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm should be determined by reference to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, to be ascertained in accordance with the formulae provided in 
Article 76(4).354  
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ITLOS thus concluded that natural prolongation did not constitute an independent, 
separate criterion for the establishment of entitlement to an outer continental shelf.355 Before 
the Bangladesh/Myanmar judgment was handed down, one scholar had argued that: 
Article 76 does not indicate a formula or method to prove natural prolongation. The 
wording of the introductory sentence of paragraph 4 suggests that the formulae are to be 
applied by a coastal State to determine its limits only after a determination that there is 
natural prolongation up to the outer limit of the continental margin beyond 200 nm. There 
is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the formulae in paragraph 4 are the 
same formulae that must be used to indicate proof of natural prolongation’.356  
ITLOS’s holding, however, showed that there is in fact a close connection between 
paragraphs (1) and (4) of Article 76, in the sense that the latter provides the technical formulae 
to define the concept of ‘natural prolongation’ contained in the former.  
ITLOS’ dismissal of the requirement of ‘natural prolongation’ in the establishment of 
entitlement to outer continental shelf was criticised by Judge Gao in his Separate Opinion in 
Bangladesh/Myanmar, as well as by some other scholars.357 Judge Gao opined that ‘natural 
prolongation retains its primacy over all other factors and that legal title to the continental shelf 
is based solely on geology and geomorphology, at least as far as the continental shelf beyond 
200 nm is concerned.’358 Judge Gao seemed to have interpreted ITLOS’ decision as rejecting 
the relevance of the concept of ‘natural prolongation’ altogether in establishing the outer 
continental shelf. However, a closer look at the ITLOS’ judgment shows that such a reading is 
not justified. ITLOS did not state that ‘natural prolongation’ had no role to play whatsoever in 
the establishment of the outer continental shelf as construed by its critics. It only rejected the 
argument that in addition to identifying the outer edge of the continental margin pursuant to 
Article 76(4), a coastal State would also have to show that there is geological and/or 
geomorphological continuity between the land mass and the continental shelf. In other words, 
ITLOS’ conclusion was simply that ‘natural prolongation’ could not constitute an additional 
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criterion to those contained under Article 76(4) in order to establish entitlement to outer 
continental shelf. 
ITLOS was surely correct in rejecting ‘natural prolongation’—interpreted as requiring 
continuity from the land territory to the seabed area—as a separate criterion for the 
establishment of an outer continental shelf.359 Nowhere under Article 76 UNCLOS or the CLCS 
Technical Guidance is there a requirement of proof of similarities in the geological or 
geomorphological condition in the seabed of the coastal State from its landmass to the outer 
continental margin. Moreover, the negotiating records of the Third Conference for the Law of 
the Sea show that the concept of ‘natural prolongation’ was discussed in relation to three main 
issues: (i) in defining the continental shelf, inspired by the judgment of the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases;360 (ii) as a criterion for the establishment of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, as opposed to the ‘exploitability test’ employed in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention, or the distance criterion or the bathymetric criterion as proposed by some States;361 
and (iii) as a basis for the argument that all States in the continent should be entitled to a 
continental shelf, not just the coastal State. 362  More importantly, the concept of ‘natural 
prolongation’ invoked in these discussions was understood with reference to the concept of ‘the 
continental margin’.363 The negotiating texts of UNCLOS, therefore, do not lend support to the 
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argument that ‘natural prolongation’ constituted an independent requirement upon the 
fulfilment of which States would be entitled to an outer continental shelf. 364 
Furthermore, as ITLOS acknowledged, the term ‘natural prolongation’ originated from 
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. In those cases, the ICJ was not concerned with the issue 
of the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf, but with that of whether the 
equidistance/special circumstances method of delimitation for the continental shelf embodied 
in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf reflected a rule of customary 
international law.365 The notion of ‘natural prolongation’ was invoked by the Court to reject the 
argument put forward by Denmark and the Netherlands that ‘continental shelf entitlement was 
based on proximity, which implied a direct link between entitlement and delimitation between 
neighbouring states by application of equidistance’.366 The concept of natural prolongation used 
by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases was not meant to impose a condition based 
on which entitlement for the outer continental shelf could be established, but ‘to justify the 
appurtenance of the continental shelf to the coastal State’.367 It follows, therefore, that an 
interpretation of ‘natural prolongation’ as a separate criterion to establish entitlement to an outer 
continental shelf finds no basis either under the Convention or the history of development of 
the shelf. 
In short, the concept of ‘natural prolongation’, as Evans correctly noted, performs 
multiple functions including ‘a basis of title, a means of delimitation, an equitable principle of 
delimitation, a criterion for delimitation and as a relevant circumstance’.368 This concept has 
been discussed in several cases before other dispute settlement bodies,369 but mainly in relation 
to continental shelf delimitation, not as the basis of title to an outer continental shelf within the 
UNCLOS framework. UNCLOS tribunals through their decisions have made important 
contributions to clarifying the meaning of this concept, often considered to be ‘a source of 
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mystery and confusion’370 or ‘a semi sacred expression’371 in establishing entitlement to a 
continental shelf. UNCLOS tribunals made clear that ‘natural prolongation’ under Article 76 
did not mean geological or geomorphological continuity or similarity between the land mass 
and the seabed. The Bay of Bengal decisions ultimately mean that within the UNCLOS 
framework, geological or geomorphological continuity does not constitute a condition for 
entitlement to the continental shelf in its entirety. For shelves that do not extend beyond 200 
nm, entitlement is based on distance, thus a discontinuity between the landmass and the seabed 
within 200 nm is irrelevant. Beyond 200 nm, ‘natural prolongation’ is defined with reference 
to the outer edge of the continental margin as determined by the formulae under Article 76(4).  
1.2. The relationship between entitlement and the outer limits of the continental shelf 
In Bangladesh/Myanmar, Myanmar objected to ITLOS exercising its jurisdiction to delimit the 
outer continental shelf on the basis that the Tribunal could not determine entitlements to an 
outer continental shelf, as this task belonged to the CLCS. This objection may at first glance 
pertain only to procedural issues. However, given that the tasks of the CLCS involve reviewing 
and giving recommendations to coastal States regarding the location of the outer limits of the 
continental shelf, in essence, Myanmar’s objection implied that a coastal State's entitlement to 
an outer continental shelf depended on the establishment of the outer limits of the shelf.  
In response to Myanmar’s objection, ITLOS held that it had competence to determine 
entitlements. ITLOS drew a clear a distinction between the notions of ‘entitlement to the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm’ and ‘the outer limits of the continental shelf’.372 ITLOS was 
adamant that the coastal State’s entitlement to an outer continental shelf ‘does not depend on’ 
the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf. 373  It further held that the 
procedures set out under Article 76(8), whereby States are required to submit information to 
the CLCS and then to wait for the latter’s recommendation regarding the outer limits, did not 
imply that entitlement to the continental shelf depended on any procedural requirements.374 In 
ITLOS’s view, Article 77(3) confirms that the existence of entitlement does not depend on the 
establishment of outer limits but only on ‘the sole fact that the basis of entitlement, namely, 
sovereignty over the land territory, is present’.375 
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There are merits in ITLOS’s view regarding the independent relationship between the 
establishment of ‘entitlement’ to and the identification of the ‘outer limits’ of the continental 
shelf. A coastal State does not need to have established its outer limits in order to prove that it 
has entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm. Under UNCLOS, entitlement is 
determined with reference to the outer edge of the continental margin, which is ascertained in 
accordance with Article 76(4).376 On the other hand, the outer limits of the continental shelf, 
pursuant to Article 76(5), are drawn ‘in accordance with paragraph 4(a)(i) and (ii)’ and subject 
to the technical requirements under paragraphs (5), (6) and (7) of the same article. It is clear 
that the identification of the line indicating the outer edge of the continental margin is only the 
starting point of the delineation process to determine the outer limits of the shelf. Further, the 
‘test of appurtenance’ set out by the CLCS, which requires that a coastal State must first prove 
that it has a continental shelf entitlement that extends beyond 200 nautical miles before it is 
permitted to delineate the outer limits of the shelf, affirms that the establishment of entitlement 
to an outer continental shelf precedes and predicates the identification of the outer limits of the 
shelf. 377 In other words, in addition to identifying the outer edge of the continental margin, the 
coastal State would have to take further steps and consider all of the requirements under 
paragraphs (5), (6) and (7) in order to establish the outer limits of the continental shelf. 
Entitlement to an outer continental shelf, therefore, does not depend on the establishment of the 
outer limits of the shelf. 
In short, the Bay of Bengal cases clarified three important issues. First, the basis of a 
coastal State’s entitlement to an outer continental shelf is the existence of a juridical continental 
margin as defined under Article 76(3) that extends beyond 200 nm, ascertained pursuant to 
Article 76(4). Second, natural prolongation is still relevant to the establishment of an outer 
continental shelf, but not in the sense that there has to be geological or geomorphological 
continuity between the land territory and the seabed area beyond 200 nm. 'Natural prolongation' 
is defined with reference to Article 76(4), which means that the natural prolongation of a coastal 
State's territory is the seabed area that extends to the outer edge of the continental margin as 
determined by Article 76(4). Third, the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf 
does not constitute the basis for entitlement. A coastal State does not need to identify the exact 
scope of the continental shelf—or the limits of its entitlement—in order to establish that it has 
entitlement beyond 200 nm. 
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2. Evidence for entitlement to an outer continental shelf 
Based on the independent relationship between the determination of entitlement to an outer 
continental shelf and the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the tribunals 
in the Bay of Bengal cases confirmed that the determination of entitlement to an outer 
continental shelf fell within their jurisdiction, whereas any tasks relating to the identification of 
the outer limits belonged to the CLCS. This, however, raises an interesting question regarding 
the evidence that a party seeking to establish an outer continental shelf must present to an 
international court or tribunal to prove its entitlement. The decisions rendered by international 
courts and tribunals have not to date definitively disposed of this question.  
In the 2012 maritime delimitation case between Nicaragua and Colombia, in which 
Nicaragua requested the ICJ to delimit the outer continental shelf as part of a request for the 
delimitation of the maritime boundary with Colombia, Nicaragua had only submitted 
‘Preliminary Information’ indicative of the limits of the continental shelf to the CLCS, not a 
full submission with complete information. 378  The Court found that the Preliminary 
Information ‘falls short of meeting the requirements for information on the limits of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles’ to be submitted by the coastal State to the 
Commission in accordance with Article 76(8) of UNCLOS.379 In its judgment, rendered after 
Bangladesh/Myanmar, the ICJ declined to delimit the boundary between Nicaragua and 
Colombia in the area in which Nicaragua claimed an outer continental shelf entitlement. Even 
though the Court acknowledged the decision of ITLOS, it distinguished its case from that of 
ITLOS on the basis that both Bangladesh and Myanmar had made full submissions to the 
CLCS,380 whereas ‘Nicaragua, in the present proceedings, has not established that it has a 
continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile 
entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast’.381 In the 
operative paragraph, the Court declared that it ‘cannot uphold’ Nicaragua’s claim to an outer 
continental shelf. This decision may create the impression that information in Preliminary 
Information to the CLCS would not be sufficient to prove entitlement to an outer continental 
shelf.  
However in 2016, when Nicaragua again invited the ICJ to delimit its maritime boundary 
with Colombia in an area beyond 200 nm from Nicaragua’s mainland coast, the ICJ explained 
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that in 2012 it neither made a decision on whether or not Nicaragua had an entitlement beyond 
200 nm, nor on ‘the substantive legal standards which Nicaragua had to meet to prove 
entitlement beyond 200 nm’.382 During the proceedings of the new case, the parties disagreed 
on the meaning of the term ‘cannot uphold’ that the Court had used in the operative paragraph 
in its 2012 judgment. Nicaragua argued that this term simply meant that the ICJ refused to rule 
on the request because a procedural and institutional requirement had not been fulfilled,383 
while Colombia contended that ‘cannot uphold’ must be interpreted as a ‘straightforward 
dismissal of Nicaragua’s request for lack of evidence’.384 The ICJ agreed with Nicaragua and 
held that:  
While the Court decided, in subparagraph 3 of the operative clause of the 2012 Judgment, 
that Nicaragua’s claim could not be upheld, it did so because the latter had yet to discharge 
its obligation, under paragraph 8 of Article 76 of UNCLOS, to deposit with the CLCS the 
information on the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles required by 
that provision and by Article 4 of Annex II of UNCLOS.385  
The Court, therefore, made clear in the 2016 Nicaragua v Colombia judgment that the 
Court’s decision in 2012 was based on a procedural requirement. In the 2012 judgment, the 
Court did not ‘consider it necessary to decide the substantive legal standards which Nicaragua 
had to meet if it was to prove vis-à-vis Colombia that it had an entitlement to a continental shelf 
beyond 200 nautical miles from its coast.’386 The Court’s judgment in 2016 clarified that the 
2012 Nicaragua v Colombia judgment could not be construed as providing any guidance on the 
evidential threshold required of a State to prove entitlement to an outer continental shelf.  
In the 2016 Nicaragua v Colombia case, the ICJ interpreted its 2012 Judgment requiring 
Nicaragua to submit its information to the CLCS ‘as a prerequisite for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles by the Court’.387 Nicaragua had in fact, following 
the 2012 Judgment, furnished complete information and documentation to the CLCS, although 
the Commission had yet to issue its recommendation. The ICJ then found that it had jurisdiction 
to delimit the maritime boundary within the area of in which Nicaragua argued that it had outer 
continental shelf entitlement.388 Bearing in mind that delimitation could only be conducted if 
the parties have entitlement to the area in question and these entitlements overlap,389 this 
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confirmation of jurisdiction could be read to mean that the full submission to the CLCS was 
implicitly accepted by the ICJ as evidence of Nicaragua’s entitlement beyond 200 nm.  
In Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh/India, all three States had made submissions to 
the CLCS in respect of their claims beyond 200 nm. In both cases, UNCLOS tribunals 
acknowledged that the parties had entitlement an outer continental shelf and thus proceeded to 
delimitation. Again, this would seem to suggest full submissions to the CLCS were considered 
necessary and sufficient evidence for entitlement. In fact, one commentator argued that ‘in order 
to continue the delimitation beyond 200 nautical miles, it was crucial that the parties had each 
made their submissions to the Commission’.390  
However, on closer inspection, interpreting the approaches taken by UNCLOS tribunals 
and the ICJ in the above cases as establishing an evidentiary threshold for coastal States’ 
entitlement beyond 200 nm is arguably mistaken. In the Bay of Bengal cases, UNCLOS 
tribunals were eager to proceed with delimitation because, based on available scientific 
evidence to which neither party objected, they were certain that the parties had entitlements to 
an outer continental shelf. In other words, it was not the submission per se that assured the 
tribunals that they should exercise jurisdiction, it was the availability of uncontested scientific 
evidence which removed any doubt as to the existence of the outer continental shelf. The fact 
that the parties had made their submissions was not the ‘crucial’ element in this case. Therefore, 
a general conclusion that submissions to the CLCS constitute conclusive evidence of 
entitlement cannot be drawn from these two cases. 
In the latest Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire case decided by the Special Chamber of ITLOS, both 
parties had logged their submissions to the CLCS, and Ghana, for its part, had received the 
recommendation from the CLCS. Neither parties contested the entitlement of the other party to 
a continental shelf beyond 200 nm,391 thus the question of uncertainty regarding the existence 
of entitlement did not arise in this case. Ghana, however, questioned the scope of Côte d’Ivoire's 
entitlement,392 arguing that the latter's Revised Submission to the CLCS in 2016 indicated an 
overlap between the entitlements of the two States which had not existed previously.393 Ghana’s 
objection to the Revised Submission was based on ‘normal principles of litigation’394—as the 
Revised Submissions were made after the proceedings before the Chamber had commenced—
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as well as the claim that this was a tactic for Côte d’Ivoire to ‘discard and set aside seven years 
of common practice and agreement’ in relation to the delimitation line.395 It could be seen that 
Ghana’s doubts regarding Côte d’Ivoire's scope of entitlement beyond 200 nm had little to do 
with the sufficiency or otherwise of the Revised Submission or the fact that it had not been 
considered by the CLCS. As Ghana was more focused on procedural issues, the Special 
Chamber eventually dismissed this objection on account of the fact that ‘Côte d’Ivoire invoked 
this fact before the closure of the written proceedings’.396 The Chamber's decision thus did not 
provide new insights into the question of evidence of entitlement to the outer continental shelf. 
As for the ICJ, in the 2016 Nicaragua v Colombia case, nowhere in the judgment did the 
ICJ attempt to deal with the question of whether Nicaragua had met the legal threshold to prove 
entitlement by virtue of a full submission to the CLCS, or whether Nicaragua had entitlement 
to an outer continental shelf. This was perhaps partly due to the fact that Colombia’s objection 
to the Court’s jurisdiction was not grounded on the insufficiency of Nicaragua’s evidence to 
prove its claim to entitlement.397 Instead, Colombia relied on the argument that ‘the CLCS has 
not made the requisite recommendation concerning Nicaragua's Submission, nor has it 
‘consider[ed] and qualif[ied]’ it according to Article 5(a) of Annex I to its Rules of 
Procedure’.398 Colombia’s objection thus related to procedural issues, in particular to the fact 
that Nicaragua had not obtained the CLCS’s recommendation. The Court did not, therefore, 
have to address the question relating to evidence of entitlement to deal with Colombia’s 
objections. It only needed to follow the approach taken by UNCLOS tribunals in the Bay of 
Bengal cases—albeit without once acknowledging it—to reject the importance of procedural 
requirements in establishing entitlement. In any case, it is worth noting that, while the Court 
might have been silent on the issue, seven judges in their Joint Dissenting Opinion put forward 
the view that ‘information submitted to the CLCS pursuant to Article 76 (8) of UNCLOS will 
																																																								
395 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire in the Atlantic 
Ocean (Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire), Reply of Ghana 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_merits/pleadings/Reply_of_Ghana__Vol._I_
.PDF> accessed 25 September 2018. 
396 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire (n 340) [515]. 
397 This can be contrasted with the position that Colombia took in Nicaragua v Colombia (2012), in which one of 
the main arguments that it employed to object to Nicaragua’s claim to an outer continental shelf was that ‘the so-
called “evidence” that Nicaragua has adduced […] is woefully deficient, and would not even begin to satisfy the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf’. See Verbatim Record of the Public sitting held on Friday 27 
April 2012, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v Colombia), para 46 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/124/16985.pdf> accessed 27 December 
2017.25 September 2018. 
398 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Nicaragua and Colombia Beyond 200 Nautical 
Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicaragua v Colombia), Preliminary Objections of the Republic of Colombia, 




not necessarily be regarded as sufficient to establish the existence of an extended continental 
shelf’.399 
In the end, international courts and tribunals, including both the ICJ and UNCLOS 
tribunals, have not definitively disposed of the question regarding what constitutes sufficient 
evidence of entitlement to an outer continental shelf in cases in which there is uncertainty 
regarding the existence of such an entitlement. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELIMITATION AND DELINEATION 
In the context of the outer continental shelf, ‘delimitation’ refers to the establishment of a 
boundary that divides overlapping entitlements lying beyond 200 nm from the baselines of one 
or more States, whereas delineation refers to the establishment of the limits of the continental 
shelf. While there has been some confusion relating to the use of these two terms,400 ITLOS 
made clear in Bangladesh/Myanmar that delineation and delimitation are two distinct 
concepts.401 Delimitation does not depend on delineation, meaning that delimitation can be 
carried out regardless of whether the outer limits of the continental shelf have been identified; 
it only requires that the parties’ entitlements to an outer continental shelf exist and that those 
entitlements overlap. 402  On the basis of this distinction, UNCLOS tribunals in the two 
Bangladesh/Myanmar and Bangladesh/India cases clarified the much debated relationship 
between the UNCLOS tribunals and the CLCS. 403  This Part examines the soundness of 
UNCLOS tribunals’ approach in this regard and questions whether their decisions could be 
considered to have settled the relationship between UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies and the 
CLCS.   
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1. The relationship between UNCLOS tribunals and the CLCS 
ITLOS stated that, as a dispute settlement body, it has the legal expertise to interpret and apply 
the provisions of the Convention; while the CLCS deals with scientific and technical issues.404 
When faced with the question of entitlement to the outer continental shelf under Article 76, 
ITLOS held that as Article 76 contains both elements of law and science, its proper 
interpretation and application required both legal and scientific expertise.405 Therefore, as ‘the 
question of the Parties’ entitlement to a continental shelf beyond 200 nm raises issues that are 
predominantly legal in nature’, ITLOS would be in a position to examine this issue under 
Article 76.406  
With regard to the interaction between the tasks of the two bodies, ie between 
delimitation and delineation, ITLOS noted that there was nothing in the Convention, the Rules 
of Procedure of the Commission or in its practice to indicate that delimitation of the continental 
shelf constituted an impediment to the performance by the Commission of its functions.407 In 
the same vein, the CLCS is mandated only to consider coastal States’ submissions relating to 
the limits of continental shelf, an exercise of technical nature, and it should do so ‘without 
prejudice to questions of delimitation’ as required under Article 76(10). ITLOS thus adopted 
the view, which was subsequently followed by the Annex VII arbitral tribunal in 
Bangladesh/India, that the absence of a CLCS recommendation relating to the limits of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm could not prevent it from determining the existence of 
entitlement to the continental shelf and delimiting the continental shelf between the parties 
concerned. 408  ITLOS further supported this conclusion by stating that it was justified in 
delimiting the outer continental shelf boundary because if it had not done so, there would have 
a deadlock in the resolving the dispute between the two parties when the CLCS could not make 
a recommendation in respect of Myanmar’s submission.409  
The clarification of the interrelated but independent relationship between the two 
institutions has a significant bearing on the temporal order in which delimitation and delineation 
are to be carried out. Before the Bay of Bengal decisions, some scholars had argued that 
delimitation should not and could not be conducted prior to delineation.410  The case law 
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produced by UNCLOS tribunals has, however, rejected this absolute view. Their decisions 
mean that, as one scholar notes, ‘States are now free to choose whichever course of action to 
first undertake, be it the CLCS path or the delimitation the continental shelf with their 
neighbouring States’.411  Even though it is possible that in some cases, as will be further 
analysed below, international courts should be cautious in delimiting the outer continental shelf 
in the absence of a CLCS recommendation, what is at least clear is that there is no set temporal 
order between delineation and delimitation, in which delineation must necessarily precede 
delimitation in all cases.  
The decisions of ITLOS and the Annex VII arbitral tribunal in the Bay of Bengal cases 
regarding the relationship between a dispute settlement body and the CLCS stood in contrast 
with earlier decisions by other international courts and tribunals. In particular, in the 
delimitation case between Canada/France arbitration in 1992, the arbitral tribunal declined to 
recognise any rights of the parties over the outer continental shelf in the absence of a 
determination as to where their entitlements ended, because ‘it is not possible for a tribunal to 
reach a decision by assuming hypothetically the eventuality that such rights will in fact exist.’412 
In Nicaragua v Honduras in 2007, the ICJ held that ‘any claim of continental shelf rights 
beyond 200 miles must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf established thereunder’.413 It is worth 
noting, however, that in this case, neither party had requested the Court to delimit the outer 
continental shelf. Thus, the Court’s obiter dictum should not be construed as establishing a 
relationship between itself and the CLCS, nor did the Court say that the recommendation of the 
CLCS was a precondition for delimitation. It does, however, signal a certain level of reluctance 
on the part of the Court to deal with question of delimitation beyond 200 nm in the absence of 
a CLCS recommendation. An explicit refusal to proceed with the delimitation of the outer 
continental shelf by the ICJ only came in Nicaragua v Colombia in 2012.414 It can be seen that 
following the 2012 Nicaragua v Colombia case, there was disparity in the view of UNCLOS 
tribunals and that of other international dispute settlement bodies concerning the relationship 
between a court or tribunal and the CLCS, as well as the impact of this relationship on the 
																																																								
Continental Shelf’ (2010) 25 IJMCL 237. 
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jurisdiction of a court or tribunal to delimit the outer continental shelf in the absence of a CLCS 
recommendation.  
However, the 2016 Nicaragua v Colombia judgment presented an important shift in the 
approach of the ICJ to the relationship between itself and the CLCS. In determining ‘whether a 
recommendation made by the CLCS, pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8, of UNCLOS, is a 
prerequisite in order for the Court to be able to entertain the Application filed by Nicaragua’,415 
the ICJ essentially adopted the view of UNCLOS tribunals in the Bay of Bengal cases regarding 
the relationship between delineation and delimitation and that between the CLCS and 
international tribunals 416 Moreover, both Nicaragua and Colombia relied extensively on the 
two Bay of Bengal cases in their pleadings to advance their arguments.417 Even when Colombia 
urged the ICJ not to confirm jurisdiction to delimit the outer continental shelf beyond 200 nm, 
it did not argue that the conclusions of the Bay of Bengal tribunals were wrong or unreasonable. 
It merely contended that the factual circumstances of the case before the Court differed 
substantially from those of the Bay of Bengal cases, so that the UNCLOS tribunals’ conclusions 
were not applicable to the case. 418  This illustrates that the significance of the UNCLOS 
tribunals’ decisions transcended the two cases in which they were delivered. With the 2016 
Nicaragua v Colombia judgment, the approach of international courts and tribunals regarding 
the relationship between a dispute settlement body and the CLCS, along with its implications 
on the former’s jurisdiction to delimit the outer continental shelf seems to have converged.  
2. Does delimitation effected by an international court or tribunal prejudice 
the work of the CLCS? 
In distinguishing between the functions of the CLCS and dispute settlement bodies, UNCLOS 
tribunals were adamant in stating that their work could not be seen as precluding or prejudicing 
the work of the Commission. ITLOS grounded this statement on Article 76(10) which makes 
clear that the determination of the extent of the continental shelf is ‘without prejudice’ to the 
question of its delimitation. Indeed, if delineation occurs before delimitation, that is, if the 
CLCS issues a recommendation regarding the location of the outer limits of a coastal State's 
entitlement before a tribunal determines the maritime boundary between that State and its 
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neighbour, such a recommendation will unlikely prejudice the maritime boundary to be drawn 
by the tribunal. This is because delineation makes no presumption about where the boundary 
will lie, nor does it determine the course of the boundary. Article 76(10) ensures that the Article 
76 process of defining the outer limits of the continental shelf ‘is not intended to coincidentally 
settle in any way delimitations of overlapping areas of continental shelf’.419  
However, a different scenario emerges when an international court or tribunal is 
requested to delimit the outer continental shelf before the CLCS has adopted final 
recommendations regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf. Even though ITLOS took 
pains to show that ‘delimitation by an international tribunal would not prejudice the work of 
the CLCS’,420 such a statement might not be true for all cases. 
 First, a statement that ‘delimitation’ did not depend on the identification of the ‘outer 
limits of the continental shelf’ was true in the Bay of Bengal cases, but might not necessarily 
be so in other cases. The three States in the Bay of Bengal cases are adjacent to each other. 
When delimitation is between States with adjacent coasts, as Evans argued, ‘it is perfectly 
possible to project a delimitation line seawards in accordance with the favoured methodology 
and allow for the terminus to be determined at some later date when the precise delineation of 
the outer limit might be determined’.421 In cases where the two States have opposite coasts, 
such as Nicaragua and Colombia, it may be difficult for a tribunal to determine whether there 
are overlapping entitlements without knowing where the limits of the entitlement end. This was, 
in fact, the argument used by Colombia in its Written Pleadings to distinguish the case brought 
by Nicaragua to the ICJ in 2016 from the Bay of Bengal cases.422  
Moreover, ITLOS and the Annex VII arbitral tribunal were faced with a much less 
controversial situation as the Bay of Bengal is quite unique. The sea floor of the Bay of Bengal 
is covered by a thick layer of sediment some 14 to 22 kilometres deep originating in the 
Himalayas and the Tibetan Plateau,423 which covers practically the entire floor of the Bay of 
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Bengal. Bangladesh, Myanmar and India had made their submissions to the Commission, in 
which three parties included data indicating that their entitlement to the continental margin 
extending beyond 200 nm was based on the thickness of sedimentary rocks pursuant to the 
formula contained in Article 76(4)(a)(i) of the Convention.424 Therefore, it was beyond any 
doubt that the parties had entitlement to an outer continental shelf based on the thickness of the 
sediment on its floor even when the CLCS had not issued its recommendations.  
In cases which do not share the same characteristics as the Bay of Bengal, the delimitation 
effected by a dispute settlement body before the outer limits have been identified may in fact 
encroach on the work of the CLCS. In particular, first, delimitation must be based on 
overlapping entitlements.425 Therefore, by agreeing to proceed with delimitation, a tribunal 
implicitly recognises that at least one, or both parties, has entitlements beyond 200 nm and that 
these entitlements overlap. Supposing that the CLCS later finds that one or both of the parties’ 
entitlements does not extend beyond 200 nm, or that their entitlements do not extend so far as 
to create overlapping entitlements, what remains of the delimitation effected by the 
international court? For this reason, Judge Ndiaye, in his Separate Opinion in 
Bangladesh/Myanmar believed that ITLOS ‘should have referred the matter to the Commission 
at this stage in the proceedings […] since the Tribunal should have considered itself unable to 
dispense justice in the circumstances of the case.’426  
Second, the tribunals’ recognition of the coastal State’s entitlements beyond 200 nm may 
encourage the latter to use the outer limit lines contained in its submission even when they have 
not been validated by the CLCS. In Bangladesh/Myanmar, although ITLOS referred to the fact 
that submissions of Bangladesh and Myanmar to the Commission clearly indicated an overlap 
of entitlements in the area in dispute, the CLCS had neither confirmed nor rejected the scientific 
information contained in the submissions made. The claimed entitlements were, in Judge 
Ndiaye’s words, ‘founded more on presumptions than proof’.427 As a result, contrary to what 
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ITLOS insisted, its decision could in fact have the effect of legitimizing a claim to an outer 
continental shelf—a task that belongs to the Commission—and therefore, encroach on the 
functions of the Commission.428 As one commentator observed, in such cases, ‘the role of the 
Commission is somehow literally being reduced to declarative recommendations which would 
not necessarily correspond to an ordinary meaning of LOSC Article 76(8) in conjunction with 
Article 7 of Annex II to the LOSC.’429 
 Third, to justify its contention that its exercise of jurisdiction would not ‘be seen as an 
encroachment on the functions of the CLCS’,430 ITLOS drew an analogy between delimitation 
of the outer continental shelf effected through adjudication or arbitration and delimitation 
reached through negotiation. ITLOS said the latter would ‘not be seen as precluding 
examination by the Commission of the submissions made to it or hindering it from issuing 
appropriate recommendations’.431 In the same vein, the exercise of its jurisdiction to delimit the 
outer continental shelf could not be seen as an encroachment on the functions of the 
Commission. ITLOS’ analogy, however, does not stand up to examination as it overlooked the 
fundamental difference between dispute settlement through negotiation and through third-party 
settlement—flexibility and political compromises.432 When States negotiate their boundary for 
the outer continental shelf, they may agree to set aside the absence of established outer limits 
and/or the lack of a recommendation of the Commission.433 In the course of negotiation, it is 
likely that the parties will have agreed to put in place some arrangement to deal with the absence 
of the outer limits, such as allowing for the subsequent identification of the terminus of the 
boundary,434 or adjustments to the boundary when the outer limits are identified at a later 
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time. 435  For example, when Iceland, Norway and Denmark (Faroes) negotiated the three 
maritime boundaries prior to filing submissions to the CLCS, the agreed minutes of the 
negotiations provide that if one or more of the States is unable to demonstrate ‘that the area of 
its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles corresponds in size, as a minimum, to the area 
that falls to the same State according to the agreed boundaries’, the boundaries would be 
adjusted on the basis of previously agreed terms also found in the minutes.436 The possibility 
of adjustment ensures that effect will be given to the recommendation of the CLCS, thus the 
parties’ agreement will not pre-empt the recommendation to be issued by the CLCS.  
It is true that the flexibility found in negotiation may to a certain level extend to cases in 
which the parties only request the court or tribunal to advise them on the principles to be applied 
to effect a maritime boundary, like the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. A court or tribunal 
could in such an instance take into account the potential changes which could be brought about 
by the CLCS recommendation to the area of the seabed to which the States are entitled and 
provide guidance on how to these changes might affect the boundary to be established. 
However, in cases in which the court or tribunal is requested to delimit the actual the maritime 
boundary, the course of the boundary is fixed and the boundary becomes ‘final and binding’.437 
The court or tribunal in question could theoretically leave open the possibility of boundary 
adjustment; or the parties may, if they so wish, negotiate to reach an agreement to adjust the 
boundary established by the international court in the event that the CLCS’s recommendation 
subsequently renders the boundary inequitable. Even then, in many cases, the court cannot draw 
a precise boundary without determining the extent of the entitlement in the first place, thus 
treading into what should be the CLCS’s realm of expertise. 
One may argue that the tribunals would not encroach on the CLCS’ functions as nothing 
prevents the CLCS from issuing a recommendation on the outer limits of the continental shelf 
which contradicts the court’s finding on the scope of entitlement. This is true from a technical 
point of view; however, such practice would not be conducive to the implementation of 
UNCLOS and should thus be avoided. The Preamble of the Convention clearly states that the 
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goal of UNCLOS is to establish ‘a legal order for the seas’ in order to ‘promote the peaceful 
uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources’. UNCLOS 
tribunals and the CLCS are new institutions set up with a view to realizing these goals, ie 
maintaining a legal order at sea. Discrepancies in the advice given to States by different treaty 
institutions on the same matter clearly do not serve this purpose. That is not to say that an 
international court or tribunal should never proceed to delimitation in the absence of a CLCS 
recommendation. UNCLOS tribunals in the Bay of Bengal were correct in finding that under 
certain geographical circumstances, delimitation effected by a court or tribunal would not 
prejudice the tasks of the CLCS. However, while delimitation effected by an UNCLOS tribunal 
might not technically prevent the CLCS from performing its function, it may lead to 
inconsistencies in the interpretation and application of the Convention, which runs counter to 
the object and purpose of UNCLOS. 
One may also be tempted to further argue that when a tribunal delimits a maritime 
boundary beyond 200 nm, its role could be construed merely as advising the parties about the 
course of their boundary in the event that the CLCS eventually confirms their entitlements 
beyond 200 nm. In other words, the tribunal helps to indicate, not to conclusively determine the 
area in which a State can exercise their rights and obligations vis-à-vis the neighbouring States. 
This argument is, however, not tenable. In such a case, the existence of overlapping entitlements 
is still hypothetical. An international court or tribunal could advise States on what the law 
regulating a certain issue in an abstract manner or in hypothetical situations, but only in the 
context of advisory proceedings. In a contentious proceeding, the court or tribunal is asked to 
settle a ‘dispute’,438 and the fact that the ‘dispute’ between the parties may or may not exist, 
depending on whether they have entitlements beyond 200 nm, should render the case 
inadmissible and the court or tribunal should not exercise jurisdiction in such cases.439  
In the two Bay of Bengal cases, the involvement of the CLCS might not have been 
crucial since the scientific evidence was clear and uncontested, enabling UNCLOS tribunals to 
determine that the parties had entitlement to an outer continental shelf. Therefore, the UNCLOS 
tribunals could have proceeded to delimitation before the issuance of the CLCS’s 
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recommendation without much controversy. ITLOS itself admitted in Bangladesh/Myanmar 
that it ‘would have been hesitant to proceed with the delimitation of the area beyond 200 nm 
had it concluded that there was significant uncertainty as to the existence of a continental 
margin in the area in question’.440 This statement illustrates the awareness on the part of the 
tribunal of the special circumstances of the case before it and the threshold at which it would 
not exercise its function.  
UNCLOS tribunals have provided an answer to the long-debated relationship between 
the two newly established institutions of UNCLOS, the dispute settlement bodies and the 
CLCS, thereby clarifying to a certain extent the application of Article 76(10) UNCLOS. 
However, while the approach adopted by UNCLOS tribunals was enlightening, the decisions 
reached were limited to the factual circumstances of the cases. Consequently, caution should 
be exercised when attempting to generalise the tribunal’s conclusions in the Bay of Bengal 
cases to all other situations. 
III. THE METHOD OF DELIMITATION APPLICABLE TO THE  OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF 
Using the argument that there is only one continental shelf, UNCLOS tribunals in the three 
cases Bangladesh/ Myanmar,441 Bangladesh/India442 and Ghana/ Cote d’Ivoire443 all stated 
that the delimitation method to be employed for the continental shelf within and beyond 200 
nm should not differ. In other words, the delimitation method applicable to the outer continental 
shelf continued to be the equidistance/relevant circumstances method which has established 
itself as the favoured method of delimitation in international jurisprudence.444 ITLOS further 
explained in Bangladesh/Myanmar that the equidistance/relevant circumstances method was 
‘rooted in the recognition that sovereignty over the land territory is the basis for the sovereign 
rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State with respect to both the exclusive economic zone and 
the continental shelf.’445 As one commentator noted, ‘[t]he approach of the ITLOS, including 
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the references to LOSC Article 83, gives strong support to the equidistance/relevant 
circumstances methodology prima facie applying to overlapping shelf claims beyond 200 
nm.’446  
Judge Treves commended ITLOS in Bangladesh/Myanmar—as the first international 
tribunal to have proceeding with delimitation of the outer continental shelf—for having ‘[kept] 
in mind the need to ensure consistency and coherence’ by following the methodology developed 
by the ICJ and recent arbitral awards on delimitation, but still contributing ‘its own grain of 
wisdom and particular outlook’447 in applying the notion of relevant circumstances and in its 
decision to delimit the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. Judge Treves commented that 
ITLOS, in so doing, had ‘become an active participant in a collective interpretative endeavour 
of international courts and tribunals’.448  
However, the question that arises is whether the equidistance/relevant circumstances 
method was in fact the appropriate method for the delimitation the outer continental shelf. 
Article 83 only specifies that the result for delimitation of the continental shelf, be it within or 
beyond 200nm, should be equitable; it does not say that the method has to be the same.449 Both 
ITLOS and the Annex VII tribunal relied on the ‘one continental shelf’ argument to determine 
that the equidistance/relevant circumstances method, which had been developed through case 
law for the delimitation of areas within 200nm only, was also applicable to the delimitation of 
areas beyond 200nm without undertaking a serious examination of its ability to produce an 
equitable outcome beyond this distance. Due to the differences between the inner and outer 
continental shelf in terms of the basis for entitlement, the criteria for establishing the limits as 
well as the role that the Convention assigns to the CLCS, the automatic application of the 
equidistance/relevant circumstances method by UNCLOS tribunals to delimiting the outer 
continental shelf may raise certain questions. In particular, it is questionable whether (i) 
equidistance should be used as the starting point; (ii) whether circumstances deemed relevant 
within 200nm continue to be appropriate beyond 200nm, and (iii) whether the proportionality 
test provides an accurate outcome in the absence of the outer limits.  
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First, the basis for entitlement for the inner continental shelf is distance from the coast. 
This differs from that for the outer continental shelf, which is the location of the outer edge of 
the continental margin determined by geomorphological and geological criteria. Within 200 
nm, therefore, coastal geography plays a significant role in the process of delimitation. The use 
of the equidistance line as a point of departure for delimitation is assumed to be equitable as it 
is constructed based on geographical conditions of the relevant coasts and ‘divides the 
overlapping areas of the projections of the two coasts almost equally’.450 Moreover, within 200 
nm, the existence of the EEZ and the tendency of States to establish a single maritime boundary 
mean that geographical factors have a particularly significant role in the delimitation process. 
As one commentator rightly observed:  
A single line delimitation requires that geographical factors be placed at the heart of the 
process; geographical factors call for geometrical methods […] since all geometrical 
methods based on the real geography belong, in the ultimate analysis to equidistance.451 
Beyond 200 nm, given that the coast no longer remains the basis to establish entitlement to an 
outer continental shelf, but it is instead the geomorphology and geology condition of the seabed 
that determines entitlement, it is not clear whether equidistance line should still retain its 
primacy as the first step in delimitation. The International Law Association Committee was of 
the opinion that ‘the fact that the basis for entitlement to continental shelf and its delimitation 
are linked suggests that the process of delimitation may be different within and beyond 200 
nm’.452 
Second, regarding relevant circumstances calling for the adjustment of the provisional 
boundary, both ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunal only took into account those that had 
already been considered relevant for the areas of water within 200 nm, such as concavity of the 
coast producing cut-off effects. No mention was made to those that are peculiar to the areas 
beyond 200 nm, namely geological or geomorphological circumstances ITLOS in 
Bangladesh/Myanmar in fact rejected Bangladesh’ argument relating to ‘the most natural 
prolongation’ as a relevant circumstance in the delimitation of the outer continental shelf. This 
decision received support from Judges ad hoc Mensah and Oxman in their Joint Declaration in 
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Bangladesh/Myanmar. The two Judges believed that ‘[a]cceptance of this idea would, in our 
view, introduce a new element of difficulty and uncertainty into the process of maritime 
delimitation in this case’, and that ‘it could have an unsettling effect on the efforts of States to 
agree on delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles.’453  
However, could ITLOS’ decision be read to mean, as one author contends, that ITLOS 
‘rejects geology as a relevant circumstance for the delimitation of the outer continental shelf; 
in other words, geology is completely immaterial beyond 200 nm’?454 The answer seems to be 
no. ITLOS’ rejection of ‘the most natural prolongation’ argument flowed from a conclusion it 
adopted earlier that ‘natural prolongation’ could not constitute an independent criterion to prove 
entitlement to the outer continental shelf. In ITLOS’ view, therefore, Bangladesh could not 
claim that because it had more ‘natural prolongation’, it should be entitled to a bigger shelf. 
There is no basis to suggest that ITLOS’ rejection of the ‘most natural prolongation’ argument 
amounted to a complete rejection of the relevance of geological and/or geomorphological 
criteria in the delimitation process.  
In fact, in the Bay of Bengal cases, neither ITLOS nor the Annex VII arbitral tribunal 
explicitly said anything to endorse or reject the relevance of geological factors in the 
delimitation of the outer continental shelf. In the course of the delimitation, no geological and 
geomorphological factors were taken into account. On the other hand, interestingly, in 
Bangladesh/Myanmar, ITLOS declined to accept that the Bengal depositional system was 
relevant to the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf within 200 nm as: 
The location and direction of the single maritime boundary applicable both to the seabed 
and subsoil and to the superjacent waters within the 200 nm limit are to be determined 
on the basis of geography of the coasts of the Parties in relation to each other and not 
on the geology or geomorphology of the seabed of the delimitation area.455  
This holding is reminiscent of the statement made by the ICJ in Libya/Malta that there was no 
‘reason why a factor which has no part to play in the establishment of title should be taken into 
account as a relevant circumstance for the purposes of delimitation.’456 In fact, in no cases in 
which the delimitation of the continental shelf within 200 nm was at issue before the ICJ did 
the Court find geophysical factors put forward by the parties relevant.457 This would seem to 
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suggest that, a contrario, if a factor has a part to play in the establishment of the shelf, it should 
be taken into account. It follows that the decisions of international courts and tribunals to date, 
including those of UNCLOS tribunals, leave open the possibility that geological and 
geomorphological factors may be deemed relevant to delimitation on the outer continental shelf 
since they do have a role to play in forming the basis of entitlement to such an area.  
Moreover, as UNCLOS tribunals reiterated, there is only ‘one continental shelf’, thus 
Article 76, including those paragraphs that pertain to the outer continental shelf, and Article 83 
should have a close connection. This strengthens the contention that geological and 
geomorphological factors should have a role to play in the delimitation of the outer continental 
shelf. Of course, this does not suggest that geomorphological or geological factors ‘operate to 
the exclusion of other relevant facts in the delimitation of the outer continental shelf’.458 The 
decision as to which factor could be deemed relevant can only be made on a case-by-case basis, 
so long as the solution is equitable as required by Article 83. As geomorphological or geological 
factors have a clear role to play in establishing entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 
200nm, arguably, they should at least have been considered and not completely ignored as in 
the Bay of Bengal cases.  
The question as to what impact geological and geomorphological factors would have on 
the delimitation process is another issue altogether. Some commentators put forward the 
argument that ‘[i]f a major geomorphic or geological feature (eg, a trough or plate boundary) 
exists in the area to be delimited, then such a feature could be used as the basis for the alignment 
of the outer continental shelf boundary’.459 Such an argument was, in fact, adopted by the 
United Kingdom in the Delimitation of the Anglo–France Continental Shelf Arbitration, in 
which it argued that the ‘Hurd Deep’ or ‘Hurd Deep Fault Zone’, which was a trough or trench, 
should constitute a natural boundary between the French and British continental shelf. The 
arbitral tribunal did not accept this argument as, in its view, the trench or trough did not ‘disrupt 
the essential unity of the continental shelf either in the Channel or the Atlantic region’.460 Thus, 
even though there is still uncertainty as to how geological and geomorphological factors could 
impact the delimitation line, it seems that at least States cannot merely argue that a factor that 
disrupts the natural prolongation of its submerged territory would constitute a boundary line. 
Instead, ‘States should be able to argue convincing as to ‘why should such a naturalness (or 
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interruption therefore) presuppose the finding of an actual boundary line, and how could it 
support even a rudimentary location for that line?’461 
The last step in the equidistance/relevant circumstances method is a (dis)proportionality 
test in order to ensure that the boundary line drawn by the tribunal produces an equitable result 
for the parties concerned. The proportionality test requires the tribunal to check if the boundary 
line, whether adjusted or not, ‘results in any significant disproportion between the ratio of the 
respective coastal lengths and the ratio of the relevant maritime areas allocated to each Party’.462 
ITLOS already established that the relevant area should include maritime areas subject to 
overlapping entitlements of the parties.463 However, in both of the Bay of Bengal cases, the 
outer limits of the continental shelf had not been identified, giving rise to the question as to 
whether it was possible for the tribunals to have known definitively the total area of overlapping 
outer continental shelf of the two parties? ITLOS determined that the relevant maritime area 
for the purpose of the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf between Bangladesh 
and Myanmar was that resulting from the projections of the relevant coasts of the Parties.464 No 
attention was paid to the outer limits of the shelf, or the lack thereof. In Bangladesh/India, the 
arbitral tribunal took cognisance of the outer limits of the continental shelf by referring to 
Bangladesh’s submission to CLCS in order to determine the south and southwest limits of the 
relevant area.465 However, this also meant that an Annex VII arbitral tribunal took upon itself 
to validate Bangladesh’s submission regarding its outer continental shelf limits, which, as 
analysed above, could prejudice the work of the CLCS.466 In Ghana/Cote d’Ivoire, ITLOS 
conceded that the size of the relevant area ‘can only be an approximation’ as ‘the outer limits 
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm have not yet been finally established’.467 If the relevant 
maritime area could not be conclusive determined due to the lack of the outer limits of the 
continental, it is questionable whether the proportionality test could be performed or whether 
the final boundary line would ensure an equitable result. 
In short, the delimitation method applicable to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm has 
been clarified, but many questions regarding its appropriateness and its ability to produce an 
equitable result as required by Article 83 remain unresolved.  
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IV. THE GREY AREA  
The delimitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm in both of the Bay of Bengal cases 
gave rise to an area known as the ‘grey area’, in which sovereign rights over the seabed and the 
superjacent water belong to two different States. The grey area resulted from a situation in 
which the delimitation line which was not an equidistance line reached the outer limit of one 
State’s EEZ and continued beyond it in the same direction, until it reached the outer limit of the 
other State’s EEZ.468 In Bangladesh/Myanmar, which was the first case in which such an area 
was created by an international tribunal, this grey area was located beyond 200 nm from the 
coast of Bangladesh but within 200 nm from the coast of Myanmar, yet on the Bangladesh side 
of the delimitation line.469 Similarly, in Bangladesh/India, the grey area was beyond 200 nm 
from the coast of Bangladesh but within 200 nm from the coast of India, but again on the 
Bangladesh side of the delimitation line.470  
It is worth noting that both Bangladesh and Myanmar were against the creation of a grey 
area.471 Bangladesh argued that the differentiation of water-column rights and continental-shelf 
rights could cause great practical inconvenience, which was why ‘differential attribution of 
zone and shelf has hardly ever been adopted in State practice’.472 Myanmar contended that 
‘[a]ny allocation of area to Bangladesh extending beyond 200 [nm] off Bangladesh’s coast 
would trump Myanmar’s rights to EEZ and continental shelf within 200 [nm]’, which was 
‘contrary to both the Convention and international practice’.473 In response, ITLOS merely 
noted that in a situation involving concurrent EEZ and continental shelf rights, each coastal 
State must exercise its rights and perform its duties with due regard to the rights and duties of 
the other.474 ITLOS in the end left it to parties to determine the measures that they consider 
appropriate for this purpose. 475 Similarly, the Annex VII tribunal also expressed its confidence 
that ‘the Parties will act, both jointly and individually, to ensure that each is able to exercise its 
rights and perform its duties within this area’.476 It is clear that the grey area was not favoured 
by the parties to the case; it was merely a by-product of the method of delimitation chosen by 
UNCLOS tribunals.  
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As the Bay of Bengal cases were the first instances in which a grey area was created by 
international tribunals, the tribunals’ reasoning, albeit limited, posed interesting questions 
regarding the legal nature of the EEZ and continental shelf, as well as the relationship between 
these two maritime areas, both from doctrinal. The creation of the grey area also raises practical 
issues with regard to coastal States’ implementation of their rights and obligations in the EEZ 
and continental shelf within the grey area. These two issues will be examined in turn. 
1. Implication of the ‘grey area’ on the relationship between the EEZ and 
continental shelf 
ITLOS and Annex VII tribunal adopted the same approach to explaining the legal basis for the 
‘grey area’, as well as for the rights and obligations of the parties therein. With regard to the 
former, both tribunals invoked Article 56(3) which provides that ‘the rights set out in this 
Article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI’ 
and Article 68 which excludes sedentary species from the provisions relating to the EEZ.477 By 
relying on Articles 56(3) and 68, the tribunals seemed to have been saying that the Convention 
already envisioned the separation of the water column and the seabed within 200 nm. Further, 
ITLOS and the Annex VII arbitral tribunal called on the parties to exercise their rights and 
perform their duties with due regard to the rights and duties of the other States pursuant to the 
principle reflected in the provisions of Articles 56, 58, 78 and 79.478  
In creating the grey area, UNCLOS tribunals practically severed Myanmar’s and India’s 
subsoil and seabed in the EEZ from their respective superjacent water, and allowed Bangladesh’ 
‘outer’ continental shelf to extend into what would have been the other two parties’ ‘inner’ 
continental shelf. The implication of the tribunals’ decisions is two-fold: (i) the regimes of EEZ 
and continental shelf are separable within 200nm; and (ii) a State’s entitlement to an area 
beyond 200 nm can encroach on another state’s entitlement to continental shelf within 200 nm 
of its coastal baselines. These implications are highly significant for the long-standing debate 
on the relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf, as well as that between the 
‘inner’ and ‘outer’ continental shelf. They also suggest that UNCLOS tribunals implicitly 
endorsed the primacy of the continental shelf over the EEZ regime. However, as will be shown 
below, the tribunals’ scarce and unsatisfactory reasoning in support of the grey area seems to 
have raised more questions than answers.  
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With regard to the relationship between the EEZ and the continental shelf, Article 56(1) 
states that the EEZ includes the exploration and exploitation of resources both ‘of the waters 
superjacent and the seabed and its subsoil’. If follows that when a coastal State has claimed an 
EEZ, the seabed and subsoil form an integral part of the EEZ. Since Article 56(3) provides that 
the rights in seabed and subsoil of the EEZ ‘shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI’, the 
EEZ and continental shelf regimes overlap within 200 nm.479 Thus, within 200 nm, as the ICJ 
in Libya/Malta acknowledged, the two institutions are ‘linked together in modern law’ and 
‘[a]lthough there can be a continental shelf where there is no exclusive economic zone, there 
cannot be an exclusive economic zone without a corresponding continental shelf. 480 In his 
partial Dissenting Opinion in Bangladesh/India, Judge Rao also opined that, ‘the sovereign 
rights of a coastal State over the water column and the seabed and its subsoil are considered as 
two indispensable and inseparable parts of the coastal State’s rights in the EEZ’.481Moreover, 
the rules governing the rights of the coastal States in the adjacent waters and the seabed are to 
a large extent uniform. For example, the coastal State’s sovereign rights over living and non-
living resources, its rights and jurisdiction with regard to artificial islands, marine scientific 
research, as well as its obligations regarding environmental matters in the EEZ and continental 
shelf are almost identical.482 All of the above point to the argument that the EEZ and continental 
shelf regimes constitute an integral system of rights and obligation within 200 nm.  
As mentioned, ITLOS and the Annex VII arbitral tribunal suggested that the regimes for 
the superjacent water and for the seabed and subsoil within 200 nm are already separated by 
virtue of Articles 56(3) and 68. It is true that the regimes regulating the waters and seabed and 
subsoil within 200 nm are provided for in different parts of UNCLOS. However, paragraph (3) 
of Article 56 cannot be read in isolation. It should instead be interpreted within the context of 
Article 56 as a whole, including paragraph (1) and taking into account international 
jurisprudence which emphasises the similarities, even homogeneity, of regimes within the 200 
nm zone.483 Article 56(3) was put in place in order to ‘remove the potential for confusion 
between the [EEZ] and the continental shelf’. 484  This provision also highlights that 
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notwithstanding the introduction of the EEZ, which significantly impacted the way the limits 
of the continental shelf are determined under UNCLOS as well as the delimitation method 
adopted by international tribunals within 200 nm, and despite the interconnectedness between 
the two regimes within 200 nm, the EEZ and continental shelf are still two distinct maritime 
zones. The EEZ regime does not cause the continental shelf regime to cease to exist, nor does 
the EEZ regime subsume the continental shelf regime.485 Article 56(3) thus protects the rights 
of the coastal States over the seabed within 200 nm under Part VI in cases in which a coastal 
State has not claimed an EEZ.486 It cannot serve as the legal basis for the separation and 
distribution of the waters to one State and the seabed and subsoil within 200 nm to another. In 
the only Dissenting Opinion rendered in Bangladesh/Myanmar, Judge Lucky also argued that 
‘a strict interpretation of the law set out in Parts V and VI of the Convention prohibits the 
allocation of waters superjacent to the seabed and its subsoil, ie the continental shelf, to two 
different States.’487 
Furthermore, by allowing Bangladesh’s continental shelf to extend into the seabed within 
200 nm of the other two parties, UNCLOS tribunals seem to have provided a negative answer 
to the questions regarding whether there is a hierarchy of claims between the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
continental shelf, and, as Evans queried, whether the 200 nm ‘inner’ shelf could be considered 
‘an absolute entitlement, incapable of being encroached upon by the “outer” continental shelf 
of another State?’488 UNCLOS tribunals repeatedly used the argument that ‘there is only one 
continental shelf’ as the basis for their decisions. However, this ‘one continental shelf’ 
argument does not seem to stand up to scrutiny. While it is true that physically speaking, a 
continental shelf does not stop when it reaches the 200 nm limit, the continental shelf that is 
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regulated under UNCLOS is one of a juridical nature. As a result, there are in fact differences 
in the legal regime that governs the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ parts of the shelf. Judge Rao, in 
Bangladesh/India, disagreed with the majority’s view that ‘no distinct inner and outer 
continental shelf exist’ and contended that this was true only ‘insofar as the resources the shelf 
encompasses and any regulation that goes with them’.489 Judge Rao’s comment is certainly 
correct, but only up to a point. As far as the regulation over resources is concerned, there are 
still differences in UNCLOS provisions regarding the coastal State’s rights over resources 
located on the seabed within and beyond 200 nm. For example, Article 82 UNCLOS requires 
the coastal State to ‘make payments or contributions in kind with respect to the exploitation of 
non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm’ while no such requirement is in 
place for activities conducted within 200 nm. In addition, while the coastal State has the 
discretion to regulate marine scientific research conducted on the continental shelf within 200 
nm, in accordance with Article 246(6), the coastal State may not withhold consent for research 
undertaken beyond 200 nm. The discrepancies in the legal regimes regulating the continental 
shelf within and beyond 200 nm show that there might be one natural physical continental shelf 
in a scientific sense, but not one continental shelf in a legal sense as provided for under 
UNCLOS. Consequently, UNCLOS tribunals’ use of the continental shelf unity to override the 
EEZ and continental shelf unity within 200 nm may not be tenable from a legal point of view. 
The preceding discussion shows that UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions to draw a 
delimitation line which separated Myanmar’s and India’s seabed and subsoil from the adjacent 
waters within 200 nm of their coasts paid little attention to the theory of parallelism between 
the EEZ and continental shelf which has received widespread support since the entry into force 
of UNCLOS.490 Instead, UNCLOS tribunals gave more weight to preserving the continental 
shelf regime. Even though the Bay of Bengal decisions appear to have at first sight resolved the 
difficult issue regarding the relationship between the EEZ and continental shelf regimes, the 
rather simplistic explanation that the tribunals provided did not satisfactorily address the 
concerns raised above.  
2. Practical difficulties caused by the ‘grey area’  
Apart from raising doctrinal and legal questions, the separation of the water column and the 
seabed within 200 nm also creates practical difficulties for the parties in exercising their rights 
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and jurisdiction within the grey area. It should be recalled that Barbados, in objecting to the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear Trinidad’s claim to an outer continental shelf in Barbados 
v Trinidad and Tobago argued that a grey area would create ‘an unprecedented and unworkable 
situation of overlap between seabed and water column rights.’491 Although Barbados did not 
elaborate on what ‘unworkable situation’ it had in mind, it is not difficult to contemplate a few 
such situations in the grey area. For example, supposing Bangladesh placed a mobile oil rig in 
the waters of Myanmar’s EEZ for the purposes of exploring and exploiting its oil resources in 
the seabed and the latter alleged that this oilrig in conducting its activities on the seabed was 
causing pollution to its waters, would Article 208 relating to pollution from seabed activities or 
Article 211 relating to pollution from vessels apply? Article 208 meant that Bangladesh would 
have the jurisdiction over the vessel, while Article 211 would confer jurisdiction on Myanmar 
in accordance with Article 220. Likewise, India, under Article 60, has the exclusive right and 
jurisdiction over artificial islands, installations and structure in its EEZ. But supposing that the 
construction of those structures involved the dredging of the seabed, which damaged the living 
resources on the continental shelf of Bangladesh, which State would have enforcement power 
in this case?  
These are just some of the many difficulties that coastal States would face due to the 
bifurcation of rights and obligations in the EEZ and continental shelf within 200 nm. Within 
this distance, the effective exercise of many of the sovereign rights under UNCLOS to a certain 
extent depends on the fact that only one coastal State is exercising those rights. The arbitral 
tribunal in Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago held that a maritime boundary should be ‘both 
equitable and as practically satisfactory as possible, while at the same time in keeping with the 
requirement of achieving a stable legal outcome’.492 It seems evident that UNCLOS tribunals 
in the Bay of Bengal cases were occupied with adopting the method of delimitation deemed to 
bring an equitable outcome for the parties,493 while overlooking the impractical consequences 
of their decisions.   
Finally, the problems raised above may not be so significant if the States have actually 
agreed to the separation of their rights in the grey area. Some States have in practice agreed, in 
their maritime boundary delimitation treaties, to an area in which the EEZ belongs to one State 
and the continental shelf to another. These treaties, however, always include arrangements 
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regarding the exercise of the States’ rights and jurisdiction in such areas.494 Where jurisdiction 
is separated, ‘the arrangements are heavily dependent upon the goodwill and active cooperation 
of the State parties’.495 In the Bay of Bengal cases, not only did the parties object to the creation 
of a grey area, they also resorted to adjudication and arbitration in the hope of definitively 
settling long-standing disputes. Instead, Bangladesh, Myanmar and India have now been 
directed back to the negotiation table to find a solution for unprecedented tribunal-created areas 
of waters. UNCLOS tribunals seem to have ignored the fact that it was precisely because 
negotiations had failed to produce any tangible results in the past decades that the parties had 
resorted to third-party settlement. As the grey area was not envisioned by the parties when 
submitting the cases, it would have been more desirable if the tribunal had acknowledged the 
difficulties in exercising of rights in the grey area and provided some guidance for the States 
concerned to deal with them. Both Judge Lucky and Judge Rao regarded the decisions to leave 
the issues involving the grey areas unresolved and to refrain from offering any comment or 
suggestions to the parties to resolve the matter ‘a failure on the part of the UNCLOS tribunals 
to definitively resolve the disputes brought before them.’496 Although there are no provisions 
under UNCLOS to govern the situation where the two regimes overlap, Judge Lucky argued 
that ‘[w]here the law is not clear or there are no specific provisions, a judge must be innovative 
[…] If the law does not specify a solution, then the judge must, by applying the law, find one.’497 
Judge Lucky’s opinion regarding the role of the judge in developing the law is perhaps not 
without controversy. However, there are merits in his argument that as UNCLOS tribunals had 
gone far enough to create a zone for which the legal basis under UNCLOS is murky, they should 
also have spelled out the manner in which such a zone should be regulated. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
UNCLOS tribunals were the pioneers in examining issues concerning the legal regime of the 
outer continental shelf—an issue which had been avoided, or only superficially examined, by 
other international courts or tribunals. As such, they gave substance to Article 76, specifically 
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its paragraphs 1, 4 and 10, thereby answering questions which lie at the heart of the outer 
continental shelf regime. In particular, ITLOS’s analysis of the term ‘natural prolongation’ 
provides authoritative guidance on the meaning of this undefined term in establishing 
entitlement to the outer continental shelf. Also, by establishing a close connection between 
paragraphs (1) and (4) of Article 76, ITLOS confirmed that under UNCLOS, entitlement for an 
outer continental shelf is based on the existence of a continental margin as defined under Article 
76(3) beyond 200 nm. This further underlines the fact that the concept of the continental shelf 
under UNCLOS is largely of juridical nature.  
Second, UNCLOS tribunals were also the first to examine in detail the relationship 
between Articles 76 and 83. ITLOS drew a clear distinction between delimitation and 
delineation under UNCLOS, thereby confirming the independent relationship between 
UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies and the CLCS. The fact that the ICJ in the 2016 Nicaragua 
v Colombia case adopted a similar approach to that of UNCLOS tribunals, despite having 
refused to do so in 2012, may signify that some sort of judicial dialogue between different 
courts has taken place.498 What could have been perceived as fragmentation of the law of the 
sea did not in the end materialise. 
Third, as the first international tribunals to apply Article 83 to the delimitation of the 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm, UNCLOS tribunals also elucidated on the method of 
delimitation applicable to the delimitation of the outer continental shelf, which is the 
equidistance/relevant circumstances method. Even though the decisions are only binding on the 
parties to the case, some scholars have predicted that ‘the ITLOS decision may prove to be 
influential in the context of future dispute resolution, whether through third party adjudication 
or not’.499  
On the other hand, one ought to be careful about drawing broad implications from or 
generalizing the findings in the Bay of Bengal cases. Some of UNCLOS tribunals’ 
pronouncements regarding the interpretation of Article 76 should be assessed against an 
important caveat—the uniqueness of the Bay of Bengal. ITLOS’ conclusion regarding the non-
prejudicial nature of the interaction between UNCLOS tribunals and the CLCS, for example, 
may not hold true in cases in which the States involved have opposite coasts; or the requirement 
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of the issues which the ICJ judges were interested in discussing with ITLOS judges was the delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf. See: Judge Golitsyn, Expert Roundtable ‘ITLOS at 20: Impacts of the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ London Centre for International Law and Practice, London (23 May 2016), Q&A 
Session (author’s notes). 
499 Shaun Lin and Clive Schofield, ‘Lessons from the Bay of Bengal ITLOS case: Stepping Offshore for a ‘Deeper’ 
Maritime Political Geography’ (2014) 180(3) The Geographical Journal 260, 263. 
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for evidence of entitlement to an outer continental shelf may have to be more stringent where 
scientific evidence regarding the existence of an outer continental shelf is not so clear-cut. In 
other words, the jurisprudential value and enduring significance of the ITLOS judgment and 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal remains to be seen, especially in cases in which scientific evidence 
is still in doubt and the existence of outer continental shelf claimed by both parties is subject to 
much more uncertainty.  
The application of Article 83 also raises difficult issues. UNCLOS tribunals’ use of the 
equidistance/relevant circumstances method for the delimitation of the outer continental shelf 
manifested several substantive shortcomings, including the lack of proper acknowledgement of 
the basis of entitlement to an outer continental shelf, the lack of regard for geological factors as 
potential relevant circumstances in adjusting the provisional boundary line and, in the absence 
of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the inability to conclusively determine the relevant 
areas for the purposes of the performing the proportionality test. These deficiencies pose a 
serious challenge to the assumption that the equidistance/relevant circumstances method could 
automatically be applicable to the delimitation of the outer continental shelf to provide an 
equitable outcome. Last but not least, the tribunals’ creation the grey area raises both doctrinal 
and practical questions which they failed to adequately address in their decisions. 
In conclusion, UNCLOS tribunals made the first foray into clarifying important, but 
ambiguous or controversial, legal concepts under Article 76 and shedding light on the method 
of delimitation for the outer continental shelf under Article 83. At the same time, it should be 
acknowledged that not all of the tribunals’ answers or their accompanying reasoning were 
provided in a cogently manner, and some of the tribunals’ findings were further confined to the 
particular circumstances of the cases, potentially limiting their jurisprudential value. The 
significance of these contributions, therefore , lies more in the fact that they laid the first 
building blocks to understanding these articles and lent authority to certain interpretations of 
the legal concepts under these articles amidst various competing ways to understanding them. 
In consequence, the relevant pronouncements of UNCLOS tribunals have the potential 
normative power to influence the future development of the outer continental shelf regime. In 
other words, even with the limitations, they have set out a course for the law regulating the 
outer continental shelf to develop and take shape. It now remains to be seen whether that course 
will be followed by other international actors; the first signs from the ICJ, at least at the 
jurisdictional phase, seems to be in the positive. 
110 
 
CHAPTER 4     DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON MARINE   ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
 
The protection of marine environment assumes a special place under UNCLOS. Not only does 
the Convention prescribe States’ rights and obligations regarding the conservation of marine 
resources in the maritime zones falling under their jurisdiction, it also devotes an entire Part 
XII to the ‘Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment’. Part XII begins with a 
general obligation on States to ‘protect and preserve the environment’ and subsequently 
proceeded to provide for States’ obligations with regard to different forms of marine pollution. 
However, while innovative, it is noteworthy that Part XII merely provides a general framework 
for the protection of the marine environment, and indeed, Article 237 UNCLOS gives 
preference to specific obligation assumed by States under other special agreements over those 
contained under this Part. 
To date, ITLOS has not had the opportunity to deal with the protection of the marine 
environment in any contentious proceedings, but only in provisional measures and advisory 
opinion proceedings. Annex VII arbitral tribunals, for their part, did not have the opportunity 
to make any substantive contributions to the development of marine environment protection in 
the first two decades following the Convention’s entry into force.500 It was not until the recent 
Chagos MPA in 2015 and South China Sea in 2017 that Annex VII arbitral tribunals were able 
to deal with the legal rules relating to the protection of the marine environment. Despite the 
limited number of cases, ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals’ decisions have contributed 
to clarifying important principles under international environmental law, namely the 
precautionary principle, the duty to cooperate, the obligation of due diligence and the obligation 
to conduct environmental impact assessment. The following sections will examine the ways in 
which the tribunals dealt with each of these principles and assess the contributions made to the 
development of these principles.  
I.  THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
Even though the precautionary principle can be found in many international instruments,501 its 
status under international law as well as its normative content remains unclear due to a variety 
																																																								
500  When the cases concerning the marine environment, such as Southern Bluefin Tuna, MOX Plant, Land 
Reclamation, eventually proceeded to arbitration, they were either terminated and or rejected by the arbitral 
tribunals due to the lack of jurisdiction or consideration of comity to other courts. 
501 See in general, Arie Trouwbost, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law 
(Kluwer Law International 2002). 
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of reasons. First, there is a lack of a single universally accepted definition of the principle. 
Second, the specific requirements for the elements commonly present in the formulation of the 
precautionary principle, namely the existence of scientific uncertainty,502  the threshold of 
risk,503 and precautionary action,504 vary in different agreements. Third, different versions of 
the principle may entail different levels of commitment on the part of States.505 Finally, the 
precautionary principle also generates disagreement regarding its effects. It is not clear whether 
the precautionary principle lowers the standard of proof of harm to the environment to trigger 
response, 506 or reverses the burden of proof, by shifting the burden of proof from the party 
opposing the planned activity to prove that harm will be caused to the party wishing to take 
certain actions to prove that the actions will not cause harm to the environment. 507  
Due to the disparity in the formulation of the precautionary principle, its application is 
specific to the convention or treaty under which it is stipulated. UNCLOS, however, is not 
among those conventions; UNCLOS does not contain explicit references to the precautionary 
principle. 508 Notwithstanding the absence of the precautionary principle under UNCLOS, it has 
																																																								
502 Some instruments require ‘lack of full scientific uncertainty’. See, eg, Rio Declaration (n 301) Principle 15; 
Bergen Declaration, Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the ECE Region, 
A/CONF/151/PC/10. Others set the level of uncertainty at ‘no conclusive evidence’. See, eg, Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), 2354 UNTS 67, Article 
2.2; Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 1507 UNTS 167, Article 3.2. 
503  A precautionary measure would only be triggered when the threshold of risk is crossed. This threshold 
comprises of two requirements, the severity of potential risk and the probability of the risk. The severity of risk 
varies between ‘significant’, ‘serious’ or ‘irreversible’, while the probability of risk could be ‘reasonable grounds 
to believe’ or none at all. See, eg, Rio Declaration (n 301), Principle 15; United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 170, Article 3.3; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity 39 ILM 1027 (2000), Article 10.6. 
504 Most instruments do not specify the types of measures required in response to the risk. The rare exception is 
found under Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration which specifies ‘cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation’. Rio Declaration (n 301) Principle 15. 
505 The precautionary principle has been argued to function in two ways: (i) as a justification to take action, but 
not as a basis to compel action, in the face of scientific uncertainty, or (ii) as a duty to act, ie a duty to take 
preventative measures in cases of scientific uncertainty. See Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, ‘Precaution’ in 
Jorge E Viñuales (ed), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: A Commentary (OUP 2015) 408. 
506 Alan Boyle, ‘The Environmental Jurisprudence of the ITLOS’ (2007) 22 IJMCL 369; Arie Trouwborst, ‘The 
Precautionary Principle in General International Law: Combating the Babylonian Confusion’ (2007) 16 RECIEL 
185.  
507 Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd edn, CUP 2012) 222; 
Cançado Trindade (n 505) 409. 
508 There have been several suggestions, however, that the precautionary principle is not completely absent in 
UNCLOS. One contended that the concept of the precautionary principle can be read into UNCLOS by 
establishing the link between the precautionary principle and the prevention principle. See Bénédicte Sage-Fuller, 
The Precautionary Principle in Marine Environmental Law: With Special Reference to High Risk Vessels 
(Routledge 2013) 68. Another argument is that a trace of the precautionary principle can be seen in Articles 61(2) 
and 119 which create the assumption that that if scientific evidence is not available, conservative obligations under 
the Convention prevail, which is the essence of the precautionary principle. See Gerd Winter (ed), Towards 
Sustainable Fisheries Law: A Comparative Analysis (IUCN 2009) 15. Churchill argues that there is an ‘embryonic 
use’ of the principle in the definition of marine pollution under Article 1(1)(4) UNCLOS as including the 
introduction of substances or energy into the marine environment that not only results in deleterious 
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arisen in several cases concerning the protection of the marine environment before UNCLOS 
tribunals, particularly ITLOS. The tribunal has dealt with the principle, however, with varying 
degrees of elaboration and clarity. 
1. UNCLOS tribunals and the precautionary principle 
The Southern Bluefin Tuna case was the first instance in which the precautionary principle was 
invoked before ITLOS. In this case, Australia and New Zealand alleged that Japan, by 
unilaterally designing and undertaking an experimental fishing programme, failed to comply 
with obligations to conserve and cooperate in the conservation of the SBT stock under 
UNCLOS, the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and 
‘rules of customary international law’.509 By ‘customary international law’, Australia and New 
Zealand were referring specifically to the precautionary principle.510 Pending the constitution 
of Annex VII arbitral tribunal, the Applicants requested that ITLOS prescribe provisional 
measures, inter alias, to ensure that ‘the parties act consistently with the precautionary principle 
in fishing for SBT pending a final settlement of the dispute’.511  
The Applicants invoked under UNCLOS Articles 64, 116 and 119, found in Parts V and 
VII of UNCLOS concerning the conservation of living resources in EEZ and high seas 
respectively. While the Applicants did not base their claims on any provisions of Part XII, in 
the Order for provisional measures, ITLOS confirmed that ‘the conservation of the living 
resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment’.512 This paved the way for ITLOS to take into account environmental principles 
to deal with the conservation of living resources. The Tribunal acknowledged that the SBT ‘is 
severely depleted and is at its historically lowest levels and that this is a cause for serious 
biological concern’. 513 On this basis, it held that ‘the parties should in the circumstances act 
with prudence and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent 
																																																								
effects but also that ‘is likely to result’ in such effects. See Robin Churchill, ‘The LOSC Regime For Protection 
of the Marine Environment – Fit For The Twenty-First Century?’ in Rosemary Gail Rayfuse (ed), Research 
Handbook on International Marine Environmental Law (Edward Elgar 2015) 9. 
509 Southern Bluefin Tuna Order (n 227) [45]. Convention for The Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 819 
UNTS 360 (10 May 1993). 
510 Australia and New Zealand asked ITLOS in their written pleadings to take into account ‘the parties’ obligations 
under general international law, in particular the precautionary principle’. See Request for the Prescription of 
Provisional Measures Submitted by New Zealand, para. 1 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/request_new_zealand_eng.pdf> accessed 
25 September 2018; Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures Submitted by Australia, para. 1, 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/request_australia_eng.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2018. 
511 Order (n 227) [34]. 
512 ibid [70].  
513 ibid [71]. 
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serious harm to the stock of SBT’.514 Most importantly, ITLOS held in paragraphs 79 and 80, 
which deserve to be quoted in full, that: 
Considering that there is scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be taken to 
conserve the stock of southern bluefin tuna and that there is no agreement among the 
parties as to whether the conservation measures taken so far have led to the 
improvement in the stock of southern bluefin tuna; 
Considering that, although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific 
evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of 
urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the 
southern bluefin tuna stock.515 
Although ITLOS did not explicitly refer to the precautionary principle, there are 
elements in these two paragraphs which signalled the application of this principle.516 ITLOS 
highlighted the lack of scientific certainty regarding the measures to be taken and their 
effectiveness in conserving the stock, but nonetheless still decided to prescribe measures in 
order to prevent further deterioration to the stock. The decision to take action despite scientific 
uncertainty clearly paid heed to the precautionary principle as provided for in various 
instruments mentioned above.517 Coupled with the reference to ‘caution and prudence’, it does 
not seem difficult to conclude that ITLOS intended to apply the precautionary principle. In fact, 
the two paragraphs cited above show that the precautionary principle served as the main basis 
for the prescription of provisional measures in this case. As one scholar commented: 
The precautionary principle or approach was relevant in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
order in two senses: first as a specific rule or norm regulating the conduct of the parties, 
																																																								
514 ibid [77]. 
515 ibid [79], [80]. 
516 Several judges confirmed in their separate and dissenting opinions that the prescription of the provisional 
measure was based upon the considerations of the precautionary principle. See Southern Bluefin Tuna (New 
Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, Sep. Op. Treves) ITLOS 
Reports 1999, 280 [8]; Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Provisional Measures, 
Order of 27 August 1999, Sep. Op. Laing) ITLOS Reports 1999, 280 [19]; Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand 
v Japan; Australia v Japan) (Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999, Sep. Op. Shearer) ITLOS Reports 
1999, 280, 6. 
517 Note that Judge Laing argued that ITLOS did not adopt the precautionary principle but merely the precautionary 
approach. In his view, ‘adopting an approach, rather than a principle, appropriately imports a certain degree of 
flexibility and tends, though not dispositively, to underscore reticence about making premature pronouncements 
about desirable normative structures.’ However, it is generally agreed that the use of either of these terms carries 
little difference in terms of the function that it plays. See also: Cançado Trindade (n 505) 412; Nicolas de Sadeleer, 
Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 92. 
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and second as an organizing principle to guide the Tribunal’s assessment of Australia 
and New Zealand’s request for interim order.518  
It should be noted, however, that ITLOS did not confirm the status of the precautionary 
principle as a rule of customary international law as contended by the Applicants. Judge Treves 
in his Separate Opinion attempted to account for this oversight, stating that ‘in order to resort 
to the precautionary approach for assessing the urgency of the measures to be prescribed in the 
present case, it is not necessary to hold the view that this approach is dictated by a rule of 
customary international law.’519 Instead, ‘the requirement of urgency is satisfied only in the 
light of such precautionary approach’520  and thus, ‘a precautionary approach seems to be 
inherent in the very notion of provisional measures.’521 Judge Treves’ reasoning implied that, 
in his view, the basis for the application of the precautionary principle was found in the 
Convention itself, particularly in the requirement of ‘urgency’ under Article 290(5). This view 
has received support from another scholar, who argues that the inclusion of the ‘serious harm 
to the marine environment’ as a basis for the prescription of provisional measure enhances the 
precautionary aspect of provisional measures.522 Judge Laing went even further than Article 
290(5) and contended that ‘UNCLOS adopts a precautionary approach in preambular paragraph 
4, articles 61, 63 to 64, 116, 117, 118, 119 and 290(1).523 
When the case proceeded to the Annex VII arbitration, the arbitral tribunal found that it 
did not have jurisdiction.524 In the face of scientific uncertainty which could have laid the 
ground for the application of the precautionary principle, the fact that the arbitral tribunal 
declined to exercise jurisdiction was considered ‘a blow to the environmental movement’.525 
However, it should be noted that the arbitral tribunal rejected the case on grounds of jurisdiction 
and not on the merits. In fact, the arbitral tribunal praised the provisional measures prescribed 
by the ITLOS, and held that the revocation of the provisional measure did not mean that ‘the 
parties may disregard the effects of that Order and their own decisions made in conformity with 
it’.526  
																																																								
518 Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (CUP 2009) 225. 
519 Southern Bluefin Tuna, Separate Opinion of Judge Treves (n 516) [9]. 
520 ibid [8]. 
521 ibid [9]. 
522  Caroline Foster, Science and the Precautionary Principle in International Courts and Tribunals: Expert 
Evidence, Burden of Proof and Finality (CUP 2013) 268. 
523 Southern Bluefin Tuna, Separate Opinion of Judge Laing (n 516) [17]. 
524 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award (n 290) [57]. 
525 Leah Sturtz, ‘Southern Bluefin Tuna Case: Australia and New Zealand v. Japan’ (2001) 28 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 455; Tim Stephens (n 518) 228. 
526 Southern Bluefin Tuna Award (n 290) [67]. 
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The precautionary principle also arose in MOX Plant concerning Ireland’s challenge to the 
commission and operation of the MOX Plant by the UK.527 In its Written Request, Ireland 
contended that the precautionary principle had attained the status of a customary international 
rule and, as such, it was binding on both parties.528 In the context of a provisional measures 
proceeding before ITLOS, Ireland argued that the precautionary principle should inform the 
Tribunal’s assessment of the urgency of the measures that it was required to take in respect of 
the operation of the MOX plant.529 The UK, on the other hand, maintained that due to the lack 
of proof and on the facts of this case, the precautionary principle had no application.530  
ITLOS in this case adopted a more cautious approach when dealing with the precautionary 
principle than in Southern Bluefin Tuna. Despite both parties’ reference to the legal status of 
the principle and to the insufficiency of scientific data, ITLOS did not address any of these 
issues in its Order. ITLOS rejected Ireland’s request for provisional measures due to the lack 
of urgency of the situation required provisional measures under Article 290(5).531 However, in 
the Provisional Measures Order, the Tribunal still used the term ‘prudence and caution’ seen in 
Southern Bluefin Tuna in order to require the parties to cooperate ‘in exchanging information 
concerning risks or effects of the operation of the MOX plant and in devising ways to deal with 
them’.532 The use of ‘prudence and caution’ was not supported by any discussion, particularly 
on scientific uncertainty or risk of harm, thus it is unclear as to whether ITLOS actually intended 
to invoke the precautionary principle in this case. If, for the sake of argument, ITLOS had 
intended to do so, the precautionary principle would have served as a basis for the prescription 
of procedural obligations, as opposed to substantive obligations. Such use of the precautionary 
principle would have constituted a new way of applying the precautionary principle unseen in 
the case law of other tribunals before.533  In any event, ITLOS’ refusal to take apply the 
precautionary principle to grant Ireland the requested provisional measures could be seen as a 
retreat from the strong endorsement that ITLOS had shown for the principle in Southern Bluefin 
Tuna. As argued by one commentator, the characteristics of the MOX Plant dispute suggested 
																																																								
527 MOX Plant (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001) ITLOS Reports 
2001, 95. [MOX Plant Order] 
528  Request for Provisional Measures and Statement of Case Submitted on Behalf of Ireland, para 97 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_10/request_ireland_e.pdf> accessed 25 
September 2018. 
529 ibid. 
530 MOX Plant Order (n 527) [75].  
531 ibid [81]. 
532 ibid [84]. 
533 Note, however, that Judge Treves in his Separate Opinion queried whether ‘a precautionary approach is 
appropriate as regards the preservation of procedural rights’. See MOX Plant (Ireland v United Kingdom) 
(Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, Sep. Op. Treves) ITLOS Reports 2001, 95 [8].  
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that it was a ‘text book’ example of a situation that would require the precautionary principle.534 
ITLOS, therefore, missed an important opportunity to make a meaningful contribution to 
clarifying this increasingly important but still rather vague principle of environmental law. 
Judge ad hoc Székely was critical of ITLOS’ decision to disregard the applicability of the 
precautionary principle. In his view, the UK did not provide ITLOS with evidence to 
substantiate its allegations that the commission and operation of the MOX Plant would not 
cause irreparable harm to the marine environment.535 He contended that in the face of such 
uncertainty, there was place for the application of the precautionary principle, which would 
have led to the granting of provisional measures regarding the suspension of the commissioning 
of the plant. 536 
Judge Wolfrum, in contrast, agreed with ITLOS’ decision as, in his view, the application 
of the precautionary principle would have resulted in the fact that:  
The granting of provisional measures becomes automatic when an applicant argues with 
some plausibility that its rights may be prejudiced or that there was serious risk to the 
marine environment. This cannot be the function of provisional measures, in particular 
since their prescription has to take into consideration the rights of all parties to the 
dispute.537  
It is interesting to contrast Judge Wolfrum’s statement with that of Judge Treves in the Southern 
Bluefin Tuna case mentioned above, in which the latter contended that ‘a precautionary 
approach seems to be inherent in the very notion of provisional measures’.538 The fact that the 
two prominent judges adopted very different views on the implication of precaution on the 
prescription of provisional measures seems to further buttress the controversial nature of the 
precautionary principle. 
In the Land Reclamation case concerning Malaysia’s allegations that Singapore had 
violated UNCLOS for conducting land reclamation activities in the Straits of Johor, Malaysia 
also invoked the precautionary principle when requesting provisional measures. In addition to 
various provisions under UNCLOS, Malaysia cited, as the legal basis for its claims, ‘the 
precautionary principle, which under international law must direct any party in the application 
																																																								
534 Tim Stephens, International Courts and Environmental Protection (n 518) 234; Ted McDorman, ‘International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’ (2001) 21 YBIEL 531. 
535 ibid [18]. 
536 ibid [22]. 
537 MOX Plant (Ireland v United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, Sep. Op. Wolfrum) 
ITLOS Reports 2001, 95, 3. 
538 Southern Bluefin Tuna, Separate Opinion of Judge Treves (n 516) 8.  
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and implementation of those obligations’.539 Singapore rejected this submission and argued that 
there was no room to apply the precautionary principle in the case in question.540 Similar to the 
approach taken in the MOX Plant case, ITLOS did not discuss the precautionary principle when 
considering Malaysia’s allegations that Singapore’s activities in the Straits of Johor could cause 
irreparable prejudice to the Malaysia’s rights or serious harm to the marine environment. The 
Provisional Measure Order dealt with the activities carried out in the sector of Tuas to the west 
and Pulau Tekong to the east separately. In the area of Tuas, ITLOS was not convinced by the 
evidence presented by Malaysia that its rights would suffer irreversible damage, and thus 
rejected provisional measures.541 In the eastern part, in contrast, the Tribunal found that that 
environmental impact assessment had not been conducted,542 and came to the conclusion that 
‘the land reclamation works may have adverse effects on the marine environment’.543 Despite 
such findings, ITLOS did not find it appropriate to apply the precautionary principle to suspend 
Singapore’s ongoing activities, at least until the results of a more concrete assessment of the 
environmental impacts of the land reclamation activities would be published. Instead, ITLOS 
only recalled the familiar phrase ‘prudence and caution’ to require the parties to ‘establish 
mechanisms for exchanging information and assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation 
works and devising ways to deal with them in the areas concerned’.544 The use of the phrase 
‘prudence and caution’ bore resemblance to that used in MOX Plant. Again had the 
precautionary principle been intended to be used at all, it was only in connection with 
procedural obligations.  
Finally, the Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States with respect to 
Activities in the Area presented the occasion in which ITLOS came the closest to endorsing the 
status of the precautionary principle. The Seabed Dispute Chamber (‘SDC’ or ‘the Chamber’) 
was requested to answer three questions submitted by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) 
concerning the responsibilities, obligations and liability of UNCLOS States Parties with respect 
to the sponsorship of activities in the Area. Unlike previous cases in which the precautionary 
principle was invoked as a matter of customary international law due to the lack of provision 
under UNCLOS, in this Advisory Opinion, the precautionary principle is clearly stipulated in 
the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (Nodules 
																																																								
539 Land Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v Singapore) (Provisional Measures, Order of 
8 October 2003) ITLOS Reports 2003, 10. [Land Reclamation Order] 
540 ibid [75]. 
541 ibid [72]–[73]. 
542 ibid [95]. 
543 ibid [96]. 
544 ibid [99]. 
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Regulations), and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides 
in the Area (Sulphides Regulations) which are binding instruments and are applicable to 
exploration activities in the Area.545 As a result, the SDC found that the implementation of 
precautionary approach as defined in these Regulations was a binding obligation on sponsoring 
States. 546  
Moreover, the precautionary principle is further inscribed in a ‘standard clause’ for 
exploration contracts contained in Annex 4 of the Sulphides Regulations, which re-emphasises 
the importance of the principle in the conduct of activities in the Area. A parallel standard 
clause for exploration contracts in the Nodules Regulations does not, however, contain the 
precautionary principle. 547  As a result, although the general obligation to implement the 
precautionary principle already exists in the Sulphides Regulation, perhaps it was this absence 
that prompted the SDC to engage in a discussion on the status of the principle under 
international law. The SDC, in what could be described as an obiter dictum, held that: 
[T]he precautionary approach has been incorporated into a growing number of 
international treaties and other instruments, many of which reflect the formulation of 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. In the view of the Chamber, this has initiated a trend 
towards making this approach part of customary international law.548  
Even though the SDC did not explicitly state that the principle was a customary rule, this 
statement came closer to accepting the customary nature of the principle than any other 
tribunals had, and have, to date.  
The SDC also took the opportunity to shed some light on the meaning and application of 
this principle, albeit only in relation to the activities provided for in the Regulations. The 
Chamber explained that Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration contained two sentences, of which 
the second specified the scope of application of the precautionary principle. In particular, the 
second sentence of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration set the scale of harm to ‘serious or 
irreversible damage’ and limited the measures to be taken to only ‘cost-effective measures’.549 
																																																								
545 Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, ISBA/19/C/17 (amended) 
(22 July 2013); Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area, 
ISBA/16/C/L.5 (6 May 2010). Regulation 31, paragraph 2 of the Nodules Regulations and Regulation 33, 
paragraph 2 of the Sulphides Regulations require sponsoring States as well as the Authority to ‘apply a 
precautionary approach, as reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration’ in order ‘to ensure effective protection 
for the marine environment from harmful effects which may arise from activities in the Area’. See Advisory 
Opinion on Activities in the Area (n 235) [125]. 
546 ibid [127]. 
547 ibid [134]. 
548 bid [135]. 
549 ibid [128]. 
119 
 
Moreover, the Chamber also noted that the Rio Declaration also allowed for certain flexibility 
in the application of the principle, in light of the phrase ‘applied by States according to their 
capabilities’.550 The SDC interpreted this to mean that, in the context of the Advisory Opinion, 
‘the requirements for complying with the obligation to apply the precautionary approach may 
be stricter for the developed than for the developing sponsoring States’.551 This statement 
created a link between the precautionary principle and the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibility’ widely recognised under international environmental law.552 In 
addition, the SDC also stated that ‘the precautionary approach is also an integral part of the 
general obligation of due diligence of sponsoring States’.553 This was the first time in which an 
international tribunal analysed the structure and meaning of the precautionary principle as 
contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration in any detail, providing an important 
clarification of the meaning and application of this principle. 
2. Some observations regarding the precautionary principle  
A perusal of ITLOS’ cases shows that ITLOS was the first tribunal to have applied the 
precautionary principle in Southern Bluefin Tuna in 1999, albeit without calling it by name. It 
should be noted that the precautionary principle is recognised in almost all fisheries instruments 
post-UNCLOS.554 Such widespread recognition perhaps gave ITLOS the incentive to be more 
readily accepting of the precautionary principle in fisheries conservation cases, such as 
Southern Bluefin Tuna, as compared to marine pollution cases, such as MOX Plant or Land 
Reclamation. Even though ITLOS did not extend the strong support that it had shown for the 
precautionary principle in Southern Bluefin Tuna to these two subsequent cases when there was 
arguably room for the application of the principle, it seems that the principle was never 
completely dismissed. Some have argued that the Provisional Measures Orders in MOX Plant 
and Land Reclamation had a certain precautionary character as they were premised on 
considerations of ‘prudence and caution. 555 The Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, in 
turn, came closest to endorsing the status of the precautionary principle seen in any international 
decisions. Even though ITLOS did not explicitly state that the precautionary principle had 
become part of customary international law, the SDC’s view that there was now a trend towards 
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making this approach part of customary law was the boldest acknowledgement of the principle 
by any international tribunal. ITLOS, therefore, can be said to be the forerunner in the adoption 
of the precautionary principle. 
This becomes even more apparent when one compares ITLOS’ approach with that of other 
international courts and tribunals when faced with the precautionary principle. In cases such as 
Gabcykovo/Nagymaros,556 and more recently, the Whaling,557 the ICJ did not once endorse or 
apply the principle. It only engaged in a brief discussion of the precautionary principle in Pulp 
Mills in 2010, acknowledging that ‘a precautionary approach may be relevant in the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of the Statute’. 558  This statement 
notwithstanding, the ICJ still required Argentina, which was opposed to the operation of the 
Pulp Mills, to show clear evidence for the existence harmful substance to the factory.559 One 
can only find references to the principle in the dissenting or separate opinions of the judges, 
most noticeably those of Judge Weeramantry in Nuclear Tests,560 Judge Cancado Trindade in 
Pulp Mills,561 and Judge Charlesworth in Whaling.562  
The WTO Appellate Body has likewise been rather cautious whenever the precautionary 
principle arose in its case law. So far, it has not recognised the principle as a customary rule, 
calling the status of the principle as ‘less than clear’.563 The WTO Appellate Body in the EC–
Hormones only acknowledged that the precautionary principle had been ‘incorporated and 
given a specific meaning in article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement’564 but declined to comment on 
the question of the status of the principle, opining that such a question was ‘important’ but 
‘abstract’.565 
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Notwithstanding ITLOS’ acknowledgment of the precautionary principle, due to the fact 
that the principle has been dealt with only in the provisional measure and advisory proceedings, 
the Tribunal’s contribution to the development of the normative content of the principle has 
been rather limited. The application of the precautionary principle seems to have been informed 
by the nature of provisional measures proceedings. In terms of the threshold for the severity of 
harm, in Southern Bluefin Tuna, ITLOS read the gravity of harm contained in Article 290, ie 
‘serious harm’, as the triggering point for the application of the precautionary principle. In MOX 
Plant and Land Reclamation, whether ‘serious harm’ occurred to the marine environment was 
also examined, interchangeably with ‘irreversible harm’ or ‘significant impact’. However, as 
ITLOS did not invoke the precautionary principle as the basis for its provisional measures in 
these cases, it seems that the discussion on the level harm was part of the examination of Article 
290(5), not of the precautionary principle.  
With regards to the burden of proof, the provisional measures cases all seem to indicate 
that ITLOS did not reverse the burden of proof. The applicants still bore the obligation to prove 
‘serious harm’ to the environment when requesting precautionary measures from the 
respondents. However, it is arguable that, as Judge Wolfrum acknowledged in MOX Plant, 566 
the reversal of the burden of proof was not undertaken in the case because ITLOS was only 
required to establish prima facie jurisdiction in provisional measures. Therefore, the refusal to 
reverse the burden of proof in ITLOS case law was dictated by the exceptional nature of 
provisional proceedings.567 It is not possible, therefore, to draw a definitive conclusion from 
ITLOS’ decisions regarding the impact of the precautionary principle on the reversal of the 
burden of proof in other contexts beyond provisional measure. 
Even though ITLOS was prepared to apply the precautionary principle in Southern Bluefin 
Tuna, it is worth asking whether Judge Treves’ statement that ‘the precautionary principle is 
inherent in provisional measure’ holds true, particularly in the context of fisheries conservation. 
Article 290(5) requires that provisional measures could be prescribed only when ‘the urgency 
of the situation so requires’. This means that the party requesting the provisional measure must 
show that damage would occur in the limited window of time, although ITLOS’ decisions are 
inconsistent as to whether this limited time is between the provisional measure proceedings and 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal,568 or between the provisional measure proceedings and 
consideration of the merits of the case by the Annex VII arbitral tribunal.569 This requirement, 
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if read into the precautionary principle, would seem to add an extra element, ie the temporal 
element, to the threshold for the application of the precautionary principle. This may create a 
situation of dilemma where on the one hand, the precautionary principle encourages 
environmental-friendly actions even in the face of scientific uncertainty; and on the other hand, 
the lack of scientific certainty regarding the possible harm to the environment may make it 
impossible to predict urgency of the situation. This scenario is especially prone to happen in 
cases involving the protection of marine living resources where it is inherently difficult to be 
certain of the level of stocks that is available or depleted.570 One scholar has argued that 
‘[s]cientific uncertainty is normally the rule in fisheries management and a straightforward 
application of the precautionary principle would have resulted in the impossibility of 
proceeding with any activity relating to marine fisheries’.571 
In the context of an advisory proceeding, the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area 
was among the first to clarify link between the precautionary principle and several other 
environmental obligations. In earlier cases, namely MOX Plant and Land Reclamation, ITLOS 
already hinted at the link between the precautionary principle and procedural obligations, using 
‘prudence and caution’ as the basis for prescribing provisional measures which were of a 
procedural nature, such as the duty to cooperate. 572  The SDC, however, expanded the 
relationship between the precautionary principle not only to the duty to cooperate, but also to 
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ and due diligence. As ITLOS was 
only required to examine the precautionary principle in the abstract in an advisory proceeding, 
it did not elaborate more on the peculiarities of these links. 
In short, ITLOS’ decisions have added an authoritative voice to endorsing the status and 
applicability of the precautionary principle to marine environment protection under UNCLOS. 
ITLOS has also contributed to clarifying certain elements of the principle’s normative content, 
although the contribution was limited by the nature of the proceedings in which the principle 
was examined. 
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II. DUTY TO COOPERATE 
Unlike the precautionary principle which is not expressly provided for under UNCLOS, the 
duty to cooperate to protect the environment is clearly set out in various provisions in the 
Convention.573 The duty to cooperate has come up before UNCLOS tribunals in two contexts, 
in the conservation and management of marine resources and the prevention of pollution to the 
marine environment.  
1.  UNCLOS tribunals and the duty to cooperate 
ITLOS’ decisions relating to the duty to cooperate in conserving marine sources have been 
analysed extensively in Chapter 2. It suffices here to recall the conclusion that ITLOS 
acknowledges and places great emphasis on duty to cooperate in the conservation and 
management of resources. However, ITLOS stopped short of giving meaningful content to this 
duty, which resulted in cooperation becoming more of a policy aspiration than a binding legal 
obligation. The separate opinions of the judges seem more helpful in this regard and have gone 
further in clarifying the content of the duty to cooperate. The remainder of this Part will focus 
on UNCLOS decisions’ relating to the duty to cooperate in the prevention of marine pollution 
The duty to cooperate took centre stage in the MOX Plant and Land Reclamation cases. In 
MOX Plant, Ireland alleged that, inter alia, the UK breached its obligations under Articles 123 
and 197.574 Article 123 requires State Parties to cooperate in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas 
either directly or through an appropriate regional organisation; Article 197 imposes on them an 
obligation to cooperate in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and 
recommended practices and procedures for the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. It is interesting to note that while these articles do not specify what would be 
required of State Parties to fulfil the obligation to cooperate, Ireland’s claim incorporated into 
them other duties also found under UNCLOS, such as the duty to exchange information and to 
carry out EIA. Although ITLOS did not find that there was urgency requiring the provisional 
measure requested by Ireland, it still prescribed provisional measures requiring both parties to 
cooperate and enter into consultations regarding several issues. In one of the most important 
paragraphs of the Order, ITLOS stated that: 
The duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the 
marine environment under Part XII of the Convention and general international law and 
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that rights arise therefrom which the Tribunal may consider appropriate to preserve under 
article 290 of the Convention.575  
In saying so, ITLOS affirmed that the duty to cooperate existed beyond the confines of 
UNCLOS and had become part of general international law. Interestingly, ITLOS seems to 
have been saying that the duty to cooperate created a corresponding right on other States to 
request for cooperation, the latter in need of preservation for the purposes of Article 290.  
Furthermore, ITLOS further held that ‘prudence and caution require that Ireland and the 
UK cooperate in exchanging information concerning risks or effects of the operation of the 
MOX plant and in devising ways to deal with them, as appropriate’.576 As already mentioned, 
ITLOS used precaution as the basis for the need to cooperate, which in turn, required the 
exchange of information between the parties. In prescribing its provisional measure, ITLOS 
held that ‘Ireland and the UK shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose, enter into consultations 
[…]’577 One author argued that the insertion of the phrase ‘for this purpose’ indicated that the 
duty to enter into consultation was a method of fulfilling the duty to cooperate.578 The duty to 
cooperate in this case, thus, included the obligation to exchange information and to enter into 
consultation.  
The importance of the duty to cooperate is further highlighted in the separate declarations 
and opinions of the judges. In particular, Judges Caminos, Yamamoto, Park, Akl, Marsit, 
Eiriksson and Jesus stated that their support for the Order of the Tribunal was a response to ‘the 
almost complete lack of cooperation between the Governments of Ireland and the UK with 
respect to the environmental impact of the planned operations.’579 The judges believed that 
requiring the parties to cooperate was the most effective measure that could have been 
adopted.580 The joint declaration helped shed light on underlying reason for the adoption of a 
provisional measure that vastly differed from what the applicant had requested, further 
highlighting the importance of the duty to cooperate in the consideration of the Tribunal in 
general.  
Also supportive of ITLOS’ emphasis on the duty to cooperate, Judge Wolfrum added that 
the duty was the ‘Grundnorm’ of Part XII of the Convention, as well as of customary 
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international law for the protection of the environment, as it moved the emphasis from States 
sovereignty and individual interests to the environment and community interests.581  More 
interestingly, Judge Wolfrum observed that although the obligation to cooperate with other 
States existed under UNCLOS as a multilateral convention, the creation of rights, as a corollary, 
for every other individual State Party of the Convention should be cautioned against.582 Here 
again, the relationship between the obligation and the right to cooperate resurfaced. The 
implication of Judge Wolfrum’s statement seems to be that the duty to cooperate did not exist 
as an erga omnes or even erga omnes partes obligation,583 and that a State can only require 
cooperation from another State in specific cases where its rights may be at stake.  
Judge Anderson was also critical of the tribunal’s provisional order calling for parties to 
cooperate and enter into consultation. Even though he agreed that there was room for 
heightened bilateral cooperation between the two parties, he did not find that Article 123 was 
the appropriate legal basis for such a requirement. In his view, Article 123 ‘does not require 
cooperation to be at the bilateral level so long as there is cooperation through an appropriate 
regional body’.584 Such an interpretation of Article 123 does, however, not seem tenable. A 
closer reading of Article 123 suggests that the existence of an appropriate region body does not 
render bilateral cooperation redundant. The means through which cooperation is taken is not 
determinative to the fulfilment of Article 123, the key point to consider under Article 123 is 
whether the States in question have endeavoured to cooperate and coordinate in the conducting 
the activity in question. Judge Anderson’s opinion on the irrelevance of Article 123 also 
touched upon an ongoing debate concerning the normative force of this article due to the weak 
language that it employs, ie that States are merely under the obligation to ‘endeavour’ to 
coordinate, a point to which ITLOS could perhaps have paid more attention in its Order.585  
It can be seen that the declarations and separate opinions of some of the judges showed a 
certain level of disagreement with ITLOS’ provisional measure directing both parties to 
cooperate and consult. However, the criticism was mostly directed at whether asking the parties 
to cooperate was appropriate as a provisional measure in light of the requirements of Article 
290 or the legal basis of such an obligation. None of them questioned the significance of the 
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duty to cooperate in cases of transboundary harm, which contributed to reaffirming the 
importance attached to cooperation.  
ITLOS’ approach in MOX Plant was subsequently adopted in Land Reclamation. It should 
be noted, however, that this case was not entirely similar to MOX Plant. Firstly, Malaysia when 
requesting provisional measure did not bring up the issue of cooperation, at least by name. In 
its Request, Malaysia asked the Tribunal to order Singapore to provide Malaysia with full 
information concerning the current and projected works, to afford Malaysia a full opportunity 
to comment upon the works and their potential impacts; and to agree to negotiate with Malaysia 
concerning any remaining unresolved issues. 586  All of these may be part of the duty to 
cooperate, as has been held in the MOX Plant case, but some of them also exist as independent 
obligations under UNCLOS. Secondly, in response to several of Malaysia’s requests, Singapore 
gave assurances and undertakings which indicated Singapore’s readiness and willingness to 
enter into negotiations, to give Malaysia a full opportunity to comment on the reclamation 
works and their potential impacts, and to notify and consult Malaysia before it proceeded to 
construct any transport links. Singapore also extended an explicit offer to share the information 
that Malaysia requested, and re-examine its works in the case that Malaysia was not convinced 
by the evidence supplied.587 All these assurances corresponded to the various obligations found 
under UNCLOS, namely obligation to consult, obligation to notify environmental damage, 
obligation to exchange information and data.  
Despite placing Singapore’s commitments on records, ITLOS still found the level of 
cooperation between the parties insufficient. ITLOS recalled the statement made in the MOX 
Plant case that ‘the duty to cooperate is a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution 
of the marine environment under Part XII of the Convention and general international law’.588 
In almost identical wording to the MOX Plant case, ITLOS then held that ‘prudence and caution 
require that Malaysia and Singapore establish mechanisms for exchanging information and 
assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation works and devising ways to deal with them in 
the areas concerned’.589  
The provisional measures eventually prescribed echoed many of Singapore’s 
commitments. ITLOS required Malaysia and Singapore to cooperate, for the purposes of which, 
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to enter into consultations, exchange information, assess risks and most importantly, establish 
a group of independent experts with a mandate to conduct a study to determine the effects of 
Singapore’s land reclamation, to propose measures to deal with any adverse effects of such land 
reclamation; and to prepare an interim report on the subject of infilling works in Area D at 
Pulau Tekong. 590  The duty to cooperate in this case thus included the duty to exchange 
information regarding the activities as well as their possible consequences, the duty to consult 
with other States that may be affected by the planned activities and to devise appropriate 
measures as deemed necessary for the protection of the marine environment. Although the duty 
to cooperate was not invoked by the Malaysia in its submissions, the whole case in the end 
revolved around this duty. 
The duty to cooperate have also manifested itself in a different form in other cases, in 
particular in the duty to have regards to the rights of other States. In Chagos MPA before an 
Annex VII arbitral tribunal, Mauritius claimed that the manner in which the UK declared the 
establishment of a marine protected area (MPA) around the Chagos Archipelago violated 
several provisions under UNCLOS, including Article 194(4) concerning the obligation to give 
due regards to the rights of Mauritius.591 In response, the arbitral tribunal explained that the 
requirement under Article 194(4) that a State ‘refrain from unjustifiable interference’ when 
taking measures to prevent, reduce or control pollution of the marine environment could be 
considered functionally equivalent to the obligation to give ‘due regard’ as set out in Article 
56(2).592 The arbitral tribunal then interpreted the obligation ‘to give due regard’ as entailing at 
least consultation and a balancing exercise with its own rights and interests.593 To the extent 
that the obligations to enter into consultation, to make information available, to exchange 
information are part of the duty to cooperate, there is clearly a level of overlap between the duty 
to have regard as interpreted by the arbitral tribunal and the duty to cooperate. The ICJ in 
Whaling in fact confirmed this overlap. The Court held that Japan had an obligation to give due 
regard to the resolutions and guidelines of the International Whaling Commission (IWC).594 
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The obligation to give due regards in the view of the ICJ stemmed from the obligation to 
cooperate with the IWC and the Scientific Committee set up by the ICW as provided for under 
ICRW itself.595 The difference between the duty to give due regards in Whaling case and in 
Chagos MPA is that the former is owed by the State party to the international organisation, ie 
the IWC, and not to another State as in the latter.  
In addition, the duty to cooperate has been argued to exist under Article 194(1) by virtue 
of the obligation to ‘endeavour to harmonize policies’ in preventing pollution of the marine 
environment. In Chagos MPA, Mauritius argued that this obligation required the sharing of 
information, the exchange of ideas, and some degree of consultation with a view to making 
pollution-related policies for the Chagos Archipelago consistent or compatible with those of 
other States in the region.596 The UK, on the other hand, contended that Article 194(1) was 
‘simply the chapeau to the more specific treatment of different sources of marine pollution set 
out in paragraph (3)’.597 The arbitral tribunal unfortunately did not elaborate on the meaning of 
the term ‘to harmonize policies’ nor did it specify what this obligation imposed on States. If 
Mauritius’ interpretation had been adopted, this would have suggested that Article 194(1) 
provided another basis for the duty to cooperate under UNCLOS in the context of marine 
environment pollution.  
2. Some observations on the duty to cooperate 
The fact that the duty to cooperate was at the core of various cases concerning the marine 
environment before ITLOS attested to the significance of this particular duty in the protection 
of the marine environment. ITLOS’ decisions on the duty to cooperate have made some 
important contributions to the status and content of the duty. The duty to cooperate is now 
acknowledged to be part of general international law, as held by ITLOS in MOX Plant and 
confirmed in Land Reclamation. The duty to cooperate is found to be applicable to all aspects 
of the protection of the marine environment, including the conservation of marine resources as 
affirmed in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case and the prevention of transboundary pollution as in 
MOX Plant, Land Reclamation and Chagos MPA.  
The scope of the duty to cooperate has also been clarified to a certain extent. The duty to 
cooperate, at least in the prevention of marine pollution, comprises more concrete obligations, 
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namely, the obligations to exchange information, to consult with other States potentially 
affected by the planned activities, to jointly study the impacts of the activity on the marine 
environment, monitor risks or the effects of the operation and devise measures to prevent 
pollution of the marine environment. It should be noted that these obligations already exist as 
separate obligations under UNCLOS and under general international law. What ITLOS did was 
to incorporate these independent obligations under the umbrella of the duty to cooperate. 
UNCLOS tribunals also clarified that interaction between the duty to cooperate and other duties 
under Part XII such as the duty to give due regard to the rights of other States, making clear 
that they share similar normative content. When it comes to the conservation of marine 
resources, however, ITLOS has been less successful in defining the contours of the obligation 
to cooperate with regards to shared stocks. 
It is evident that the emphasis on the duty to cooperate helped the parties to resolve their 
differences in some cases. For example, the establishment of an independent group of experts 
as required in Land Reclamation enabled the parties to reach a Settlement Agreement in their 
own terms.598 Similarly, before the Annex VII arbitral tribunal that was established to hear the 
merits of the MOX Plant case, Ireland acknowledged that there had been some improvement in 
the processes of co-operation and the provision of information. The arbitral tribunal, in turn, 
stated that it was ‘satisfied that since December 2001, there has been an increased measure of 
co-operation and consultation, as required by the ITLOS Order’.599  
This acknowledgment notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that the arbitral tribunal in MOX 
Plant also pointed out problems, both before and after the ITLOS Order, concerning ‘the 
absence of secure arrangements, at a suitable inter-governmental level, for coordination of all 
of the various agencies and bodies involved.’600 This statement highlights the issue commonly 
found in the decisions of UNCLOS tribunals concerning the duty to cooperate. With the 
exception of Land Reclamation in which ITLOS prescribed at least one concrete measure to be 
taken by the parties to discharge of the duty to cooperate, UNCLOS tribunals were generally 
much more general or, in the words of Judge ad hoc Shearer in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, 
too ‘diplomatic’, with regard to the measures to be taken so as to fulfil the duty to cooperate. 
UNCLOS tribunals have a tendency to call on the relevant parties to enter into consultations 
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and exchange information as a means of cooperation. States retain wide discretion as to the 
manner in which to fulfil their duty to cooperate. Consequently, although UNCLOS tribunals 
have clarified the scope of the duty by reading other independent obligations into the obligation 
to cooperate, there is still room for further contribution on the part of the tribunals.  
III.  ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT  
1. UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions on environmental impact assessment 
The obligation to carry out environment impact assessment (EIA) is provided for in Article 206 
UNCLOS.601 Beyond the Convention, the ICJ in Pulp Mills recognised that this obligation also 
existed under general international law ‘where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity 
may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared 
resource’.602 The status of this obligation under international law is, therefore, no longer subject 
to debate. It is the content of the obligation that is still shrouded in uncertainty. UNCLOS 
tribunals have had the opportunity to deal with the duty to conduct EIA in several cases, with 
varying degree of specificity. In earlier cases, the contribution of ITLOS to clarifying the 
content of this obligation was limited; and it was not until the recent South China Sea arbitration 
that the Annex VII arbitral tribunal managed to engage in a more detailed analysis of this 
obligation.  
In MOX Plant, one of Ireland’s allegations was that UK had refused to carry out a proper 
assessment of the impacts on the marine environment of the MOX plant and associated 
activities.603 Ireland argued that even though the UK in 1993 had carried out EIA on the basis 
of which the commission of MOX Plant was authorised, the 1993 Impact Assessment Statement 
was not adequate as it did not address the potential harm of the MOX Plant to the marine 
environment of the Irish Sea.604 Meanwhile, the UK contended that it had adduced evidence to 
establish that the risk of pollution from the operation of the MOX plant would be infinitely 
small and that the commissioning of the MOX plant would not cause serious harm to the marine 
environment or irreparable prejudice to the rights of Ireland.605 ITLOS, for its part, did not 
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address the adequacy or lack thereof of the 1993 Impact Assessment Statement in its 
Provisional Measure Order.  
Judge ad hoc Székely took issue with the majority’s decision with regard to the lack of 
attention to EIA. He was deeply unimpressed by the UK’s 1993 Environmental Impact 
Statement, calling it ‘surprisingly empty and superficial’.606 Emphasising that ‘EIA is a central 
tool of the international law of prevention’, Judge Székely believed that the inadequacy of the 
UK’s EIA, constituting a violation of Ireland’s substantive rights under Article 206, should 
have been sufficient for the prescription of the provisional measures.607 In contrast, Judge 
Mensah argued that a violation of the duty to conduct EIA was not of substantial significance 
for the purposes of prescribing provisional measures, as it could not have led to irreversible 
damage pending the constitution of Annex VII arbitral tribunal.608 He argued that violations of 
procedural rights, including the duty to undertake appropriate EIA, were capable of being made 
good by reparations that the arbitral tribunal to be constituted may consider appropriate. Judge 
Mensah did not seem to object to the obligation to conduct EIA per se, but rather queried its 
applicability in a provisional measure proceeding.  
In Land Reclamation, Malaysia also alleged that Singapore had not, prior to commencing 
its current land reclamation activities, conducted and published an adequate assessment of their 
potential effects on the environment and on the affected coastal areas. 609  Even though 
Singapore argued that the land reclamation had not caused any adverse impact on Malaysia, the 
Tribunal found that EIA had not been undertaken by Singapore.610 This fact proved to be crucial 
in the granting of provisional measures as ITLOS held that in the absence of the EIA, it could 
not be excluded that the land reclamation works might have adverse effects on the marine 
environment.611 Consequently, although ITLOS did not order Singapore to suspend its land 
reclamation activities as requested by Malaysia, it ordered the establishment of a group of 
experts whose mandate was to ‘study the effects of Singapore’s land reclamation and to 
propose, as appropriate, measures to deal with any adverse effects of such land reclamation’.612 
The task assigned to this group was in effect that of EIA, the results of which would form the 
basis for any actions as agreed by the two parties. Similar to MOX Plant, the lack of EIA did 
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not prompt ITLOS to grant the applicant the provisional measures that the latter had requested. 
However, EIA formed the crux of the provisional measure that ITLOS eventually prescribed.  
In the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, ITLOS—free from the constraints of 
provisional measures proceedings—managed to shed further light on the obligation to conduct 
EIA. With regard to activities in the Area, the obligation to carry out an EIA, besides finding 
basis in Article 206, is also found in the Annex to the 1994 Agreement as well as the Nodules 
Regulations and the Sulphides Regulations.613 Notwithstanding this fact, the SDC still added 
that an obligation to conduct an EIA was a general obligation under customary international 
law.614 It recalled the statement made by the ICJ concerning EIA in Pulp Mills, but stated that 
although EIA in that case was discussed in a transboundary context, the obligation to conduct 
EIA: 
[M]ay also apply to activities with an impact on the environment in an area beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction; and the Court’s references to ‘shared resources’ may also 
apply to resources that are the common heritage of mankind.615  
With regard to the content of the obligation to conduct an EIA, the SDC did not leave it 
open as did the ICJ in Pulp Mills. The SDC held that this obligation was one of the ‘direct 
obligations’ imposed on sponsoring States, meaning ‘obligations with which sponsoring States 
have to comply independently of their obligations to ensure a certain behavior by the sponsored 
contractor’.616 In the specific context of activities in the Area, the SDC pointed out that the 
content of the obligation to conduct an EIA was specified in the Nodules Regulations, Sulphides 
Regulations and the Recommendations for the Guidance of the Contractors for the Assessment 
of the Possible Environmental Impacts Arising from Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in 
the Area. 617  Furthermore, the SDC held that ‘EIAs should be included in the system of 
consultations and prior notifications set out in article 142 of the Convention with respect to 
resource deposits in the Area which lie across limits of national jurisdiction.’618 There has been 
uncertainty regarding the relationship between EIA and other procedural obligations, 
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particularly consultation with and notification to the affected population. Dupuy and Viñuales 
contend that this ‘depends on the source of the obligation’ but that ‘outside the treaty and 
administrative framework, the question is less clear’;619 while Okanawa maintains in a more 
general manner that EIA is implicit in the duty to consult and notify other States of proposed 
activities that may entail harm.620 The SDC’s abovementioned statement confirmed that EIA 
under UNCLOS was part of the obligation to consult and notify, insofar as activities in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction are concerned. The ICJ in 2015 in fact confirmed this close 
relationship between the obligation to conduct EIA and the obligation to notify and consult in 
Construction of a Road. Having established that Nicaragua was not under an international 
obligation to carry out EIA, the Court held that it was not required to notify, or consult with, 
Costa Rica.621 An a contrario reading of this statement indicates that if the obligation to conduct 
EIA arises, the State will also bear the obligation to consult and notify with the State affected 
by the activity. 
The Annex VII arbitral tribunal’s analysis of the obligation to carry out EIA under Article 
206 in South China Sea further shed light on the relationship between these two obligations. In 
dealing with the Philippines’ allegation that China’s construction activities on several features 
in the South China Sea violated the latter’s obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment, the tribunal recalled what the ICJ had stated in Construction of a Road that the 
mere assertion of the existence of assessment was not the same as conducting the assessment 
itself.622 While China claimed that it had undertaken thorough studies, the documents that the 
tribunal managed to locate from China or elsewhere concerning the environmental impact of 
China’s island-building activities were found to fall short of the criteria for EIA under Chinese 
domestic regulation, as well as international standards reviewed by international courts or 
referred to in the Chinese reports themselves. 623  The tribunal was not able, therefore, to 
conclude whether China had indeed prepared an EIA. It nevertheless stated that ‘[t]o fulfil the 
obligations of Article 206, a State must not only prepare an EIA but also must communicate 
it.’624 On that basis, the tribunal found a violation of Article 206 on the part of China due to the 
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fact that it had never communicated its EIA report to the tribunal or any other international 
ogranisations.625 
2. Some remarks on the obligation to conduct EIA 
In all the cases brought before UNCLOS tribunals, none of the parties disputed the necessity of 
EIA or the existence of the obligation to conduct an EIA under international law. Their 
arguments instead only revolved around whether EIA had been conducted and if so, whether it 
was adequate and the results reliable. This clearly shows a high level of consensus among States 
regarding the existence of such obligation under international law and its importance in cases 
of potential environmental harm.  
When it came to the scope and content of the duty, ITLOS’ decisions concerning EIA threw 
little new light on what the duty involves or the criteria based on which an EIA would be 
considered satisfactory. Both the MOX Plant and the Land Reclamation cases involved 
submissions requiring the interpretation and application of Article 206. In neither of the cases, 
however, was the alleged lack of EIA considered for the prescription of provisional measures. 
The only exception was the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, in which the SDC was 
able to clarify the content of the duty to conduct EIA thanks to the specific Rules and 
Regulations concerning the activities in the Area. These Rules and Regulations, however, 
contain criteria that are applicable in a very limited context with specific actors, and thus may 
not readily be extended to other instances in which the duty also arises. 
The South China Sea arbitral tribunal was the first to deal with Article 206 in a contentious 
case and the only case to date in which a violation of the duty to conduct EIA under Article 206 
has been found. The tribunal’s analysis raises interesting points for the broader application of 
this obligation. First, the tribunal made clear that a State cannot claim to have conducted EIA 
without showing proof of it. This was highlighted by the statement that the assertion of an 
assessment was not sufficient as evidence that the EIA has been conducted. Second, by 
emphasising the obligation to communicate the findings of EIA, it reaffirmed the connection 
between the obligation to conduct EIA and the obligation to consult and notify with the 
potentially affected State. Third, while the tribunal did not get the chance to elaborate on what 
should be included in an EIA as there was no EIA report available for scrutiny, it seemed to 
have placed particular emphasis on the criteria for EIA stipulated in Chinese domestic 





The third point is particularly interesting in light of the fact that despite requiring the 
conduct of an EIA, Article 206 of UNCLOS does not elaborate on the content of this obligation. 
In their written submissions to the Annex VII arbitral tribunal in MOX Plant, both Ireland and 
the UK elaborated on their views with regards to the specific content of the obligation to 
conduct EIA. Ireland was particularly mindful of the fact that Article 206 did not impose any 
specific obligations on the UK regarding EIA, but argued nonetheless that the arbitral tribunal, 
in interpreting and applying Article 206, ‘should take into account the common standards of 
EIA in other instruments such as the UNEP EIA Principles or the Espoo Convention’.626 The 
UK, for its part, argued that by virtue of the terms ‘reasonable grounds’ and ‘as far as 
practicable’ under Article 206, States retained the discretion as to the manner in which EIA 
should be carried out.627 As the arbitration was suspended by the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, it 
remains open as to which of the two views should prevail. The disagreement between Ireland 
and the UK raises the question as to whether and to what extent Article 206 can be informed 
by existing standards of EIA found in other international instruments.628 This question is part 
of an even broader discussion concerning whether transboundary EIA is part of international 
law, in particular of the requirement of Principle 21 of 1972 Stockholm Declaration,629 or 
whether it is an outgrowth of domestic EIA regulations.630 If it is the former, there should be a 
general standard for EIA imposed on States, whereas if it is the latter, States retain large 
discretion as to how to carry out their EIA. In Pulp Mills, the ICJ held that ‘general international 
law does not specify the scope and content of EIA’,631 implying that the content is the obligation 
‘is set by the domestic law of States’.632 The reference to both domestic law and international 
standards in the South China Sea Award did little to help clarify this issue, although the 
reference to international standards could arguably be taken as hinting at an inclination to 
restrict the absolute discretion of States in conducting EIA. 
With regard to the question as to whether the standard for EIA contained in other 
international instruments could be read into Article 206 UNCLOS, there are tools available for 
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UNCLOS tribunals to refer to relevant standards contained in other international instruments 
to shed light on in provisions of the Convention whose wording may be too vague and 
general.633 It is interesting to note that the SDC in its Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area 
was willing to interpret the Nodules Regulations in light of the development of the law 
contained in the subsequent Sulphides Regulations. More specifically, the Nodules Regulations 
did not mention precautionary principle and only contained a very general provision on ‘best 
environmental practice’. Nevertheless, the SDC had no hesitation in reading the precautionary 
principle and the requirement to apply ‘best environmental practices’ found under the Sulphides 
Regulations into the Nodules Regulations.634 Admittedly, the context for the application of the 
Sulphides Regulations and the Nodules Regulations was almost identical, thus such an 
incorporation made sense. In the South China Sea Jurisdiction and Admissibility Award, the 
arbitral tribunal stated that although it did not have jurisdiction to decide on violations of the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) it could consider the relevant provisions of the CBD for the 
purposes of interpreting the content and standard of Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention.635 
This was of course facilitated by the fact that both the Philippines and China are parties to the 
CBD. The use of standards contained in external treaties for the purposes of interpreting 
provisions of UNCLOS, according to the tribunal, was made possible thanks to Article 293(1) 
UNCLOS on Applicable Law and Article 31(3) of the VCLT. 
In conclusion, the most significant contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to the development 
of the duty to conduct EIA has been the strengthening of its status and importance in cases of 
transboundary harm. In terms of the normative content of the obligation, there are perhaps 
merits in the comments of one scholar that ITLOS case law on EIA ‘has barely scratched the 
surface’.636 ITLOS in some of its earliest cases did not manage to contribute much to clarifying 
normative content of this obligation, primarily due to the constraints of provisional measure 
proceedings. The Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area went somewhat further but its 
general applicability was more restrained. The South China Sea arbitral tribunal, on the other 
hand, managed to shed some important light on the measures that States would have to 
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undertake to fulfil the obligations of Article 206, but did not have, or take, the opportunity to 
clarify the content of EIA under UNCLOS.  
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF DUE DILIGENCE 
The principle of due diligence holds an important place under environmental law and a key 
component of the obligation to prevent environmental harm.637 The content of this principle is 
not subject too much controversy. ICJ already explained in Pulp Mills that the due diligence 
obligation entails:  
not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level of vigilance 
in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and 
private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to 
safeguard the rights of the other party.638 
However, what is worth noticing is that UNCLOS does not explicitly provide for the principle 
of due diligence. UNCLOS tribunals have nonetheless read this obligation into various 
provisions of the Convention regulating the obligation of States over activities of different 
nature.  
In the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, the SDC held that with respect to the 
sponsorship of activities in the Area, sponsoring States have two kinds of obligations under the 
Convention, both of which relate to the obligation of due diligence. The first kind of obligation 
was the ‘obligation to ensure’ under Article 139 and the second was ‘direct obligations’ with 
which sponsoring States were to comply independently of their ‘obligation to ensure’ as 
‘compliance with these obligations may also be seen as a relevant factor in meeting the “due 
diligence” obligation of the sponsoring State’.639 These independent obligations included the 
precautionary principle, the obligation to cooperate, the obligation to conduct EIA and the 
obligation to apply ‘best environmental practices’.640 
The SDC devoted a substantial part of this Advisory Opinion to examining the ‘obligation 
to ensure’ under Article 139 UNCLOS.641  It held that this ‘obligation to ensure’ was an 
																																																								
637 International Law Association Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, First Report of 7 March 
2014 <http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/study_groups.cfm/cid/1045> accessed 25 September 2018. 
638 Pulp Mills (n 558) [217]. 
639 Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area (n 235) [23]. 
640 ibid [121]–[140]. 
641 Article 139 provides in relevant parts: States Parties shall have the responsibility to ensure that activities in the 
Area, whether carried out by States Parties, or state enterprises or natural or juridical persons which possess the 
nationality of States Parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, shall be carried out in 
conformity with this Part. 
138 
 
obligation of due diligence and an obligation of conduct.642 Recalling Pulp Mills, the SDC held 
that the connection between the obligation of due diligence and obligation of conduct meant 
that the sponsoring State was not obliged to achieve, in each and every case, the result that the 
sponsored contractor complies with the obligations. Rather, it was an obligation to deploy 
adequate means, to exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost, to obtain this result.643 In 
terms of what the ‘obligation to ensure’ entailed, the SDC, again echoing Pulp Mills, stated that 
it was not possible to describe the content of ‘due diligence’ in precise terms, as the standard 
of due diligence varied over time and depended on the level of risk and on the activities 
involved.644 At the minimum, ITLOS stated that sponsoring States were under the obligation to 
take measures within their legal system, which must consist of laws and regulations and 
administrative measures. The applicable standard was that the measures must be ‘reasonably 
appropriate’.645 The SDC’s interpretation of the due diligence obligation was very much in line 
with that of the ILC in its Commentary to Article 3 of the Draft Articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities.646  
In respect of the independent obligations, two issues are particularly noteworthy. First, with 
regard to the precautionary principle, the SDC, recalling that the ITLOS’ Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Cases Order implicitly acknowledged a link between an obligation of due diligence and the 
precautionary approach, added that the precautionary approach was an integral part of the 
general obligation of due diligence of sponsoring States.647 The link between the precautionary 
principle and the obligation of due diligence means that sponsoring States would be required to 
consider preventative measures not only when the risks of harm are apparent, but also when 
there are only plausible indications of potential risks.648 This statement suggested a different 
approach to the way due diligence has traditionally been understood, namely, as a component 
of the prevention principle requiring preventative actions in the face the foreseeable harm.649  
Second, the SDC rejected the contention that sponsoring States that were developing States 
were entitled to some preferential treatment which included a less stringent standard concerning 
the obligation of due diligence. This conclusion stood in stark contrast with the commentary of 
the ILC on Article 3 of the Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
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Hazardous Activities, in which the ILC opined that ‘the economic level of States is one of the 
factors to be taken into account in determining whether a State has complied with its obligation 
of due diligence’.650 The Chamber’s rejection of the relevance of economic development for 
States’ compliance with the obligation of due diligence seem, however, reasonable in light of 
the reality of deep seabed mining activities. The SDC observed that the differential treatment 
between developed and developing countries would only encourage sponsoring States of 
convenience, which would not ensure the highest standards of marine environment 
protection.651 Given the persistent problem of State of convenience, as demonstrated by flags 
of convenience in the field of fisheries, it is arguable that the SDC’s interpretation of 
‘capabilities’ would be better suited to ensuring States’ compliance with the obligations to 
protect the marine environment in the Area.  
Even though, as stated above, the SDC itself implied that there can be no one-size-fits-all 
standard of due diligence, its elaboration of the ‘obligation to ensure’ and the exposition of the 
relationship between the independent obligations and the due diligence obligation in the 
Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area provided some important guidance on the content 
of the due diligence principle under UNCLOS with respect to activities in the Area. Although 
the contours of the obligation of due diligence merely followed those expounded by the ICJ in 
Pulp Mills, it added substance to the vague ‘obligation to ensure’ found in Article 139. At the 
same time, it also made clear that obligation of due diligence under UNCLOS is broader than 
just the ‘obligation to ensure’. It instead encompasses other core procedural obligations and the 
fulfilment of each of these duties is prerequisite to the discharge of the due diligence obligation. 
The obligations of due diligence as elaborated in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the 
Area was enthusiastically endorsed by ITLOS in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, albeit 
in a different context. ITLOS, in considering the flag States’ obligations with regards to IUU 
activities, held that Articles 58(3), 62(4) and 192 UNCLOS imposed on flag States an obligation 
‘to take the necessary measures to ensure that their nationals and vessels flying their flag are 
not engaged in IUU fishing activities’.652 In clarifying the content of flag States’ ‘obligation to 
ensure’, ITLOS stated that the SDC’s exposition of the ‘responsibility to ensure’ and the 
interrelationship between the notions of ‘obligation of due diligence’ and ‘obligations of 
conduct’ were ‘fully applicable in the present case’.653 However, as analysed in Chapter 2, 
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ITLOS still took the opportunity to shed light on the meaning of ‘due diligence obligation’ in 
the specific context of flag States’ obligations towards IUU fishing conducted by their fishing 
vessels.654  
Beyond advisory opinions, the arbitral tribunal in South China Sea was the first tribunal to 
have had the opportunity to apply the due diligence principle as elaborated by ITLOS in a 
contentious proceeding. It held that the flag State—in this case China—had failed to exercise 
due diligence to prevent fishing by Chinese flagged vessels at Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal. While acknowledging the difficulties that flag States face to effectively exercise 
due diligence over their vessels, since ‘unlawful fishing will be carried out covertly, far from 
any official presence’,655 the tribunal found that China had in fact escorted, organised and 
coordinated the fishing activities.656  
Apart from illegal fishing, the arbitral tribunal extended the due diligence principle to 
include coastal States’ obligations to prevent their vessels from harvesting ‘species that are 
recognised internationally as being at risk of extinction and requiring international protection’. 
This obligation, according to the tribunal, followed from Article 192. Read in conjunction with 
Article 194(5),657  the arbitral tribunal held that Article 192 imposes an obligation of due 
diligence on flag States, which means that ‘in addition to preventing the direct harvesting of 
species recognised internationally as being threatened with extinction, Article 192 extends to 
the prevention of harms that would affect depleted, threatened, or endangered species indirectly 
through the destruction of their habitat.’658 More specifically, the tribunal held that flag States 
had the obligation under the Convention to ‘include a duty to adopt rules and measures to 
prevent such acts and to maintain a level of vigilance in enforcing those rules and measures’.659 
The tribunal placed particular emphasis on the latter component of the due diligence obligation 
in this case. Despite acknowledging that China had put in place legislation which prohibited 
the catching and killing of state-protected wild-life,660 the tribunal emphasised that ‘adopting 
appropriate rules and measures to prohibit a harmful practice is only one component of the due 
diligence required by States’.661 On that basis, having found that China had not taken ‘any steps 
to enforce those rules and measures against fishermen engaged in poaching of endangered 
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species’, the tribunal came to the conclusion that China had breached its obligations under 
Articles 192 and 194(5).662 The arbitral tribunal’s examination of China’s obligations clarifies 
that while Article 192 prescribes, as its title suggests, a ‘general obligation’, it is not purely 
hortatory. Instead, it imposes substantive obligations on States parties to UNCLOS to protect 
and preserve the marine environment, including the obligation of due diligence.  
In the same vein, the arbitral tribunal also held that China as the flag State had an obligation 
to ensure that its fishing vessels ‘do not take measures to pollute the marine environment’ based 
on a reading of Articles 192, 194(2) and 194(5) of the Convention.663 However, due to the lack 
of ‘evidence in the case record about the use of explosives and cyanide over the last decade or 
Philippine complaints about its use’, the tribunal gave China the benefit of the doubt and held 
that the absence of evidence ‘suggests China may have taken measures to prevent such practices 
in the Spratly Islands.’664 
In short, ITLOS’ two Advisory Opinions and the South China Sea arbitration have 
contributed to clarifying the content of the due diligence principle with regard to the protection 
of the marine environment in two ways. First, UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions were not the first 
serious judicial exposition of the obligation of due diligence. Indeed, in the ICJ’s Pulp Mills 
judgment handed down just a year before the 2011 Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, 
the ICJ had already elaborated on the nature and content of the obligation of due diligence. The 
approach of ITLOS in the Advisory Opinions did not differ to a great extent to that adopted in 
Pulp Mills, and indeed ITLOS made extensive reference to the Pulp Mills judgment. What was 
noteworthy about UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions was their willingness to read the principle of 
due diligence into various articles of UNCLOS which do not expressly provide for such 
principle. By interpreting sponsoring States’ ‘obligation to ensure’ contained in Article 139(1) 
UNCLOS and Article 4(4) Annex III, flag States’ obligations under Article 58(3), 62(4) 192 
and 194 as having a due diligence nature, UNCLOS tribunals paved the way for the principle 
to become an essential obligation in the protection of the marine environment under UNCLOS. 
Second, the Annex VII tribunal’s application of the obligation of due diligence in South China 
Sea clarified the content of the obligation, requiring not only legislative measures, but more 
importantly, enforcement measures to be taken on the part of States. Lastly, as the principle of 
due diligence establishes a mechanism through which the rules of the Convention become 
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effective for private entities, UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions contribute to developing a common 
standard for due diligence, which could be applicable to other areas of international law. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions concerning the protection of the marine environment have made 
some important contributions to the law concerning the protection of the marine environment. 
These contributions initially came from ITLOS but in recent years, the Annex VII arbitral 
tribunals have also managed to add their voice to clarifying the law on the protection of the 
marine environment. 
First, UNCLOS tribunals have not adopted a narrow or fragmented interpretation of marine 
environment protection. Instead, they have opted for a more holistic understanding of what 
marine environmental protection comprises. Both ITLOS in Southern Bluefin Tuna and the 
Annex VII tribunal in Chagos MPA regarded the conservation of marine living resources,665 
despite not explicitly provided for in Part XII, as a component of marine environment 
protection. The obligations concerning the conservation of marine resources and prevention of 
marine pollution are scattered in different parts of UNCLOS, primarily due to the zonal 
approach that the Convention adopts. By bringing them together, UNCLOS tribunals confirmed 
that they are integral components of marine environmental protection. Such an approach has 
enabled UNCLOS tribunals to extend obligations found under Part XII concerning primarily 
the prevention of marine pollution to the conservation of fisheries.666  
The most significant contribution of ITLOS towards the development of the law on marine 
environment protection is the clarification of the status of several principles of environmental 
law. In particular, UNCLOS tribunals have confirmed that the duty to cooperate, the obligation 
of due diligence and the obligation to conduct an EIA are now all part of general international 
law. It is not immediately clear whether the tribunals’ use of the term ‘general international 
law’ implied customary international law. Scholars have different opinions as to what sources 
of law are encompassed in this term. Some argue that general international law comprises both 
customary and conventional rules of international law,667 while others contend that general 
international law contains multilateral treaties of universal application such as the UN Charter, 
jus cogens, customary international law and general principles of law.668 Although UNCLOS 
tribunals did not specify which one it intended to refer to when stating that a certain principle 
																																																								
665 Southern Bluefin Tuna Order (n 227) [70]; Chagos MPA (n 106) [538]. 
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belongs to ‘general international law’, it is clear that in the view of the tribunals, these principles 
also exist independently of UNCLOS. With regard to the controversial precautionary principle, 
while not explicitly acknowledging its customary status, ITLOS is the only international 
tribunal to date which has given a green light to the precautionary principle belonging to the 
corpus of general international law, as demonstrated in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in 
the Area.  
It is important to note that not all of the environmental principles with which the UNCLOS 
tribunals have dealt can be found under UNCLOS; in fact only the obligation to cooperate and 
the obligation to conduct EIA are expressly provided for under the Convention. Nevertheless, 
UNCLOS tribunals have been willing to read principles such as the precautionary principle and 
the obligation of due diligence into UNCLOS provisions whose wording does not mention any 
of them. The keenness of UNCLOS bodies to accept emerging principles which are either still 
controversial or vague in their content and bring them into the corpus of UNCLOS shows that 
the tribunals are open to treating the Convention as having an evolving nature, and that they are 
willing to interpret UNCLOS in line with new developments in the field. This approach is 
highly welcome and reasonable, for UNCLOS came into being at a time when international 
environmental law was not yet fully developed and had only started to gather attention. 
However, the fact that international courts and tribunals acknowledge and confirm the 
existence of environmental principles may not necessarily mean they have meaningfully shed 
light on normative content of these principles. International courts have had the tendency to pay 
lip-service to environmental principles, partly contributing to what one commentator terms as 
the ‘myth system’ of international environmental law—a set of ideas often considered part of 
customary international law but do not reflect state practice, and instead merely ‘collective 
ideals of the international community’ which ‘have the quality of fictions or half-truth.’669 
Therefore, unless the normative content of the principles is clarified so as to expose clear 
obligations on States, the customary status or otherwise of the principles is of little meaning in 
practice. Regrettably, the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals have been rather modest in this 
regard.  
ITLOS was the first and the only international tribunal which has applied the precautionary 
principle to date in Southern Bluefin Tuna. However, as the principle was applied in a 
provisional measure proceeding, its normative content, such as the threshold to trigger the 
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application of the precautionary principle under UNCLOS, was informed by Article 290. This 
may restrict the applicability of the conclusions to other cases. ITLOS also shed light on the 
precautionary principle as provided for under Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, establishing 
a connection between the precautionary principle and the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility, and the principle of due diligence. All these aspects of the 
precautionary principle had not been discussed to a great extent in international jurisprudence 
before and thus, mark an important contribution of ITLOS to the development of the principle.  
In respect of the obligation to cooperate, UNCLOS tribunals managed to clarify its content 
in the context of prevention of marine pollutions, but not in the conservation of marine 
resources. More specifically, UNCLOS tribunals confirmed the link between the duty to 
cooperate and other duties such as the duty to conduct consultation, duty to exchange 
information, duty of prior notification, in the context of preventing marine pollution. In the 
conservation of marine resources, UNCLOS tribunals, however remain overly coy when it 
comes to specifying concrete measures for States to fulfil the duty to cooperate, leaving much 
room to be filled. Similarly, UNCLOS tribunals did not manage to shed much light on the 
obligation to conduct EIA. Except for the link between EIA and the duty to consult and notify 
relevant stakeholders, the content of the obligation to conduct EIA under Article 206 UNCLOS 
remains unclear, as is the question as to whether there is a common global minimum for the 
standards of EIA or whether it is at the discretion of States. 
The only principle whose content was clarified to a great extent was the due diligence 
principle to the protection of the marine environment under UNCLOS. UNCLOS tribunals not 
only read this obligation into the obligation of sponsoring States for activities in the Area and 
flag States for various activities such as preventing IUU fishing, protecting fragile marine 
habitat or preventing marine pollution, but also specified the extent to which States must adopt 
measures to fulfil the due diligence requirement. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that Article 290 requires ITLOS to prescribe provisional 
measures to either preserve the rights of the parties or prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment. However, one scholar has argued that it is States that bring the cases, not the 
marine environment, therefore, there is no guarantee that the marine environment may benefit 
from the measures prescribed or that the development of principles of marine environment 
protection may occur during the process of dispute resolution.670 As Land Reclamation shows, 
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provisional measures requiring serious and meaningful cooperation played an important role in 
not only resolving disputes between the parties but also in the protection of the marine 
environment in the Straits of Johor.671 It follows that the protection of the parties’ interests and 
the goal of protecting the marine environment are not mutually exclusive. Provisional measures 
ordering the disputing parties to undertake a joint monitoring or EIA or requiring the parties to 
cooperate to ensure conservation and optimum utilisation of a fish stock and to devise                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
measures to prevent land-based marine pollution ‘can contribute to enforce community interests 
regarding marine environmental protection,672 while at the same time, serve to protect the rights 
of the parties. ITLOS’ decisions in provisional measures proceedings, therefore, have shown 
that, despite their limitations, they can still play an important role in advancing environmental 
interests.  
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CHAPTER 5   FACTORS THAT IMPACT THE PERFORMANCE OF UNCLOS 
TRIBUNALS 
 
The contribution that UNCLOS tribunals have made to the development of the law, as can be 
seen in the previous chapters, is not equally felt in different areas of the law of the sea, nor is 
the type of contribution the same in every field. The question is, then, can these differences be 
accounted for? In other words, what are the factors that potentially impact the contribution of 
UNCLOS tribunals to the development of the law of the sea? This chapter will attempt to 
answer this question.  
The judges and arbitrators of ITLOS and Annex VII tribunals, similar to those of any other 
court and tribunal, are not ‘free agents with unfettered discretion to weigh into all aspects of 
international law’.673 There are, of course, boundaries and limitations on their authority. As 
shown in Chapter 1, the development of the law, while important, is not the primary role given 
to UNCLOS tribunals. Therefore, they can only perform this task if the legal framework in 
which they operate facilitates the role and if they are willing to engage in developing the law. 
Accordingly, this chapter will examine the factors that impact the ability and the willingness of 
UNCLOS tribunals to develop the law of the sea. In particular, it analyses the following factors: 
(i) the scope of jurisdiction that UNCLOS confers on the tribunals, (ii) the institutional structure 
of UNCLOS, (iii) the interpretative methods that UNCLOS tribunals employed in deciding 
their cases and (iv) their perception of the roles that the tribunals should perform when hearing 
cases. The first two factors determine the room available for UNCLOS tribunals to take on the 
role of developing the law. The remaining two help us to understand whether UNCLOS 
tribunals displayed a conscious endeavour to contribute to the development of the law and if 
so, how this impacted the way the cases were decided.  
I. JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF UNCLOS TRIBUNALS 
The contribution of UNCLOS tribunals—as dispute settlement bodies—to the development of 
the law transpires through the decisions rendered in the course of settling disputes or issuing 
advisory opinions. It should be acknowledged that the decision to bring cases or advisory 
requests to international courts and tribunals rests entirely with States. It is impossible to predict 
with any degree of certainty when States are willing to do so, and the proceedings under Part 
XV of UNCLOS have indeed been rather haphazard in nature. However, even when States are 
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able to reach an agreement to resort to UNCLOS tribunals to settle their disputes, the extent to 
which UNCLOS tribunals could engage in the development of the law is still informed by the 
type of proceeding and the tribunals’ jurisdictional scope in each of the proceedings. In relation 
to the former, the majority of decisions that ITLOS has rendered to date are provisional 
measures orders and prompt release judgments. The incidental nature of these proceedings, and 
the ensuing limitations on what ITLOS could examine in each proceeding, necessarily restrict 
ITLOS’ ability to touch upon, a wide range of legal issues under UNCLOS. This in turn has a 
bearing on the power of ITLOS to develop the law.  As the previous chapters show, this does 
not mean that ITLOS was not able to make important contributions to the development of the 
law of the sea in the course of these proceedings. What it does mean, however, is that 
contributions can only be made to a limited number of issues.   
UNCLOS tribunals in general have also had the chance to deal with contentious 
proceedings and, in the case of ITLOS, to render advisory opinions. In these types of 
proceedings, the tribunals are less constrained. UNCLOS tribunals are given compulsory 
jurisdiction, which seems to provide a useful tool for the tribunals for play a more active role 
in developing the law. However, there are important limitations to the exercise of the tribunals’ 
compulsory jurisdiction under UNCLOS. Taking this into account, the remainder of this part 
will examine the jurisdictional parameters that UNCLOS tribunals have determined for 
themselves both in contentious and in advisory opinion proceedings, and assess their impact on 
the ability of UNCLOS tribunals to develop of the law of the sea.  
1. Jurisdiction over contentious proceedings 
The conditions for UNCLOS tribunals to exercise jurisdiction to hear contentious cases can be 
categorised into three main groups, corresponding to the three Sections under Part XV 
UNCLOS. First, under Section 1, UNCLOS tribunals can hear a dispute only when the parties 
have not chosen another means to settle their dispute, be they negotiations or through bilateral, 
regional or general agreements. Under Section 2, Article 288(1) makes clear that UNCLOS 
tribunals only have jurisdiction ‘over the interpretation and application of the Convention’. 
Finally, Articles 297 and 298 of Section 3 contain the lists of disputes which are excluded from 
the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals automatically and by declaration. As will be shown, 
UNCLOS tribunals have interpreted the conditions in each of these groups in a manner which 
has, more often than not, enabled the tribunals to exercise jurisdiction under Part XV.  
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1.1. General provisions under Section 1 
The three most important provisions of Section 1 are Articles 281, 282 and 283, each of which 
sets out a scenario involving the use of another means of dispute settlement which would 
deprive UNCLOS tribunals of jurisdiction.  
Article 281 essentially provides that, when the parties have agreed to another means of 
dispute settlement, UNCLOS tribunals can only exercise jurisdiction if the parties have not 
been able to settle the dispute between them using the means agreed and the parties have not 
agreed to exclude further procedures, including recourse to the UNCLOS dispute settlement 
procedures. This second requirement of Article 281 was at issue in one of the first cases before 
UNCLOS tribunals, Southern Bluefin Tuna. Japan in this case argued that the jurisdiction of 
UNCLOS tribunals could not be triggered because the parties had already agreed to use the 
dispute settlement procedures under Article 16 CCSBT which excluded recourse to UNCLOS 
dispute settlement procedures. 674 The majority in Southern Bluefin Tuna agreed, holding that 
although Article 16 of the CCSBT did not expressly exclude the applicability of the procedures 
of Section 2 Part XV of UNCLOS, ‘the absence of an express exclusion of any procedures in 
Article 16 is not decisive’.675 What was important in the tribunal’s view was that paragraph (2) 
of Article 16 provided for an express obligation to continue to seek resolution of the dispute by 
the means listed in paragraph (1).676 The tribunal’s interpretation of Article 281 meant that the 
existence of any list of dispute settlement methods and a commitment to resolving the dispute 
by peaceful means would suffice as an agreement to exclude resort to UNCLOS procedures.677  
This interpretation was heavily criticised by Judge Keith in his Separate Opinion, in 
which he argued that the wording of Article 281, the structure of Part XV UNCLOS, and the 
object and purpose of UNCLOS as a whole pointed to the conclusion that ‘strong and particular 
wording’ would have to be include in Article 16 CCSBT to prevent the arbitral tribunal from 
exercising jurisdiction.678 Several scholars subsequently endorsed Judge Keith’s interpretation 
of Article 281 instead of that of the majority.679 As a result, there was serious uncertainty 
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regarding the scope of Article 281, despite it being the only judicial authority on the matter for 
a long period of time.680  
In 2016, the majority’s interpretation of Article 281 in Southern Bluefin Tuna was 
explicitly rejected by the South China Sea arbitral tribunal when deciding whether Article 281 
applied to exclude the tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the dispute brought by the Philippines 
against China concerning the South China Sea, given that there were several instruments 
containing the parties’ agreement to settle their disputes by a variety of peaceful means.681 The 
tribunal stated that it shared the view of Judge Keith in Southern Bluefin Tuna, and concluded 
that ‘Article 281 requires some clear statement of exclusion of further procedures’.682 This has 
been the only instance to date in which an UNCLOS tribunal explicitly rejected the 
interpretation adopted by another tribunal in a previous case concerning the same UNCLOS 
provision. The South China Sea arbitral tribunal’s decision to embrace the approach of Judge 
Keith in interpreting Article 281 arguably made more sense, as the interpretation adopted by 
the majority in the Southern Bluefin Tuna would render Article 281 a near impossible obstacle 
to overcome, thereby defeating the whole purpose of a compulsory dispute settlement system 
under UNCLOS. The South China Sea tribunal’s decision meant that the bar for the invocation 
of Article 281 to exclude the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals has now been set relatively 
high. 
Turning to Article 282,683 the requirements for the invocation of Article 282 were 
explained for the first time in South China Sea.684 These requirements are that (a) the parties 
have agreed through a ‘general, regional or bilateral agreement or otherwise’ that, (b) at the 
request of any party to the dispute, (c) the dispute shall be submitted to a procedure ‘that entails 
a binding decision’ and (d) the parties have not otherwise agreed to retain access (ie, to opt back 
in) to the Part XV, Section 2 procedures.685 The arbitral tribunal found that the applicable 
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instruments between the Philippines and China did not contain a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism (point (a)),686 even when the mechanism itself may be compulsory (point (c)) and 
that the parties in this case had not requested to invoke these instruments to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal under Article 282 (point (b)). With regard to point (d), the tribunal 
clarified that as ‘Part XV procedures are excluded by the alternative compulsory binding 
procedure’, Article 282 required the parties to ‘opt back in’ to using UNCLOS procedures ‘by 
“agreeing otherwise”’.687 However, as the tribunal did not need to consider this point, having 
decided that the other points were already not satisfied, it remains open to question what 
language would be required to demonstrate the parties’ intention to ‘opt back in’, and whether 
the ‘opt-in’ could be implied or explicit as in the case of Article 281. What is clear is that under 
Article 282, the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals is not automatically excluded by virtue of 
the mere existence of other compulsory dispute settlement procedures. Instead, a specific act of 
the parties to invoke them is further required.  
Finally, Article 283 has been the most frequently invoked article in Section 1 for the 
purpose of objecting to UNCLOS tribunals’ jurisdiction.688 As a result, the tribunals have had 
ample opportunity to shed light on the requirements contained in this article. For example, 
ITLOS has clarified that ‘a State Party is not obliged to continue with an exchange of views 
when it concludes that the possibilities of reaching an agreement have been exhausted’.689 This 
interpretation turned the obligation to exchange views under Article 283 into an obligation of 
conduct, and not one of result. This interpretation, however, did not shed light on the question 
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regarding the content required of the exchange of views. In this regard, the Chagos MPA award 
was particularly instructive. In the tribunal’s view, Article 283 only imposed on State parties 
the obligation to negotiate the method to resolve the dispute, not the obligation to negotiate the 
substance of the dispute.690 It follows, therefore, that as long as the parties expeditiously 
conduct an exchange of views on the method to resolve the dispute, Article 283 would be 
satisfied. UNCLOS tribunals up to this case had adopted a relatively low threshold for meeting 
the requirement of Article 283. The tribunal in Chagos MPA, by requiring the parties only to 
exchange views on the method of dispute settlement, seemed to have lowered it even further.  
 In short, UNCLOS tribunals have adopted low thresholds for the satisfying of the 
requirements in Section 1. As a result, while Section 1 seems to give priority to the parties’ 
choice of forum, it is now not difficult for the tribunals to overcome the jurisdictional barriers 
envisioned in these articles. In other words, the interpretation and application of these articles 
in the case law of UNCLOS tribunals have increased the opportunity for UNCLOS tribunals to 
be able to hear cases brought before them.  
1.2. Subject-matter of jurisdiction 
Article 288(1) states that UNCLOS tribunals can only exercise jurisdiction over disputes 
concerning the ‘interpretation and application of the Convention’. This article thus sets the 
parameters, in terms of the subject-matter, within which UNCLOS tribunals are to operate. 
ITLOS in M/V Louisa made clear that in order for a dispute to fall within the jurisdiction of an 
UNCLOS tribunal, it was necessary to ‘establish a link between the facts advanced by [the 
Applicant] and the provisions of the Convention referred to by it and show that such provisions 
can sustain the claim or claims submitted by [the Applicant]’.691 However, UNCLOS tribunals 
have had to consider issues which are not regulated under the Convention, such as the use of 
force in M/V Saiga, and Guyana v Suriname, territorial sovereignty in Chagos MPA and South 
China Sea. The way in which UNCLOS tribunals have proceeded with regard to establishing 
jurisdiction over issues beyond the scope of UNCLOS has not been entirely consistent, 
primarily due to the confusion between Article 288 on jurisdiction and Article 293 on applicable 
law. 
In M/V Saiga, ITLOS acknowledged that UNCLOS did not contain ‘express provisions 
on the use of force in the arrest of ships’, but nevertheless asserted that it had jurisdiction to 
consider whether Guinea had used excessive and unreasonable force in stopping and arresting 
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the Saiga because ‘international law, which is applicable by virtue of Article 293 of the 
Convention, requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force 
is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances’.692 
ITLOS thus used Article 293 on the applicable law as the basis to bring issues which were not 
provided for under UNCLOS into its jurisdictional ambit. Similarly, in Guyana/Suriname, the 
Annex VII tribunal, recalling ITLOS’ above statement, held that it had the competence, under 
Article 293, to decide on matters that concerned the UN Charter and general international law 
on the use of force.693 
In contrast, the arbitral tribunal in MOX Plant adopted an opposite understanding of the 
relationship between Articles 288(1) and 293. It held that ‘there is a cardinal distinction between 
the scope of its jurisdiction under Article 288, paragraph 1 of the Convention, on the one hand, 
and the law to be applied by the Tribunal under Article 293 of the Convention on the other 
hand’.694 It would appear that the MOX Plant tribunal’s approach is more tenable. Although 
Article 293 allows judges or arbitrators to resort to legal rules and principles contained under 
general international law to settle a dispute, such use should be strictly limited to assisting them 
to decide a dispute that arises under the Convention, not as the basis for jurisdiction to hear that 
dispute.695 In Guyana v Suriname, for example, the question of whether a State has resorted to 
the use of force in violation of general international law is not regulated by UNCLOS but is in 
itself a stand-alone dispute that does not require the interpretation of the Convention. Nor was 
it necessary for ITLOS or the Annex VII arbitral tribunal in the abovementioned cases to 
consider this question of the use of force before it could settle a dispute concerning the 
Convention.  
Among the most controversial issues concerning UNCLOS tribunals’ scope of 
jurisdiction is perhaps the question relating to whether the tribunals have competence to decide 
on disputes over territorial sovereignty.696 In Chagos MPA, the parties disagreed as to whether 
a dispute concerning the status of the UK or Mauritius as the ‘coastal State’ with regard to the 
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Chagos Archipelago 697  was one that concerned the ‘interpretation and application of 
UNCLOS.698  The arbitral tribunal proceeded to deal with this issue in two steps. It first 
examined the nature of the dispute in order to identify what ‘the real dispute’ and the ‘object of 
the claim’ were. 699 Second, if the real dispute concerned the interpretation or application of the 
Convention, the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal pursuant to Article 288(1) could extend to 
‘ancillary determinations of law’ that are necessary to resolve the disputes. If, on the other hand, 
the real dispute did not relate to the interpretation or application of the Convention, then ‘an 
incidental connection between the dispute and some matter regulated by the Convention is 
insufficient to bring the dispute, as a whole, within the ambit of Article 288(1)’.700 Applying 
this two-step test, the tribunal decided that the real dispute between the parties primarily 
concerned sovereignty, with the UK’s actions as a ‘coastal States’ merely representing a 
manifestation of that dispute.  
The tribunal then considered ‘the extent to which a dispute over land sovereignty 
touching in some ancillary manner on matters regulated by the Convention could fall under its 
jurisdiction’.701 In order to answer this, the tribunal looked to Article 298(1)(a)(i) as this is the 
only article in the Convention in which jurisdiction over sovereignty disputes is mentioned. 
Mauritius contended, as several commentators had before,702 that an a contrario reading of this 
article implied that sovereignty disputes would be subject to compulsory dispute resolution in 
the absence of a declaration to that effect.703 The tribunal, however, by three votes to two, 
dismissed such a broad reading and held that since the context of Article 298(1)(a)(i) concerned 
maritime boundary and historic title, at most an a contrario reading of this paragraph could 
only suggest that an issue of land sovereignty might be within the jurisdiction of a Part XV 
court or tribunal if it was genuinely ancillary to a dispute over a maritime boundary or a claim 
of historic title.704 The tribunal also interpreted the negotiating history of the Convention, which 
did not explicitly address jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty, as suggesting that none of the 
Conference participants expected that a dispute over territorial sovereignty would be considered 
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as a dispute ‘concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention’ and if they had, 
they would have excluded it from compulsory jurisdiction in the same manner as maritime 
delimitation disputes, due to the sensitivity of the issue.705 The majority’s approach showed that 
territorial disputes are not definitively excluded from the jurisdiction of an UNCLOS tribunal, 
the key is that the sovereignty question has to be ancillary or incidental to a dispute that has a 
nexus to UNCLOS.706 
The majority’s conclusion on jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty was met with 
strong criticism from the dissenting arbitrators Kateka and Wolfrum. Judges Kateka and 
Wolfrum contended that Mauritius only raised the question of the competence of the UK as a 
coastal State in relation to the establishment of an MPA.707 The real dispute for the dissenting 
judges, therefore, was not one of territorial sovereignty,708 but was instead concerned with the 
interpretation of Article 56, which plainly fell within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.709 In 
addition, the two Judges were critical of the majority’s interpretation of Article 298(1)(a)(i). 
They found it difficult to accept the majority’s argument that because the drafters of the 
Convention had not foreseen the possibility of a sovereignty dispute falling within the ambit of 
UNCLOS, this meant that the drafters had intended to exclude it from compulsory 
jurisdiction.710 Instead, they argued that jurisdiction over sovereignty disputes was touched 
upon during the negotiations of the Convention but that the drafters deliberately chose not to 
automatically exclude them from compulsory jurisdiction.711  The debate over whether an 
UNCLOS dispute settlement body has jurisdiction over territorial sovereignty disputes was 
expected by many to be settled with Chagos MPA,712 but given the split between the majority 
and minority, the uncertainty does not seem to have been entirely resolved.  
In the more recent South China Sea case, an Annex VII arbitral tribunal also had to 
consider the question of whether the case brought by the Philippines was by nature one that 
concerned sovereignty. The tribunal, similar to Chagos MPA, took cognisance of the existence 
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of a territorial sovereignty dispute between the Philippines and China,713 and examined the 
relevance of the existing sovereignty dispute to the disputes before it.714 The tribunal found that 
sovereignty was not the issue at stake in the case as the tribunal would not have to decide on 
territorial sovereignty issues in order to resolve the Philippines’ claims, nor was the Philippines’ 
actual objective to advance its position regarding sovereignty.715 
However, the most interesting aspect relating to the tribunal’s jurisdiction in South China 
Sea perhaps related to Submissions 1 and 2. In these submissions, China claimed that their 
entitlements in the South China Sea were based on an understanding of ‘historic rights existing 
independently of, and allegedly preserved by, the Convention’.716 The Philippines’ position, on 
the other hand, was that ‘UNCLOS supersedes and nullifies any “historic rights” that may have 
existed prior to the Convention.’717 The tribunal then stated that: 
This is accordingly not a dispute about the existence of specific historic rights, but rather 
a dispute about historic rights in the framework of the Convention. A dispute concerning 
the interaction of the Convention with another instrument or body of law, including the 
question of whether rights arising under another body of law were or were not preserved 
by the Convention, is unequivocally a dispute concerning the interpretation and 
application of the Convention.718 
The tribunal in this instance did not occupy itself with the question as to which particular 
provision of UNCLOS was at stake. Instead, while accepting that historic rights existed 
independently under general international law, the tribunal still found that it had jurisdiction to 
consider the question regarding whether this right was protected under the Convention. This 
was a new approach to interpreting Article 288(1). At first glance, this approach would seem to 
widen the jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals. However, on a closer look, the tribunal 
was not asked to shed light on the concept of ‘historic rights’, but on whether these rights were 
preserved under the Convention in some form or another. As the tribunal correctly noted, this 
involved the interpretation of the content and scope of relevant UNCLOS provisions concerning 
the extent of coastal States’ maritime entitlement under the Convention.  
In short, the decisions of UNCLOS tribunals relating to the scope of their jurisdiction 
under Article 288(1) show that UNCLOS tribunals have become more cautious and restrictive 
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in deciding which issues may fall within their competence. In earlier cases such as Saiga (No 
2) or Guyana v Suriname, the tribunals were not hesitant to exercise jurisdiction over issues not 
provided for under UNCLOS, frequently using Article 293 on applicable law to expand their 
jurisdiction. In more recent cases, however, the tribunals seem to have been keener to establish 
that the disputes brought before them, even when they might raise issues not found under 
UNCLOS, involve the ‘interpretation and application of the Convention’ as required by Article 
288(1) before confirming jurisdiction. Thus, it could be concluded that UNCLOS tribunals have 
taken a relatively more stringent approach with regard to the legal issues that could fall within 
their jurisdiction.  
1.3 . Exclusions and limitations under Section 3 
Articles 297 and 298 set out the limitations and exclusions to compulsory jurisdiction 
respectively. The limitations under Article 297 are automatically applicable, while those 
contained under Article 298 are optional. The categories of disputes contained in Article 298 
are excluded from compulsory jurisdiction only when the States concerned have made a 
declaration to that effect.  
The Chagos MPA arbitration was the first time an UNCLOS tribunal had the 
opportunity to clarify the scope and meaning of Article 297(1) and (3). First, the arbitral tribunal 
observed that while located in an article relating to limitations to jurisdiction, paragraph (1) of 
Article 297 affirmed the tribunal’s jurisdiction not only over the three categories of disputes 
enumerated in sub-paragraphs (a)-(c) but also other ‘disputes concerning the exercise of 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in other cases’ so long as they did not fall under the exceptions 
in paragraphs (2) and (3).719 Moreover, the tribunal noted that Article 297(1) expanded the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction to disputes involving the contravention of not only UNCLOS but also 
other legal instruments.720 These statements in essence broadened the scope of Article 297(1) 
beyond the express wording of this paragraph, and stood in stark contrast with long-held 
scholarly views that other than in the cases enumerated in Article 297(1), a coastal State was 
immune from challenge with regard to the exercise of its sovereignty rights and jurisdiction.721 
Second, the tribunal shed light on several key terms contained in Article 297(1)(c), such as 
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‘international rules and standards’ 722  and ‘protection and preservation of the marine 
environment’,723 which again resulted in giving Article 297(1) a broader scope than its wording 
might suggest. Finally, it found that Article 297(1)(c) gives UNCLOS tribunals jurisdiction 
over disputes relating to violations of procedural obligations concerning the protection of the 
environment. 724  The combined effect of these findings is that Article 297(1) confers on 
UNCLOS tribunals a broader scope of jurisdiction than first meets the eye.  
Turning to Article 297(3), the complicated design of the Convention regarding fisheries 
competences means that the scope of application of Article 297(3) is not always clear. The 
Chagos MPA arbitral tribunal made important contributions to elucidating on several important 
aspects of this paragraph. First, the tribunal clarified that even when a dispute was deemed to 
fall under Article 297(1), the limitations under Article 297(3) would not cease to apply, 
meaning that any aspects of the dispute pertaining to fisheries in the EEZ would still be 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunal.725 The tribunal thus rejected Mauritius’ attempt 
to use Article 297(1) to trump the limitations set out under UNCLOS concerning fisheries in 
the EEZ. At the same time, it prevented the UK from using an expansive interpretation of the 
limitations under Article 297(3) to avoid jurisdiction altogether. Second, the tribunal rejected 
Mauritius’ contention that Article 297(3) could exclude disputes concerning sovereign rights 
of the coastal state with respect to living resources in the EEZ, but not those involving the rights 
of other States in the EEZ, as the tribunal believed that these two categories of rights are deeply 
intertwined, making such a distinction was artificial.726 
Third, the tribunal confirmed that the limitations contained in Article 297(3) still applied 
to the straddling fish stocks that were found in the EEZ of the coastal State, despite 
acknowledging the shortcoming of a jurisdictional separation between disputes relating to 
fisheries in the EEZ and those in the high seas in view of the need to manage the fish stocks as 
a biological unit.727 The arbitral tribunal, relying on the Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago 
arbitral award,728 held that the limitations under Article 297(3) also applied to procedural 
obligations, including the obligations to consult and coordinate pursuant to Articles 63, 64 and 
194 of the Convention and Article 7 of the 1995 UNFSA. 729  This meant that disputes 
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concerning alleged violations of procedural obligations in fisheries would fall beyond reach of 
UNCLOS tribunals. This reliance on the Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago arbitration seemed, 
however, to have been misplaced. The right alleged to have been violated in that case was the 
right of Barbadian fishermen to have access to the resources in the EEZ of Trinidad and 
Tobago.730 Clearly this was not a procedural right and it encroached on the right of Trinidad 
and Tobago to exercise exclusive sovereign rights over its fisheries resources in its EEZ. In 
contrast, in this case, Mauritius claimed that the UK had failed to seek agreement on the 
measures necessary to co-ordinate and ensure the conservation and development of stocks of 
tuna under Article 63(1), and that it had failed to agree upon the measures necessary for the 
conservation of stocks of tuna in the area adjacent to the MPA under Article 63(2) and to 
cooperate directly with Mauritius and other States, or through appropriate international 
organisations, with regards to highly migratory species throughout the Indian Ocean region 
beyond the EEZ under Article 64(1). The obligations to seek to agree and to cooperate do not 
prejudice or compromise the exercise of sovereign rights of the UK over the fish stocks in the 
EEZ of the Chagos Archipelago. They are, therefore, different in nature to those discussed in 
Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago. In any case, as Judges Kateka and Wolfrum correctly pointed 
out, Article 297(3)(a) cannot be used as a blanket limitation to exclude all fisheries disputes, 
including those pertaining to procedural obligations.731  
The tribunal’s view also stood in contrast with the opinion appended by Judge Paik in 
the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing before ITLOS. He observed that disputes arising from 
Article 63(1), unlike disputes concerning coastal States’ sovereign rights over living resources, 
‘can be submitted to the compulsory procedure under Part XV, section 2, of the Convention’.732 
Even though the arbitral tribunal’s conclusion reaffirmed the importance of procedural rules in 
the protection of the environment, including the marine environment, it is arguable that the 
tribunal wrongly narrowed the scope of its compulsory jurisdiction by expanding the 
applicability of Article 297(3) to include procedural obligations. 
Article 298, in turn, came under scrutiny in Arctic Sunrise between Netherlands and 
Russia concerning the latter’s boarding, arrest and detention of a vessel flying the Dutch flag 
and its crew.733 In this case, the arbitral tribunal had to consider whether a declaration which 
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excluded all ‘disputes concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction’734 was permissible under Article 298. The arbitral tribunal’s 
response was in the negative.735 States could only exclude disputes relating to marine scientific 
research or fisheries, which were ‘the only areas in which the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal 
can validly be excluded pursuant to Articles 297(2) and 297(3) read with 298(1)(b) of the 
Convention’.736 The Arctic Sunrise award thus rejected an expansive interpretation of Article 
298. 
To date, the South China Sea arbitration has provided the most comprehensive 
examination of the exclusions under Article 298. The Annex VII arbitral tribunal adopted a 
narrow interpretation of all the exclusions under this article and found only one exclusion 
relating to military activities under Article 298(1)(b) applicable to the case before it. The 
tribunal held that Article 298(1)(a) excluding disputes concerning maritime delimitation ‘does 
not reach so far as to capture a dispute over the existence of entitlements that may—or may 
not—ultimately require delimitation’.737 As for the exclusion of disputes concerning ‘historical 
bays or titles’ under Article 298(1)(a)(i), the tribunal found that this proviso should properly be 
understood as excluding ‘disputes…involving historic bays or titles’, 738  not only disputes 
concerning ‘delimitation…involving historic bays or titles’ as the Philippines had argued. The 
tribunal also made an important distinction between ‘historic titles’ within the meaning of 
Article 298(1)(a)(i) and ‘historic rights’ claimed by China as the basis for its entitlement in the 
South China Sea.739 It thus restricted the scope of Article 298(1)(a)(i) by concluding that the 
latter was not intended to exclude jurisdiction over ‘a broad and unspecified category of 
possible claims to historic rights falling short of sovereignty’.740 
In interpreting the exclusions contained in Article 298(1)(b) concerning law 
enforcement activities, whose scope was to be determined with reference to the exceptions 
under Article 297, the tribunal made a particular noteworthy observation that Articles 297(3) 
and 298(1)(b) ‘do not apply where a State is alleged to have violated the Convention in respect 
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of the exclusive economic zone of another State’.741 At first glance, this statement seems to be 
in contradiction with the Chagos MPA tribunal’s holding relating to Article 297(3). To recall, 
the tribunal in Chagos MPA rejected of the distinction between disputes concerning the coastal 
State’s sovereign rights over living resources in its EEZ and disputes concerning other State’s 
claimed rights in the coastal State’s EEZ. However, a closer examination of the two arbitral 
tribunals’ reasoning reveals that they envision two different scenarios. In Chagos MPA, the UK 
was the coastal State within the meaning of Article 297(3) and the challenge was brought by 
Mauritius against the UK, ie the non-coastal State against the coastal State, regarding the coastal 
State’s failure to fulfil its undertakings regarding its resources in its EEZ. In South China Sea, 
the challenge was brought by the Philippines against China, ie the coastal state against the non-
coastal State, regarding the non-coastal State’s violation of the coastal State’s sovereign rights 
in the latter’s EEZ. In any case, the implication of the combined statements of the Chagos MPA 
and South China Sea arbitral tribunals is that the coastal State’s sovereign rights in the EEZ are 
firmly insulated from compulsory jurisdiction.742 
Finally, in relation to Article 298(1)(b) relating to military activities, the tribunal held 
that ‘Article 298(1)(b) applies to “disputes concerning military activities” and not to “military 
activities” as such.’ As a result, what is pertinent for the purposes of Article 298(1)(b) is 
‘whether the dispute itself concerns military activities, rather than whether a party has employed 
its military in some manner in relation to the dispute’.743 This interpretation prevented the scope 
of Article 298(1)(b) from becoming all-inclusive, excluding all military activities from the 
purview of the tribunal.  
In short, UNCLOS tribunals have had the opportunity to clarify the scope of application of 
the limitations and exceptions contained under Articles 297 and 298 in only a handful of cases. 
What has become clear, however, is that UNCLOS tribunals have taken different approaches 
to interpreting Article 297 and Article 298. UNCLOS tribunals confirmed that Article 297(1) 
established—not excluded—the jurisdiction of the tribunal as its title might suggest and also 
took an expansive view of Article 297(1)(c) to bring more categories of disputes into the ambit 
of UNCLOS tribunals. At the same time, the arbitral tribunal in Chagos MPA also gave the 
fisheries limitation in Article 297(3) a broad scope, excluding from the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
disputes relating to fisheries that are not apparent from its wording, such as disputes concerning 
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procedural obligations or straddling stocks.744 When it comes to the exclusions contained in 
Article 298, in contrast, UNCLOS tribunals adopted a more restrictive approach, limiting the 
reach of the optional exclusions regarding disputes over maritime delimitation, law 
enforcement and military activities.  
The expansive approach to interpreting Article 297(1) and restrictive approach to 
interpreting Article 298 combined meant that the jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals has 
been left rather broad, creating more room for the tribunals to exercise their jurisdiction over 
law of the sea disputes. However, disputes relating to coastal States’ sovereign rights in the 
EEZ are still firmly shielded from the jurisdictional reach of UNCLOS tribunals.745  
2. Advisory jurisdiction 
It has been argued that advisory proceedings are more likely to give international courts and 
tribunals leeway to develop the law.746 As the legal questions submitted for advisory opinions 
are usually formulated in a more abstract and general manner, and not confined to the facts of 
the case, the interpretation and clarification of the law in advisory proceedings have the 
potential to transcend the particular instance and have wider applicability. As with the ICJ, 
ITLOS as the permanent court established under UNCLOS also has the jurisdiction to give 
advisory opinions. However, unlike the ICJ, the advisory function is not explicitly conferred 
upon ITLOS as a whole but only on the SDC. According to Article 191 UNCLOS, the SDC is 
mandated to ‘give advisory opinions at the request of the Assembly or the Council on legal 
questions arising within the scope of their activities’. The SDC has indeed exercised this 
advisory jurisdiction in one instance and as shown in Chapter 4 contributed to clarifying 
important principles relating to activities in the Area. 
More controversial has been the question regarding whether ITLOS as a full tribunal also 
has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions? This had been a topic of much debate in the scholarly 
community as UNCLOS does not explicitly provide for such jurisdiction as in the case of the 
SDC.747 ITLOS finally resolved this issue in 2015 in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing. 
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ITLOS founded its advisory jurisdiction on the basis of a combined reading of Article 288(1) 
of UNCLOS, Article 21 of ITLOS Statute and Article 138 of the Rules of Procedure of ITLOS. 
More specifically, ITLOS held that Article 21 of ITLOS Statute, existing independently of 
Article 288 of the Convention,748 allows the tribunals to exercise jurisdiction over not only 
‘disputes’ and ‘applications’ but also ‘all matters provided for in any other agreement which 
confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal’.749 The words ‘all maters’ in ITLOS’s view, ‘must mean 
something more than only “disputes”’ and ‘that something more must include advisory opinions 
if specifically provided for in any other agreement’.750 ITLOS also found that ‘the prerequisites 
that need to be satisfied before the Tribunal can exercise its advisory jurisdiction’ under Article 
138 of the Rules were further met in that instance. 751  
ITLOS’ decision to establish advisory jurisdiction despite the lack of express authorisation 
under UNCLOS has been faced with much opposition by States—as evident in the proceedings 
of the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, and scholarly criticism.752 However, the fact that the 
full ITLOS tribunal’s advisory jurisdiction has certainly appeared to have opened a wider door 
for ITLOS to examine questions of law of the sea. 753 It is worth noting nonetheless that even 
then, its power to give advisory opinions is limited to agreements other than UNCLOS that give 
it such jurisdiction. As things currently stand, there seems to be only one such agreement, ie 
the MCA Convention mentioned above. It is unclear therefore whether ITLOS will have the 
opportunity to exercise this jurisdiction any time soon. ITLOS’s eagerness to establish advisory 
jurisdiction, however, could be taken to denote its desire to play a more active role in developing 
the law. 
In conclusion, the fact that UNCLOS tribunals have been given compulsory jurisdiction has 
undoubtedly paved the way for the tribunals to be able to hear a higher number of disputes, 
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especially those which otherwise would not have been subject to litigation due to one of the 
parties’ hostility towards third-party settlement. This compulsory jurisdiction has been 
reinforced by UNCLOS tribunals through their decisions by adopting a restrictive interpretation 
of the exceptions to jurisdiction and establishing a high threshold for the invocation of other 
dispute settlement procedures. As a result, UNCLOS tribunals have been able to hear the 
majority of cases brought before them, thereby giving them the opportunity to develop the law. 
Put differently, the jurisdictional scope of UCLOS tribunals does not appear to be a factor that 
limits the ability of UNCLOS tribunals to contribute to developing the law.  
Moreover, from a jurisdictional perspective, it might be reasonable to assume that the 
contribution of UNCLOS tribunals to the development of the law would be more limited in 
areas which are excluded from the jurisdiction of the tribunals. It might be expected, therefore, 
that UNCLOS tribunals would have a limited role to play in the law regulating the coastal 
States’ fisheries and marine scientific research in the EEZ by virtue of Article 297, as well as 
law enforcement with regard to fisheries in the EEZ, military activities and maritime 
delimitation by virtue of Article 298. However, it is worth bearing in mind that, first, the 
exceptions in Article 298 are optional. Not all states have made a declaration under Article 298, 
and not all declarations have excluded all the categories contained therein.754 Therefore, the 
possibility of Article 298 restricting the jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals is already more 
limited than it might seem. In practice, as mentioned, the only limitation which has successfully 
been invoked is that relating to fisheries in the EEZ under Article 297(3). But as Chapter 2 
shows, the extent to which UNCLOS tribunals have contributed to the rules regarding fisheries 
in the EEZ is quite significant. This seemingly contradictory reality reminds us that the 
limitation under Article 297(3) does not cover all fisheries-related disputes, only sub-categories 
of it. So while this limitation has in fact impeded UNCLOS tribunals from considering issues 
concerning sovereign rights of coastal States over fisheries resources in the EEZ, even in a 
transboundary context in cases like Barbados v Trinidad and Tobago, Chagos MPA or in the 
Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, there is still ample room for UNCLOS tribunals to contribute 
to clarifying other aspects of fisheries disputes such as the coastal State’s regulatory 
enforcement power, the flag State’s obligations in respect of fisheries in the EEZ, or the law 
regulating high seas fisheries.  
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II. INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN OF UNCLOS 
The law of the sea is indisputably one of the oldest and most developed fields of public 
international law. The maturity of the law of sea is evident in the large number of rules that 
exist to regulate oceans-related issues, whether as customary law, treaty law or soft-law 
instruments, as well as the existence of several institutions in regulating and developing the 
law. The law of the sea can perhaps be best described as a highly intricate web, at the centre of 
which is UNCLOS. As one scholar describes, ‘[UNCLOS] was not intended to deal with all 
ocean governance matters afresh. It was designed to work with existing rules and institutions, 
shaping where necessary and harnessing them where appropriate’.755 Indeed, many UNCLOS 
provisions that are vague or general have subsequently been supplemented by implementing 
agreements such as the UNFSA and other instruments concluded under the auspices of various 
other institutions of a soft-law nature, such as the FAO documents on IUU fishing, port State 
control, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) guidelines on vessel-source pollution. 
This intricate network does not, as it transpires, necessarily mean that the rules are always 
sufficiently clear in their content and meaning for immediate application. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that UNCLOS tribunals operate, along with other international 
institutions, within this finely woven fabric of the law of the sea. Treves observed that ‘the law 
of the sea system of institutions is a rather asystematic system […] Its strength does not lie in 
its structural consistency and cohesiveness, but in its functional destination to the 
implementation of the Convention.’756 Thus each of these institutions plays a distinct role in 
ensuring the effective implementation of the Convention, and ultimately ‘in ensuring the 
evolution of the Convention since its entry into force’.757 
The existence of other actors in the field, all equipped with the competence to develop 
rules and regulations concerning the law of the sea within their sphere of expertise, would 
suggest that any law-development role that UNCLOS tribunals—which only have the explicit 
mandate to settle disputes—are to assume would need to be assessed in their interaction with 
other institutions. The work of these institutions, and the demarcation of power thus influence 
the room available for UNCLOS tribunals, or at least could affect their willingness, to engage 
in the development of the law. Accordingly, this Part examines the ways in which institutions 
involved in the law of the sea could change or develop the law of sea, with a view to 
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understanding whether and how this might impact UNCLOS tribunals in developing the law of 
the sea. 
1. States parties to UNCLOS 
State are the main actors behind the creation of new rules under international law, and thus they 
have the power to change the law under UNCLOS. State parties to UNCLOS could in theory 
invoke the amendment procedure provided for under Articles 312 to 314 UNCLOS. However, 
in practice, this motion has never been triggered. As the requirements for a proposed 
amendment to be adopted, whether by normal or simplified procedure, are extremely difficult 
to satisfy,758 it is highly unlikely that these are the tools which States would choose in order to 
change or develop the law under UNCLOS. 759  State parties, however, still influence the 
development of the law of the sea in other ways. States parties to UNCLOS make unilateral 
decisions or enact legislation on a wide range of matters, and in implementing UNCLOS on the 
ground, States generate practice which reflects their understanding of UNCLOS provisions. 
The unilateral acts of States thus play an important role in the interpretation of UNCLOS. As 
held by ITLOS in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, the laws and regulations of States 
parties in conformity with UNCLOS, constitute ‘part of the legal order for the seas and oceans 
established by the Convention’.760 In practice, ITLOS has referred to State practice relating to 
the issue under scrutiny to shed light on the provisions of the Convention.761 In that sense, 
uniform State practice provides the material for UNCLOS tribunals in interpreting UNCLOS 
provisions.  
When State practice diverges and there is disagreement among States on the scope or 
meaning of the rights and obligations under the Convention, as analysed in Chapter 1, UNCLOS 
tribunals may still contribute to the development of the law by deciding between competing 
views and choose one amidst a diverging body of practice. However, diverging State practice 
may mean that a concrete rule of law has yet to emerge, and the tribunals would have to be 
more vigilant in deciding on the meaning to be given to a provision of UNCLOS, so as not to 
be seen as undertaking a legislative role. In this scenario, State practice still provides the 
important material on which UNCLOS tribunals could and should draw to interpret the law.  
Apart from unilateral State practice, another way in which States may influence the 
work of UNCLOS tribunals is collectively through multilateral conferences. The most 
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prominent among these are the Meeting of State parties to UNCLOS and the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA). The Meeting of State Parties is in fact not an organ of UNCLOS; 
instead it is convened by the UN Secretary-General pursuant to Article 319(2)(a). According to 
its Rules of Procedure,762 the functions of the Meeting of State Parties only include electing the 
members of ITLOS and of the CLCS, considering the annual report of ITLOS and dealing with 
budgetary and administrative matters.763 The report of ITLOS is delivered annually by the 
President of ITLOS and provides the State parties with an opportunity to comment on the 
decisions taken by ITLOS in that year. It has been argued that this reporting system establishes 
a clear link between ITLOS and States which ‘helps to guarantee that international judges 
remain responsive to State interests, thus ensuring that States continue to trust these judicial 
institutions’.764 As its functions mainly involve issues of procedural nature, the Meeting of State 
Parties does not actually have the power to develop substantive law of the sea. Thus, its impact 
on the work of UNCLOS tribunals has to date been quite minimal.  
The UNGA, on the other hand, has the responsibility to ‘[encourage] the progressive 
development of international and its codification’.765 In the field of the law of the sea, in 
Resolution 49/28 in 1994, the UNGA decided to assume the responsibility to conduct annual 
consideration, review and evaluation of developments relating to the implementation of the 
Convention and developments relating to ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general.766 The 
seabed regime under UNCLOS, for example, originated from the concept of ‘common heritage 
of mankind’ first introduced by the UNGA Resolution 2749 in 1970. In the past few years, the 
UNGA has been the forum at which States discuss emerging issues in the law of the sea which 
are not currently regulated, either under UNCLOS or customary law. For example, in 2015 the 
UNGA adopted Resolution 6/292 which decided to develop an international legally binding 
instrument under UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological 
diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction.767 These conferences lay the ground for the 
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adoption of new rules of law. While not binding, UNGA resolutions furnish the tribunals with 
evidence regarding where States stand on emerging issues and the path towards which the law 
regulating these issues is heading. These resolutions, therefore, have the potential to assist the 
tribunals in the interpretation of relevant UNCLOS provisions. However, the fact that States 
are still negotiating on these issues means that the legal regime regulating these issues is yet to 
be settled. This may restrain the discretion of the tribunals when requested to pronounce on 
these issues, as they should be mindful not to prematurely decide what the law should be before 
States, the law-makers under international law, could reach an agreement on the issue. 
Besides the UNGA, States also convene at diplomatic conferences to conclude 
implementing treaties to bring changes to UNCLOS, as exemplified by the 1994 
Implementation Agreement relating to Part XI and the UNFSA, or to adopt non-binding 
instruments such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21. 
These instruments record developments in international law which took place after the entry 
into force of UNCLOS and provide for important principles that are not found under the 
Convention such as ‘sustainable development’ or the ‘precautionary principle’. All these 
documents have ‘the effect of legitimizing and encouraging legal developments based on these 
new perspectives’.768 Thus, in whichever form or nature they may be, they may have a bearing 
on the UNCLOS tribunals’ approach to interpreting UNCLOS provisions which touch upon 
these issues. Indeed, as analysed in previous chapters, the Rio Declaration informed ITLOS’ 
understanding of the status of the ‘precautionary principle’ in the Advisory Opinion on Activities 
in the Area, and the UNFSA provided guidance to ITLOS in interpreting the ‘obligation to 
ensure’ in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, even if ITLOS did not acknowledge this. It 
follows that subsequent multilateral instruments and UNGA Resolutions have assisted 
UNCLOS tribunals in interpreting the provisions of the Convention, in the sense that they 
provided UNCLOS tribunals with indication of what the law regulating certain issues was at 
the time of interpretation, and thus enabled to the tribunals to read these developments into 
UNCLOS and interpreted the Convention in a way that reflected such developments.  
In short, States have an extremely significant role to play in inducing changes to the law 
of the sea. Unilateral State practice and subsequent instruments adopted by States in multilateral 
conferences provide evidence of a common understanding on the part of States in implementing 
the Convention, and thus offer guidance to the tribunals on the meaning to be given to the terms 
or provisions of the Convention. In that sense, States practice supports the law development 
role of UNCLOS tribunals. However, when a legal issue is subject to diverse State practice, the 
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lack of agreement on the part of States regarding the rule of law to be put in place may restrain 
the ability or willingness of UNCLOS tribunals to develop the law in those areas. Although this 
scenario has yet to concretise in the practice of UNCLOS tribunals, it is most likely to be a 
factor that could impact the extent to which UNCLOS tribunals are willing to venture into 
uncharted waters for fear of being accused of assuming the role of legislators.  
2. UNCLOS institutions 
Apart from ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals, UNCLOS also provide for the 
establishment of two other institutions: the CLCS and ISA. The former is responsible for 
overseeing the delineation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, and the latter for the 
implementation of the deep seabed mining regime under Part XI of the Convention. While 
neither of these bodies are explicitly given the role of developing UNCLOS, each has its own 
institutional machinery and powers to generate procedural rules for its functioning.769 These 
rules have the potential to clarify and develop UNCLOS provisions in relation to these specific 
areas. Thus the question that arises is: what impact do the competence and operation of these 
institutions have on the work of UNCLOS tribunals? While UNCLOS may contain specific 
provisions purporting to regulate the relationship between these institutions, the practice of 
these institutions reveals that the interaction between UNCLOS tribunals and themselves is not 
at all straightforward. 
With regard to the CLCS, Article 76(10) stipulates that the provisions of Article 76 ‘are 
without prejudice to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf’. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, in Bangladesh/Myanmar, ITLOS acknowledged the differences between the 
function of the CLCS as a scientific body and that of its own as a dispute settlement body. Thus 
it held that it could proceed with delimitation of the outer continental shelf, even in the absence 
of a recommendation on the outer limits of the shelf by the CLCS.770 By emphasising that the 
request brought before them was legal in nature, enabling them to exercise jurisdiction, the 
tribunals seemed to imply that they would refrain from clarifying technical and scientific terms 
of the Convention, because that would be in the realm of the CLCS’ expertise. The UNCLOS 
tribunals’ reasoning in this regard showed that they were cognisant of the limits of their powers 
in relation to the development of the regime of the outer continental shelf due to the existence 
of the CLCS.  
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Does the CLCS, however, have the power to provide legal interpretation of the 
Convention? This question is pertinent as it means that in dealing with issues relating to the 
continental shelf, UNCLOS tribunals would have to be aware of the role of the CLCS and 
decide the cases in such a way as to incorporate CLCS’ interpretation, or at least, to not conflict 
with the latter’s approach. The answer to the above question seems to be in the positive if one 
looks at the CLCS’s Scientific and Technical Guidelines. These Guidelines state that one of 
their purposes is ‘to clarify its interpretation of scientific, technical and legal terms contained 
in the Convention’.771 The CLCS explained that such clarification was necessary for three 
reasons: (i) the Convention makes use of scientific terms in a legal context which at times 
departs significantly from accepted scientific definitions and terminology, (ii) the Convention 
does not ‘determine the precise definition of various scientific and technical terms’, and thus 
various terms in the Convention might be left open to several possible and equally acceptable 
interpretations, and (iii) several provisions are so complex that States might encounter potential 
scientific and technical difficulties in making a single and unequivocal interpretation of each of 
them.772 Based on this, Judge Nelson argued that ‘the Commission is not unaware of this role’, 
ie the role to interpret and apply the provisions of the Convention relevant to its work.773 
Moreover, the mandate of the CLCS is to consider State parties’ submissions and to 
provide recommendation regarding the outer limits of the continental shelf ‘in accordance with 
Article 76’.774 However, the ‘continental shelf’ concept under Article 76 is not purely scientific, 
it is also of a juridical nature. Law and science are thus deeply intertwined. It would not be 
difficult, therefore, to envision a situation in which ‘[w]hile one interpretation of a provision of 
Article 76 may lead to the conclusion that specific data proves that the requirements of the 
Article are met, under another interpretation the same data might not provide sufficient proof 
in this respect.’ 775  Therefore, in the course of assessing scientific information in the 
submissions, the CLCS may have to undertake the task of interpreting legal terms under Article 
76 in order to decide whether the submissions have met the technical requirements of this 
article.776 As a result, the International Law Association noted that: 
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The Convention does not charge the Commission to consider and make 
recommendations on legal matters. However, the Commission has to be presumed to be 
competent to deal with issues concerning the interpretation or application of Article 76 
or other relevant Articles of the Convention to the extent this is required to carry out the 
functions which are explicitly assigned to it.’777 
It follows that the line between what could be considered a scientific and what is a legal 
interpretation of Article 76 may not be as clear cut as UNCLOS tribunals made it out to be in 
the Bay of Bengal cases. In practice, in assessing the submissions of State parties regarding the 
outer limits of the continental shelf, the CLCS’s interpretation of the terms contained under 
Article 76 also contributes to interpreting this article by introducing new requirements to Article 
76 or new rules to Annex II.778 
Does the fact that the CLCS has the ability and, in practice, has engaged in interpreting 
Article 76, have a bearing on the way UNCLOS tribunals interpret Article 76?779 The CLCS’s 
recommendations are not always made public, and when they are, they are more often than not 
in the form of a mere summary. Thus, it is not always easy for UNCLOS tribunals—or for State 
parties for that matter—to fully grasp whether and to what extent the CLCS has engaged in 
treaty interpretation. In the spirit of comity, and in order to ensure the uniformity of the 
Convention, it is of course advisable for UNCLOS tribunals take into account the interpretation 
adopted by the CLCS, although no specific provisions under UNCLOS would seem to compel 
such adherence. In practice, ITLOS in Bangladesh/Myanmar referred to the ‘test of 
appurtenance’ contained in the CLCS’ Scientific and Technical Guidelines, a concept which 
was not found under Article 76,780 to assist it in shedding light on the meaning and the role of 
‘natural prolongation’, a concept which, in turn, the CLCS ‘largely avoids using’.781 Although 
this was just one instance, it suggests that ITLOS would most likely be willing to take into 
consideration the interpretation of Article 76 adopted by the CLCS in its recommendations.  
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In short, there exist two institutions under UNCLOS which are responsible for 
overseeing the regime of the continental shelf, the CLCS and the dispute settlement bodies. 
Although the two institutions’ tasks are demarcated by a line drawn between science and law, 
this line is blurry in practice. The CLCS can and in fact has taken up the role of providing legal 
interpretation, thus there is an overlap in the functions of the two as far as Article 76 is 
concerned. The implication of this overlap is that UNCLOS tribunals would need to take into 
account the work of the CLCS in deciding the cases. ITLOS has in fact done so. But the Bay of 
Bengal case also suggests that UNCLOS, while still acknowledging the limits of their functions 
as imposed under UNCLOS, were not deterred from hear the case even when the question 
before them may implicate the function of the CLCS.  
Turning to the ISA, this is an autonomous international organisation, ‘through which 
States Parties shall [..] organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to 
administering the resources in the Area’.782 The core function of the ISA is to encourage the 
development of deep seabed mining, but it is also entrusted with other important tasks, 
including the transfer of technology to developing States, the protection of human life with 
respect to activities in the Area, and the protection of the environment from harmful effects that 
may arise from such activities. In fulfilling its duties, the ISA has to date adopted three 
Regulations, namely the Nodules Regulations in 2000, the Sulphides Regulations in 2010, and 
the Cobalt-rich Ferromanganese Crusts Regulations in 2012. The latter two Regulations are of 
particular interest because they ‘opened the door for claims for exploration sites to be made in 
respect of resources other than polymetallic nodules, which had been the only deep seabed 
resources discussed during the Conference.’783 These Regulations are thus evidence that the 
ISA has already been engaged in developing the legal regime of the Area under the Convention 
in line with the advancement of technology. The ISA also has the power to adopt criteria for 
equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area, 
for equitable sharing of payments or contributions made under Article 82 concerning the 
exploitation of non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200 nm, as well as to adopt 
rules and regulations applicable to the conduct of third parties in the Area. These powers 
highlight the important role that the ISA plays under the Convention with regard to developing 
the regime of the Area.  
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Disputes relating to the Area fall under the jurisdiction of the SDC. Although the SDC 
is part of ITLOS and comprises judges from the tribunal itself, it has a specific jurisdiction, 
separate from that of the Tribunal, to deal with disputes with respect to activities in the Area 
falling within the categories listed under Article 187. One of the reasons for the existence of 
the SDC was the uncertainties regarding the manner in which the ISA might carry out its 
responsibilities. As a result, during the Third Conference, there was a strongly held view that a 
tribunal should be established to serve as a check on the Authority's actions.784 However, 
Article 189 makes clear that the SDC has ‘no jurisdiction with regard to the exercise by the 
Authority of its discretionary powers’ under Part XI of the Convention and ‘in no case shall it 
substitute its discretion for that of the ISA’. This Article thus prevents the SDC from venturing 
into areas which are under the exclusive regulatory power of the ISA. Given the broad 
competence of the ISA as described above, this suggests that the room available for the SDC 
to contribute to the development of the UNCLOS provisions relating to the Area is restricted. 
The SDC acknowledged this limitation itself. When dealing with the question of the liability of 
a State party for a sponsored entity’s failure to comply with the Convention, for example, the 
SDC held that the Authority has only dealt with prospecting and exploration, but not liability 
arising from exploitation.785 It then stated that ‘it does not consider itself to be called upon to 
lay down such future rules on liability’.786 This statement clearly demonstrates the awareness 
on the part of the SDC regarding the scope of its power in dealing with the Area.  
However, Article 189 only prohibits the SDC from pronouncing on the conformity of 
the ISA’ rules, regulations and procedures with UNCLOS. It does not prevent the SDC from 
interpreting those rules and regulations in order to clarify their content, because it clearly has 
the jurisdiction to hear disputes concerning whether the ISA has violated the rules and 
regulations it has put in place pursuant to Article 187(b). Moreover, the SDC also has the 
explicit jurisdiction under Article 187(a) to decide on disputes concerning the interpretation 
and application of [Part XI] and the Annexes’, as well as disputes between a State Party and the 
Authority and between parties to a contract. In hearing these disputes, there is still ample 
opportunity for the SDC to clarify UNCLOS provisions in Part XI and thereby contribute to the 
development of the legal regime regulating the Area.  
Apart from contentious proceedings, the SDC also has the exclusive power to render 
advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the Assembly 
and Council of the ISA. Unlike the controversial power of the ITLOS as a full tribunal to give 
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an advisory opinion, this power of the SDC is explicitly spelled out in the Convention as well 
as the Statute of the Tribunal. As shown in Chapter 4, the SDC made use of this jurisdiction in 
the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area to elucidate an important obligation relating deep 
seabed mining under UNCLOS—the obligations of sponsoring States in the Area—thereby 
contributing to strengthening the principles for marine environmental protection applicable not 
only to the Area but also the law of the sea in general. In the course of doing so, the two 
Regulations of the ISA played an important part in guiding the SDC in the interpretation of the 
‘obligation to ensure’. In this instance, the discretionary power of the ISA, resulting in specific 
rules and regulations, facilitated the capacity of UNCLOS tribunals to develop the law.  
In sum, UNCLOS clearly envisions separate roles for the different institutions that it 
establishes. What they all have in common, however, is the task to ensure the uniform and 
effective implementation of UNCLOS. This means that UNCLOS tribunals, when performing 
their functions, should be mindful of the work of the other two institutions. The tribunals’ 
decisions to date suggest that ITLOS has also shown restraint when a particular issue clearly 
falls within the power of the other institutions, as seen in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in 
the Area. However, the Bay of Bengal cases also show that UNCLOS tribunals have not 
refrained from examining an issue which could potentially fall within the competence of  the 
other institutions, when it determined that such an issue requires the interpretation and 
application of UNCLOS. In other words, a mere overlap in function did not prevent ITLOS 
from examining the cases. Furthermore, the two cases in which the question of the relationship 
between UNCLOS tribunals and other institutions established under the Convention arose, ie 
the Bay of Bengal cases and the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, demonstrated that 
the work of these two institutions could also have a facilitating, rather than restraining, effect 
on the ability of UNCLOS tribunals to develop the law. UNCLOS tribunals have harnessed the 
expertise that the Convention confers on these institutions to assist them in shedding light on 
the meaning of vague UNCLOS provisions.  
3. Other international organisations referred to in UNCLOS 
Apart from the UNGA as discussed above, a number of UN specialised bodies are involved in 
ocean issues. It would be impossible within the limited space of this chapter to examine the 
functions and impact of all of these organisations on the work of UNCLOS tribunals. Attention 
will thus be directed to the two bodies whose roles feature most prominently under UNCLOS, 
ie the FAO and IMO. These two bodies already existed before UNCLOS came into force. The 
Convention acknowledges their existence and defers to their expertise by making references to 
these bodies in various provisions, albeit rarely by name.  
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The IMO has competence in the regulation of international shipping and navigation for 
safety, vessel-source pollution, and maritime security.787 UNCLOS defers to the expertise of 
the IMO in two ways, either by assigning the task of developing the rules under UNCLOS to 
States acting through the IMO, or by making implicit reference to IMO’s own competence.788 
The former mode could be seen in respect of maritime safety and marine pollution, for which 
UNCLOS does not specify the content of the rules, and standards.789 For these issues, the IMO 
facilitates the convening of diplomatic conferences and exercise its quasi-legislative function 
by using its own governance structure.790 UNCLOS refers to the IMO as the developer of the 
rules and standards in several provisions, such as in Article 60(3) relating to the duty of the 
coastal State to remove abandoned or disused installations and structures, or Article 41(4) on 
designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic separation schemes. 
The IMO draws direct authority to adopt such standards from its constitutive instrument and 
particular maritime conventions, such as the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea. In the exercise of these powers, the IMO plays a particularly important role in developing 
UNCLOS as it provides ‘substantive content to the jurisdictional schemes and prescriptions for 
cooperation on navigation and shipping matters in the [UNCLOS]’.791  
In South China Sea, the Annex VII arbitral tribunal was willing to recognise the 
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing of Collisions at Sea 
(COLREGS)792—a Convention of the IMO—as ‘generally accepted international regulations’ 
referred to under Article 94(5) in order to determine the scope of flag States’ duties.793 Even 
though this article did not specifically refer to the IMO as the ‘competent organisation’, the 
tribunal confirmed the relevance of COLREGS to the interpretation of UNCLOS provisions 
relating to flag States’ obligations over their vessels. 
 With regard to FAO, this organisation has an important role in the field of fisheries and 
aquaculture, especially in promoting responsible and sustainable use of fisheries resources. As 
such, FAO ‘provides, both at global and regional levels, an institutional framework within 
which, […] rules and standards may be negotiated but also political commitments adopted as 
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well as concrete measures’.794 In particular, FAO adopted in 1995 the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries and several other important international instruments in the form of plans 
of actions, strategies, guidelines and agreements, with varying degrees of bindingness, aimed 
at strengthening the mechanisms to combat harmful fishing practices.795 In addition, FAO has 
RFMOs present in all regions of the world, which are now a key component of the international 
institutional framework for ocean governance, and it also provides support to RFMOs 
established outside its framework.796 Given the emphasis under UNCLOS on the conservation 
and management of marine resources, as well as the need for cooperation between States in this 
regard, it is not difficult to see the important role that FAO plays and the impact that the 
instruments adopted under its auspices have on the development of the law relating to 
sustainable fisheries. In the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, the fisheries agreements that 
FAO had adopted, in addition to the UNFSA, provided the basis for ITLOS to read into 
UNCLOS the flag State’s obligations over fishing vessels and States’ obligation for sustainable 
development of fisheries resources, albeit without any such acknowledgement. Many of the 
instruments adopted by these bodies are non-binding in nature, thus by themselves, they have 
little normative force to compel action by States. However, by incorporating them into 
UNCLOS, the tribunals endowed authority on them and strengthened their normative value. In 
that sense, UNCLOS tribunals and these specialised organisations enjoy a mutually reinforcing 
relationship. 
In conclusion, UNCLOS tribunals are not the only institutions established by UNCLOS 
to ensure its effective implementation. The Convention incorporates the rules and standards set 
by other international organisations such as FAO or IMO into its provisions, thus giving these 
bodies the competence to develop the law in their respective field of expertise. Lowe and 
Tzanakopoulos contend that international bodies with specific technical expertise such as FAO 
or IMO have the role of ‘the regulators’ whose task is to set out guidelines and regulations in 
relation to the technical details, which eventually shape the content of the law.797 Given that 
UNCLOS clearly confers the power to develop rules in certain areas to these ‘regulators’, the 
room left for UNCLOS tribunals to develop technical details in the areas under the purview of 
these bodies would seem to be restricted. However, the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing and 
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South China Sea show that UNCLOS tribunals have benefitted from the expertise of these 
organisations in clarifying the Convention. It seems safe to conclude that the mandate and 
expertise of the international organisations recognised as ‘competent’ under the Convention, 
such as the IMO and FAO, have had the effect of facilitating and enabling UNCLOS tribunals 
to develop the law under the Convention relating to issues in the former’s area of competence. 
UNCLOS tribunals frequently had resort to the work of these institutions to aid them in the 
interpretation of the Convention. 
III. THE INTERPRETATIVE METHODS EMPLOYED BY UNCLOS 
TRIBUNALS 
As the previous chapters have shown, the development of the law of sea by UNCLOS 
tribunals—as international dispute settlement bodies—is brought about through their decisions, 
in which they interpret and apply the legal rules relevant to the case. Thus, if we were to accept 
that interpretation is the principal way in which international courts and tribunals develop the 
law, then at first glance, the interpretative method that the court or tribunal uses is of limited 
significance. As long as the law is interpreted and thus clarified, it has been developed. In other 
words, any act of interpretation by an international judicial body would be an act of law-
development, regardless of the method interpretation used. However, the act of interpretation 
is one that is inherently subjective in nature as the text of the treaty rarely carries one single 
meaning.798 The meaning of the terms or the scope of the rules contained in UNCLOS do not 
exist independently in a vacuum, waiting to be discovered by the tribunals. It is instead created 
through the tribunals’ interpretative act. The previous chapters have also shown that the 
tribunals have interpreted UNCLOS in such a way as to incorporate into the Convention the 
developments that have taken place in practice and to reflect current trends in the law of the 
sea. In that sense, UNCLOS tribunals have developed of the law in line with evolving 
circumstances, thereby maintaining the relevance and applicability of the Convention in the 
regulation of current activities at sea. Against such a background, this section seeks to 
understand how UNCLOS tribunals have approached the question of treaty interpretation, 
paying specific attention to the question of whether the tribunals deliberately employed a 
particular interpretative method to assist them, through interpretation, in developing UNCLOS 
in line with current practice.  
The departure point for any treaty interpretation exercise would be the principles of treaty 
interpretation contained in Articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT, which reflect customary international 
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law. 799  However, UNCLOS tribunals have only sparingly referred to the VCLT. ITLOS 
explicitly invoked the VCLT in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, in which it 
stated that the rules of treaty interpretation in the VCLT applied not only to the interpretation 
of UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement, but also the Regulations adopted by the Authority even 
when they are not in principle treaties.800 In Chagos MPA, the Annex VII tribunal explicitly 
invoked Article 33, and, despite not referring to Article 31, applied all the elements of this 
article such as ‘ordinary meaning’, ‘context’, ‘object and purpose’ in the course of interpreting 
Article 2(3) UNCLOS.801 In South China Sea, the arbitral tribunal explicitly stated that ‘the 
Tribunal must apply the provisions of the [VCLT]’,802  particularly Articles 31 and 32 in 
interpreting the term ‘rock’ under Article 121(3). It then conducted a detailed examination of 
the meaning of the terms contained in this article, its context, the object and purpose of the 
Convention, and the travaux préparatoires of the Convention.803 Other than these three cases, 
UNCLOS tribunals have not generally engaged in a discussion regarding the approach to treaty 
interpretation that they were adopting, nor has the VLCT featured prominently in the case law 
of UNCLOS tribunals.  
In practice, when international courts and tribunals interpret treaty provisions in a way that 
reflects developments at the time of interpretation, there is a tendency to resort to two 
interpretative techniques, namely: (i) evolutionary interpretation and (ii) reference to 
subsequent conduct. The remainder of this part seeks to explore whether UNCLOS tribunals 
have employed these two techniques to develop the law contained in the Convention.  
1. Evolutionary interpretation 
The evolutionary interpretative method is a tool used by international courts and tribunals to 
establish a contemporary meaning of a treaty provision, that is a meaning in the light of the 
circumstances at the time of its application. 804  It has been argued that evolutionary 
interpretation could be an effective means for courts to develop law, as the determination of the 
meaning of a treaty provision at the time of application ‘allows tribunals to insert their grain of 
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wisdom’.805 The ILC Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law suggested that a 
treaty has an evolutionary character where: (i) it implies taking into account subsequent 
technical, economic or legal developments; (ii) it sets up an obligation for further progressive 
development for the parties; or (iii) it has a very general nature or is expressed in such general 
terms that it must take into account changing circumstances. 806  Commentators have also 
pointed to highly general or open-textured treaty provisions, to provisions in framework 
conventions, where parties agree that in the future they may further develop the obligations 
inherent in the treaty language, 807 or to terms that have a ‘generic character’808 as the likely 
subjects of evolutionary interpretation. 
In practice, the method of evolutionary interpretation has been employed by several 
courts such as the ICJ,809 the Appellate Body of the WTO810 and the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)811 in three main circumstances. First, as held by the ICJ, a treaty provision or 
term could be considered evolutionary if ‘the parties intended, or presumed to have intended, 
to give the term a meaning or content capable of evolving, not fixed once and for all’.812 Second, 
adjudicators or arbitrators could give a treaty provision an evolutionary meaning if they deem 
that this is demanded to effectively realise the object and purpose of the treaty.813 Finally, and 
particularly in the case of human rights treaties, when a convention is considered a ‘living 
instrument’, a dispute settlement body will adopt the evolutionary approach in order to interpret 
its provisions ‘in the light of present-day conditions’.814 International courts, particularly the 
ECtHR, have used the argument of ‘a living treaty’ to interpret the rights or obligations 
contained in the relevant conventions in a manner that departs, or appears to depart, from their 
original meaning as envisioned by the drafters of the convention, or to expand the scope of the 
convention’ rights and obligations and read into the Convention rights and obligations that are 
																																																								
805 Eirik Bjorke, ‘The Vienna Rules, Evolutionary Interpretation and the Intention of the Parties’ in Andrea 
Bianchi, Daniel Peat, Matthew Windsor, Interpretation of International Law (OUP 2015) 191.  
806 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Conclusions of the work of the Study Group’ (18 July 2012) UN 
Doc A/CN.4/L.702, 22-23. 
807 See Julian Arato, ‘Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over 
Time and Their Diverse Consequences’ (2010) 9 LPICT 443; Murphy (n 804).  
808 Paolo Palchetti, ‘Interpreting ‘‘Generic Terms’: Between Respect for the Parties’ Original Intention and the 
Identification of the Ordinary Meaning’ in Boschiero et al (n 11) 91. 
809 See, eg, Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v US) [1952] 
ICJ Rep 189; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16; Dispute 
regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) [2009] ICJ Rep 243 [63].  
810 United States-Shrimps (n 283) . 
811 Tyrer v the United Kingdom, Application No. 5856/72, Judgment of 25 April 1978; Marckx v Belgium, 
Application no. 6833/74, Judgment of 13 June 1979. 
812Costa Rica v Nicaragua (n 809) [64].  
813Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belgium v Netherlands), Award, ICGJ 373 (PCA 2005) [80]. 
814Tyrer v United Kingdom (n 811) [31]. 
179 
 
not expressly contained therein.815 Moeckli and White argue that, apart from human rights 
treaties, treaties that are constitutive of international organisations, such as the UN Charter, or 
law-making treaties such as those in the field of humanitarian law or environmental law can 
also be considered to be ‘living’.816 They further argue that ‘[t]reaties with courts or quasi-
judicial bodies are likely to have more ‘life’ than treaties that rely on a review conference of 
the state parties’.817 This statement suggests an implicit acknowledgment that international 
courts and tribunals are an important driving force in bringing ‘life’ to treaties. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, UNCLOS serves as a ‘Constitution for the oceans’ and a 
framework Convention for all uses of the sea. Moreover, it is also a law-making treaty as it sets 
up a new legal regime for ocean governance and has an integral dispute settlement system of 
its own. A recent study also concluded that UNCLOS has all the characteristics of a living treat 
due to the ‘structure and substance, and the complex legal networks it generates and is situated 
within’ which ‘enable it to adopt to changing realities’. 818 Despite all these characteristics, 
UNCLOS tribunals have never acknowledged that evolutionary interpretation had a role to play 
in deciding cases. There was some vague hint in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, 
in which the SDC stated that the concept of the ‘obligation to ensure’, as an obligation of due 
diligence, ‘may change over time as measures considered sufficiently diligent at a certain 
moment may become not diligent enough in light, for instance, of new scientific or 
technological knowledge’.819 However, the SDC did not take this matter further.  
In contentious cases, some States parties appearing before UNCLOS tribunals have 
called on the tribunals to adopt an evolutionary interpretation of UNCLOS provisions. 
However, again UNCLOS tribunals have all rejected such an invitation. In Virginia G, Guinea-
Bissau advocated for ‘an evolutionary interpretation of the Convention’ to recognise the 
regulation of bunkering of fishing vessels in the EEZ as falling under the sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction of the coastal State.820 It asked ITLOS to read into UNCLOS the coastal State’s 
right to regulate the bunkering of fishing activities, when the wording of the relevant Articles, 
ie Articles 56, 61, 62 and 73, do not explicitly provide for such an activity. ITLOS did not 
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respond to this argument in its judgment, and as will be shown below, adopted a different 
interpretative technique to address this issue. 
In Chagos MPA, Mauritius, in arguing for the tribunal’s jurisdiction over territorial 
sovereignty, called for ‘an evolutionary process in the application of compulsory dispute 
settlement under the Convention’. In particular, Mauritius contended that: 
[A]s the [ITLOS] and Annex VII Tribunals have been confronted with a range of issues 
and questions that may not have been at the forefront of the minds of the drafters of the 
Convention, or indeed in their minds at all, sensible solutions have been found, and the 
law has evolved. Those solutions have been practical and they have been effective. It is 
true that they may have taken the interpretation of the Convention to a place where some 
of the early writings that the United Kingdom likes to rely upon may not have foreseen 
and may not like it. But it cannot be said that disaster has followed.821 
Mauritius thus recognised that by inviting the arbitral tribunal to establish jurisdiction over 
territorial disputes, it was essentially calling on the tribunal to deviate from the intention of the 
drafters and adopt an evolutionary interpretation of the scope of its jurisdiction. The Annex VII 
tribunal, however, rejected this evolutionary approach for several reasons, one of which being 
that an expansion of jurisdiction to cover matters of land sovereignty ‘would do violence to the 
intent of the drafters of the Convention’.822 It is worth recalling that, one of the grounds for the 
adoption of evolutionary interpretation is the intention of the drafters to allow the treaty term 
or provision to be evolutionary. Thus reference to the drafters’ intention does not necessarily 
restrict or prohibit an evolutionary interpretation of the treaty. In this case, the arbitral tribunal 
indeed referred to the drafters’ intention to determine whether a broadened scope of jurisdiction 
was envisioned. The tribunal’s refusal to adopt evolutionary interpretation in this case was, 
however, not difficult to understand as the matter under consideration was a procedural issue, 
ie the tribunal’s jurisdictional scope. The room for evolutionary interpretation resulting in an 
expansion of jurisdiction is limited due to the importance of State’s consent in international 
dispute settlement.  
 In the same vein, UNCLOS tribunals have not expressly acknowledged that the 
Convention is a ‘living treaty’. An examination of the case law of both ITLOS and Annex VII 
arbitral tribunals shows that the notion of ‘living treaty’ never appeared in the decisions of these 
bodies. This term only appeared once in the decision of ITLOS in its Advisory Opinion on IUU 
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Fishing. But even then, ITLOS was only recalling the argument made by some States that ‘the 
purpose of Article 21 of the Statute is to shape the Tribunal as a living institution’ while 
deciding whether it could exercise advisory jurisdiction.823 It did not address this argument in 
its examination of Article 21 of the Statute. In fact, the only instance in which this term was 
used was in the Separate Opinion of Judge Lucky in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing. 
Regarding ITLOS’ advisory jurisdiction, Judge Lucky argued that UNCLOS, as well as the 
Statute of ITLOS, were ‘living instruments’.824  Judge Lucky stated that these instruments 
‘“grow” and adapt to changing circumstances’.825 As ‘the law of the sea is not static’ and it is 
‘dynamic’, Judge Lucky argued that ‘through the interpretation and construction of the relevant 
Articles a court or tribunal can adhere and give positive effect to this dynamism’.826 As a result, 
in his view ‘judges must take a robust approach and apply the law in a legal but pragmatic way’. 
It is clear, therefore, that Judge Lucky viewed the ‘living treaty’ argument as an independent 
basis on which the tribunal could interpret UNCLOS provisions to reflect current developments.  
2. Resort to subsequent conduct 
Resort to subsequent conduct differs from evolutionary interpretation in that while the latter 
has been argued to be based on the original intention of the parties, interpretation based on 
‘subsequent practice’ revolves around later intentions of the parties. It allows judges and 
arbitrators to interpret treaty on the basis of the practice of the parties subsequent to its entry 
into force. Moreover, while evolutionary interpretation is not explicitly provided for under the 
VCLT—although several scholars have argued that evolutionary interpretation is in fact 
grounded on the VCLT827—treaty interpretation based on subsequent conduct finds basis in 
Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the VCLT.  
In contrast to the lack of reliance on evolutionary interpretation, UNCLOS tribunals 
have frequently resorted to subsequent practice and agreements to interpret UNCLOS, although 
they never actually acknowledged that this was the interpretative method they were adopting. 
As analysed in Chapter 2, UNCLOS tribunals referred to subsequent practice or subsequent 
developments that had taken place as recorded in domestic legislation or international 
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instruments to assist them in giving meaning to certain terms used under UNCLOS or 
determining whether certain activities or principles are compatible with UNCLOS. For 
instance, in one the first cases before ITLOS, M/V Saiga, ITLOS referred to the 1986 
Convention on the Conditions for the Registration of Ships, the 1993 FAO Compliance 
Agreement and the UNFSA to interpret the requirement of ‘genuine link’ between a ship and a 
flag state in establishing the nationality of ship under Article 94.828 In Virginia G, while ITLOS 
agreed with Guinea-Bissau that coastal States were allowed to regulate the bunkering of fishing 
vessels despite the lack of reference to this activity in UNCLOS, it did not adhere to the call 
from Guinea-Bissau to adopt the ‘evolutionary interpretation’ approach to interpreting 
UNCLOS provisions. What it did instead was take into account the definitions of ‘fishing’ and 
‘fishing-related’ activities in several international agreements, most of which came into force 
after UNCLOS, which establish the close connection between fishing and bunkering 
activities.829 It also referred to national legislation which recognises the right of the coastal State 
to regulate bunkering activities.830 ITLOS did not make clear what the legal basis for relying 
on subsequent practice was, and more specifically, whether it was invoking Article 31(3) to 
interpret relevant UNCLOS provisions. Recourse to subsequent agreements was also had in the 
Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing. Although ITLOS insisted that the flag State’s obligation to 
ensure that vessels flying their flags do not conduct IUU fishing activities within the EEZ was 
based on the wording of the relevant provisions under UNCLOS, they were in fact read into the 
Convention based on binding agreements and other soft law instruments relating to 
international fisheries that were concluded subsequent to UNCLOS. As a result, it would appear 
that ITLOS in this case was adopting an interpretative method based on subsequent agreements, 
while refusing to acknowledge it as such.831 
Apart from subsequent conduct, new trends in the law of the sea have also had an impact 
on ITLOS’ interpretation of the Convention. The first example is the interpretation of 
‘reasonable bond’ in prompt release proceedings. As elaborated in Chapter 2, while in earlier 
prompt release cases, ITLOS gave exclusive weight to quantifiable factors in determining what 
constitutes a ‘reasonable bond’, beginning from Volga and more prominently in Hoshinmaru, 
ITLOS began to take into account coastal States’ obligations to conserve its marine resources 
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in determining the reasonable bond. As all the prompt release requests were made in the context 
of alleged illegal fishing activities, the fact that conservation concerns started to make their way 
into the consideration of the judges reflected a recognition of the importance of conservation 
concerns which have increasingly taken centre stage of the law of the sea. Also in the context 
of marine environment, the SDC in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area endorsed the 
customary status of the precautionary principle by holding that ‘there was a trend towards 
making the precautionary approach part of customary international law’.832 The SDC reached 
this decision based on the observation that ‘the precautionary approach has been incorporated 
into a growing number of international treaties and other instruments, many of which reflect 
the formulation of Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration’.833 
In conclusion, both ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals have developed UNCLOS 
by interpreting the Convention progressively to include new practice that are not expressly 
provided for its provisions. However, UNCLOS tribunals generally refrain from explaining 
what interpretative method they are adopting. There is scarce mention of the VCLT. The 
tribunals have never acknowledged the use of evolutionary interpretation, even though it is 
arguable that their treaty interpretation exercises in many cases produced results that were 
evolutionary in nature. Neither have they considered UNCLOS a ‘living treaty’. The only 
approach that could be said to have been relatively prominent in cases of UNCLOS tribunals 
was the reference to subsequent conduct. Nevertheless, UNCLOS tribunals have not done this 
in a systematic fashion with a clear indication that they were consciously applying this 
interpretative method. Where subsequent instruments or practice were relied upon, there was 
no mentioning of the legal ground that warranted such resort, except for the South China Sea 
arbitration. Therefore, while it cannot be concluded that UNCLOS tribunals deliberately 
adopted a particular method of treaty interpretation with the specific aim to develop the law of 
the sea, implicit in the approach of the tribunals in several cases was the acknowledgement that 
the Convention should be interpreted in light of current developments, and that the meaning 
and scope of the rights and obligations contained under the Convention should be interpreted 
in an evolving manner.  
IV. THE PERCEPTION BY UNCLOS TRIBUNALS OF THEIR ROLES 
Chapter 1 touches upon the question of whether UNCLOS tribunals, as international courts and 
tribunals, have the authority to develop the law. However, this question has been tackled purely 
from a doctrinal perspective and from an outsider's point of view. This part seeks to take a look 
																																																								




at this question from a different angle, that is from UNCLOS tribunals' point of view. It aims 
to determine the perception of ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals of their own roles as 
evident in their decisions. In particular, it asks whether they see themselves as having the task 
of contributing to the development of the law of the sea and if so, what impact, if any, does it 
have on the way in which the tribunals decided the cases? 
1. ITLOS’s perception 
A perusal of the judgments rendered by ITLOS shows that it has not once explicitly 
acknowledged that it does or should undertake a role of developing the law of the sea. In the 
two advisory proceedings, the type of proceedings which, as argued above,834 is considered to 
give international courts and tribunals more leeway to develop the law, ITLOS was still careful 
to reiterate it should not undertake a regulatory or legislative role.  
In the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, while acknowledging that ‘the 
Regulations issued to date by the Authority deal only with prospecting and exploration’835 but 
not exploitation in relation to sponsoring States’ liability, the SDC stated that ‘it does not 
consider itself to be called upon to lay down such future rules on liability’ as ‘it is to be expected 
that member States of the Authority will further deal with the issue of liability in future 
regulations on exploitation.’836 In the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, ITLOS was again 
adamant that it was not undertaking a legislative role in response to the argument put forward 
by some States that ‘while the four questions may be couched as legal questions, what the SRFC 
actually seeks is not answers lex lata, but lex ferenda and that is outside the functions of the 
Tribunal as a judicial body’.837 ITLOS held that it did not consider that the SRFC was seeking 
a legislative role for the tribunal and, more importantly, that ‘[t]he Tribunal also wishes to make 
it clear that it does not take a position on issues beyond the scope of its judicial functions’.838
  
In both Advisory Opinions, ITLOS was careful to avoid portraying its role as that of a 
law-maker, emphasising that this task belonged to the States, or the Authority in the case the 
Area. Instead, ITLOS stated that its role in advisory proceedings was two-fold. First, it would 
assist the requesting body—the Council of the ISA and the SRFC respectively—in the 
performance of its function. Second, the Advisory Opinions would ‘contribute to the 
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implementation of the Convention’ through the interpretation of the rules pertinent to the issue 
in question. To be more specific, the SDC in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area 
clearly stated that ‘the Chamber is mindful of the fact that by answering the questions it will 
assist the Council in the performance of its activities and contribute to the implementation of 
the Convention’s regime’.839 Despite admitting that it was the members of the ISA that had the 
power to specify the rules on exploitation, the SDC went on to suggest that ‘the member States 
of the Authority may, however, take some guidance from the interpretation in this Advisory 
Opinion of the pertinent rules on the liability of the sponsoring States in the Convention’.840 
Apart from its guidance role, the SDC also acknowledged that ‘[t]he functions of the Chamber 
[…] are relevant for the good governance of the Area’.841 In the Advisory Opinion on IUU 
Fishing, ITLOS took the same approach by affirming that ‘by answering the questions it will 
assist the SRFC in the performance of its activities and contribute to the implementation of the 
Convention’. 842  When faced with a request to provide advice regarding flag States’ 
responsibility for IUU fishing activities in the EEZ of another State, ITLOS acknowledged that 
this was an issue which was not directly addressed in the Convention, and hence that there 
existed a gap in the Convention.843 However, ITLOS was careful not to be seen as adding new 
obligations to the Convention. Instead it claimed that it was merely filling in the gaps found in 
Convention, through the interpretation and application of obligations which already existed 
under the Convention.  
The first role identified above, that of assisting the requesting body in the performance 
of its function, is nothing out of the ordinary for an international tribunal when rendering an 
advisory opinion.844 However, the second role of ‘contribut[ing] to the implementation of the 
Convention’ is particularly noteworthy. From ITLOS’ statements above, this second function 
was clearly separate to and independent of the the first one. These statements show that ITLOS 
saw itself as having a role that extended beyond the function normally performed by a judicial 
body in advisory proceedings, ie assisting the requesting institutions. Rather, ITLOS 
acknowledged a role pertaining to UNCLOS itself—protecting and ensuring the effective 
implementation of the Convention’s legal regimes.  
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Beside advisory proceedings, the only contentious case in which ITLOS acknowledged 
that it had role broader than dispute settlement was Bangladesh/Myanmar. As analysed in 
Chapter 3, ITLOS in this case for the first time dealt with the highly controversial question 
regarding the relationship between itself and the CLCS in cases involving delimitation of the 
outer continental shelf in the absence of a recommendation regarding the outer limits of the 
shelf by the CLCS. ITLOS held that ‘[a] decision by the Tribunal not to exercise its jurisdiction 
over the dispute relating to the continental shelf beyond 200 nm would not only fail to resolve 
a long-standing dispute, but also would not be conducive to the efficient operation of the 
Convention.’845 It further said that if it did not resolve the case, the parties ‘would be left in a 
position where they may be unable to benefit fully from their rights over the continental 
shelf.’846 These statements indicate that in the view of ITLOS, its task was not only to resolve 
disputes, but also to safeguard the system of rights and obligations that UNCLOS conferred on 
the State parties. 
In addition to express statements, one could arguably seek to determine whether ITLOS 
views itself as having a role to develop the law by asking whether the Tribunal has been willing 
to pronounce on issues which were not strictly necessary to resolve the dispute before it. It has 
been argued that ‘courts and tribunals tend to decide on the narrowest available bases and if 
possible to avoid fundamental questions about the legal order […]. They focus on the narrower 
function of deciding particular disputes […] rather than seeing themselves overtly responsible 
for developing the legal regime.847 It follows that, as an a contrario argument, an endeavour on 
the part of ITLOS to discuss or decide on questions beyond what was needed to provide an 
answer to the questions posed to it would signal that, notwithstanding the lack of an explicit 
acknowledgement of a law-development role in its decisions, ITLOS has in fact embraced such 
a role.  
A survey of ITLOS’ decisions in contentious proceedings, however, provides no 
evidence of such practice. In advisory proceedings, as mentioned above, ITLOS has explicitly 
stated that its role was to contribute to the implementation of the Convention. In the Advisory 
Opinion on Activities in the Area, ITLOS’ approach to handling some of the issues that arose 
gives a mixed picture. On the one hand, as discussed in Chapter 4, the SDC proceeded to 
comment on the status of the precautionary principle under customary international law, even 
though the precautionary principle was already provided for in the two Regulations, and hence 
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there was no need to determine whether the precautionary principle existed as a rule of 
customary rule in order for it to be applicable to the case. Given that the precautionary principle 
at the time, and perhaps even up to date, was subjected to a great level of uncertainty, one could 
reasonably construe the SDC’s attempt to endorse the precautionary principle under customary 
international law as an endeavour to contribute to the development of this rule under 
international law. On the other hand, in the same case, the SDC was faced with an argument 
that, based on Article 191 of UNCLOS which states that the Chamber ‘shall’ give an advisory 
opinion, the SDC, unlike the ICJ, did not have the discretionary power to decline a request for 
advisory opinion.848 In response to this question, the SDC simply said that ‘the Chamber does 
not consider it necessary to pronounce on the consequences of that difference with respect to 
admissibility in the present case’.849 The SDC thus forewent an opportunity to expound on the 
contour of its advisory jurisdiction under the Convention. 
What is clear from the preceding discussion is that ITLOS has not openly acknowledged 
that it has a role to play in developing the law of the sea. ITLOS has only explicitly recognised 
its role in contributing to the implementation of the Convention by providing answers to 
advisory requests, and hinted at a similar role of ensuring the enjoyment of the rights and 
obligations under the Convention in one contentious case. While not going so far as 
acknowledging that it has a role to play in the development of the law of the sea, at least such 
a recognition indicates that ITLOS sees itself as having a role that is not merely confined to 
responding to the questions put to it, either by international organisations in advisory 
proceedings or by States in contentious proceedings. Instead, there seems to be an 
understanding on the part of ITLOS that its answers have a broader significance, in that they 
contribute to protecting the legal regime created by the Convention and further enabling the 
latter’s effective implementation. These functions are arguably the essence of that of an 
institutional guardian.  
Unlike the decisions which shed little light on its perception of the role that the tribunal 
should play, ITLOS judges in their individual opinions have been much more willing to 
advocate or acknowledge a creative role for the tribunal. In their separate and dissenting 
opinions, one can find strong and explicit endorsement for ITLOS to undertake a broader 
function that mere dispute settlement. For example, in Bangladesh/Myanmar, Judge Treves 
contended that: 
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All courts and tribunals called to decide on the interpretation and application of the 
Convention, including its provisions on delimitation, should consider themselves as 
parts of a collective interpretative endeavour, in which, while keeping in mind the need 
to ensure consistency and coherence, each contributes its grain of wisdom and particular 
outlook.850 
By calling on all courts and tribunals, including ITLOS in this particular case, to be part of ‘a 
collective interpretative endeavour’, Judge Treves seemed to have envisioned a broader and 
more systemic role for the tribunal than settling concrete disputes. It should also contribute to 
the interpretation and development of the law, in this case the law on maritime delimitation.  
Several judges have even called for an outright recognition of the role of the tribunal in 
developing the law. Judge Wolfrum explicitly stating that ITLOS is expected to have a ‘law-
making function’ in the context of maritime delimitation. He argued that ‘Article 287 of the 
Convention entrusts three institutions with the tasks and responsibility of interpreting the 
Convention, and within its framework, to progressively develop it.’ 851  The case law on 
maritime delimitation ‘constitutes an acqui judiciaire, a source of international law to be read 
into Articles 74, 83 of the Convention’852, and in perhaps the strongest endorsement of the role 
of ITLOS to develop the law, he stated that: 
It is the responsibility of these courts and tribunals not only to decide delimitation cases 
while remaining within the framework of such acquis judiciaire but also to provide for 
the progressive development of the latter. They are called upon in further developing 
this acquis judiciaire to take into account new scientific findings.853 
In the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing, several judges took the opportunity to voice 
their opinion regarding the role of the Tribunal. In Judge Ndiyae’s view, the judges must lay 
down ‘the positive law, the law in force when the decision is rendered’.854 However, where 
there is no law, he argued that ‘the judge, acting in keeping with the principle of the “court’s 
duty to decide”, interprets so as to avoid a non liquet’,855 that is to avoid uncertainty or gaps in 
the law. In essence, the role of the judge is to develop the law by filling the gaps in the law 
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through the act of interpretation. Similarly, Judge Lucky strongly endorsed the power of judges 
to develop the law by stating that: 
It is accepted that judges do not make law, but they can point out deficiencies or 
ambiguities in the law or give a wide interpretation to an Article or section of a treaty 
or convention to assist in the development of the jurisprudence of international law.856 
In Arctic Sunrise, in which Russia declined to appear before ITLOS, the Tribunal was faced for 
the first time with a case of non-appearance. Article 28 of the ITLOS Statute provides for such 
a situation. However, when examining the consequences of non-appearance on the proceedings 
within the framework of UNCLOS, ITLOS did not once refer to this Article 28, but instead 
extensively relied on the jurisprudence of the ICJ on the issue of non-appearance. Several 
judges were critical of the Tribunal’s omission, for they felt that ITLOS had missed an 
important opportunity to clarify and develop the legal regime provided for under UNCLOS. 
Judge Paik, for example, contended that: 
[T]he legal regime based on a statute and the jurisprudence of the tribunal entrusted to 
safeguard that regime cannot be expected to develop unless serious efforts are made to 
clarify some inevitable uncertainties or ambiguities lurking in many statutory 
provisions. Bypassing a provision of its own statute and simply relying on the 
jurisprudence that has been developed on the basis of the provision, though similar, of 
another statute would hardly be conducive to such development.857 
The first sentence of this statement clearly indicates that Judge Paik sees a role of developing 
the law through interpretation for the tribunal, albeit in this case for a procedural issue. Had 
ITLOS invoked Article 28 of the ITLOS Statute, it would most likely have reached the same 
conclusion regarding the legal consequences of non-appearance on the proceedings of the case. 
This means that either way, ITLOS would still have fulfilled its dispute settlement role. Judge 
Paik’s emphasis on reference to Article 28 stemmed not from concerns regarding the ability of 
the tribunal to resolve the case but from those relating to the role that the Tribunal should have 
undertaken, namely of developing the legal regime under UNCLOS. Likewise, Judges Wolfrum 
and Kelly also argued that ‘the Tribunal could have shed some further light on how non-
appearance is to be seen under a mandatory dispute settlement system such as the one 
established under Part XV of the Convention’.858Again, this went beyond what was needed to 
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dispose of the dispute, and emphasised an understanding of a broader role that ITLOS should 
play. Beyond the confines of their individual opinions, various judges have also expressed their 
view, rather firmly, that ITLOS has a role to play in developing the law of the sea in various 
fora,859 as well as in their extra-judicial writings.860 
In short, several ITLOS judges have expressed the view that its role should include 
developing the law by clarifying the content of the rules pertinent to the case, filling in the gaps 
and stating what the law is when there are no relevant rules to regulate the issue, and by 
interpreting the law in a way that ensures consistency with wider system of international law. 
The opinions of these individual judges echo the view which has gained ground in the academic 
community that international courts and tribunals should have a role to play in developing 
international law as discussed earlier in the thesis.  
What value do individual opinions of the judges of international courts carry? ITLOS 
judges, similar to their ICJ counterparts,861 are given the opportunity to append a separate or 
dissenting opinion, or a declaration to the judgment.862 Several scholars and judges attach great 
significance to individual opinions rendered by international judges. Judge Franck saw the 
dissenting opinion as ‘present[ing] to the law’s universal market place of ideas certain 
principles of law and nuances of analysis which, even if not adopted in the instant case, may be 
of use in another, as yet unforeseen, context.863 Other judges, writing extra-judicially, argued 
that separate opinions, while not changing the result of the case, ‘influence the shaping and 
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sometimes the altering of the course of law’,864 or that ‘they are said to demonstrate the range 
from which the Court has chosen its stance’.865 Providing a more specific explanation, another 
scholar argued that ‘individual opinions can offer a sort of “first airing” of possible new legal 
rules that the majority might not yet be prepared to recognize; these can contribute to the 
progressive development of international law’.866As such, individual opinions are believed to 
‘blaze trails along which future development of the law should proceed, either at the hands of 
the Court or at the hands of independent jurists.’867 
However, it is worth noting that the discussion relating to the value of individual 
opinions of judges to date mostly concerns their potential impact on substantive issues of law. 
In contrast, the opinions of ITLOS judges examined above relate to the role that the tribunal 
should assume when hearing the cases. Thus, it is unclear as to whether the significance of 
judges’ individual opinions as discussed above also bears out when they relate not to 
substantive legal issues, but to the perception of the role that the tribunal should undertake. In 
other words, when ITLOS in its decisions does not set out its perception of its own role, can the 
views of individual judges tell us anything about the tribunal’s perception? These individual 
opinions are not, of course, representative of the view of the whole tribunal. But the fact that 
such views repeatedly surfaced in the opinions of different judges, in more than just one case, 
arguably signals that an understanding of the law development role was present in the mind of 
the judges. While such a view has yet to make its way into the majority’s reasoning, the 
individual opinions help shed light on the understanding which underlay the judgment of the 
majority, but which the latter was reluctant to spell out. It arguably indicates that the lack of 
pronouncement on law development does not necessarily mean that the tribunal was not aware 
of this role, merely that it was being cautious about acknowledging a creative role. 
2. Annex VII arbitral tribunals’ perception 
Similar to ITLOS, no Annex VII arbitral tribunals have acknowledged that they should or do 
have a role to play in the development of the law of the sea. In fact, a perusal of more than ten 
awards rendered by Annex VII arbitral tribunals shows that a discussion regarding their role is 
largely missing. The only instance in which an Annex VII arbitral tribunal seemed to have 
mentioned the purpose of its work was in Bangladesh/India. The tribunal stated that: 
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[I]inaction by this Tribunal would in practice leave the Parties in a position in which 
they would likely be unable to benefit fully from their rights over the continental shelf. 
The Tribunal does not consider that such an outcome would be consistent with the object 
and purpose of the Convention.868 
This pronouncement is reminiscent of ITLOS’s statement in Bangladesh/Myanmar, signifying, 
albeit implicitly, an appreciation by the tribunal of its treaty guardian role to ensure that States 
are able to enjoy the rights and obligations that UNCLOS confers on them.  
Further, in relation to maritime delimitation, the tribunal added that ‘transparency and 
the predictability of the delimitation process as a whole are additional objectives to be achieved 
in the process’.869 This statement suggests that the tribunal was conscious that it had a broader 
role than just drawing a boundary line as requested by the parties. Instead, it should clarify the 
law that regulates the delimitation process so as to provide guidance for future cases. More 
interestingly, the tribunal held that: 
[T]he ensuing—and still developing—international case law constitutes, in the view of 
the Tribunal, an acquis judiciaire, a source of international law under Article 38(1)(d) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and should be read into Articles 74 
and 83 of the Convention.’870 
Here, the tribunal, while seemingly just accepting that under Article 38(1)(d) judicial decisions 
are merely a supplementary source of law, actually gives judicial decisions a much more 
significant role. By saying that the case law should be read into Articles 74 and 83, the tribunal 
was acknowledging that it is the judicial decisions that provides the normative content and 
scope of the rules on maritime delimitation. This statement thus implicitly admits that judicial 
decisions have an important role in developing the law, at least in the context of maritime 
delimitation. 
Other than this one example, the idea that their decisions should have a larger role to 
play, even if held by the arbitrators, was not expressed in any of the arbitral awards that have 
been rendered by Annex VII tribunals. One could argue that such a lack of discussion regarding 
a systemic role on the part of the arbitral tribunals, at least when compared with ITLOS, reflects 
the commonly held belief that ad hoc arbitral tribunals are only concerned about resolving 
disputes. But as the previous chapters show, the awards of the Annex VII arbitral tribunals have 
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made important contributions to the development of the law, regardless of whether they 
themselves recognised or deliberately aimed at achieving such an impact.  
In conclusion, neither ITLOS nor Annex VII arbitral tribunals has explicitly adopted 
the view that they do or can assume the task of developing the law. Unlike Annex VII arbitral 
tribunals, however, ITLOS at least indicated an understanding of an institutional guardian role, 
protecting the regime set up by the Convention and providing guidance to them in exercising 
the rights that UNCLOS confers on them. The lack of an acknowledgement of a law-
development role on the part of the tribunal should perhaps not come as a surprise as 
international courts are generally still reluctant to do so. It does not, however, mean that such 
an awareness was absent from the minds of individual judges. More importantly, it also did not 
prevent UNCLOS tribunals from engaging in the development of the law of sea. It seems safe 
to conclude, therefore, that even though UNCLOS tribunals were reluctant to embrace their 
law-development role, this had little impact on the outcome of their decisions or the significance 
of their decisions on the development of the law of the sea. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Chapter assesses whether and to what extent the following factors, namely the 
jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals, the institutional design of UNCLOS, the 
interpretative method that UNCLOS tribunals used and the perception of the tribunals of their 
own roles impact the ability and willingness of the tribunals to develop the law. It finds that the 
jurisdictional conditions that UNCLOS imposes on the tribunals have rarely impeded them 
from actually asserting jurisdiction to hear the cases because of the low threshold that the 
tribunals have set for the satisfaction of these conditions. In fact, UNCLOS tribunals have been 
able to assert jurisdiction to hear the majority of cases brought before them. ITLOS has only 
declined jurisdiction in one contentious case, namely M/V Louisa, and one prompt release 
proceeding, namely Grand Prince; while an Annex VII arbitral tribunal has only declined 
jurisdiction in one case, Southern Bluefin Tuna—a decision that did not subsequently go down 
well with most critics—and has suspended proceedings in MOX Plant due to consideration of 
comity towards the European Court of Justice. Among the limitations and exceptions to 
jurisdiction under UNCLOS, only the limitation regarding the coastal State’s sovereign rights 
in the EEZ under Article 297(3) has made its impact felt in several cases. But even when 
UNCLOS tribunals gave this limitation a broader scope than the wording of Article 297(3) 
might suggest, this did not completely hamper the tribunals from contributing to the 
development of the law on fisheries.  
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As for the existence of other institutions and organisations involved in the development 
of the law of the sea, their expertise and competence seem to have facilitated UNCLOS 
tribunals in the interpretation and development of the law. Although there are still uncertainties 
regarding the relationship between, for example UNCLOS tribunals and the CLCS, there is no 
evidence in the decisions rendered to date to show that UNCLOS tribunals have been hesitant 
to embark on developing the law due to the existence of other actors which may also be involved 
in regulating the same issue. Rather, UNCLOS tribunals sought to rely on the work of relevant 
institutions and use them as the basis, explicitly or otherwise, to interpret and give meaning to 
UNCLOS provisions. There is also no evidence to suggest that States have exercised constraints 
on UNCLOS tribunals to prevent them from engaging in developing the law, even though the 
mechanisms to do so exist under UNCLOS. 
 In interpreting the law under the Convention, UNCLOS tribunals have not expressly 
embraced the method of ‘evolutionary interpretation’ which has increasingly been used by 
several international courts in order to give treaty terms a more contemporary meaning at the 
time of application, as opposed to the meaning which might have been envisioned at the time 
of conclusion. The argument of ‘living treaty’ has also not played a prominent role in the 
consideration of the tribunals, although it has appeared in individual opinions of certain judges. 
In cases in which the rights and obligations under the Convention were interpreted to have a 
meaning or scope that reflect current developments, however, one can see the prevalence of 
resort of subsequent practice and agreements, albeit unsystematically and without any 
explanation as to why and how such a method was appropriate.  
Finally, UNCLOS tribunals have not, in the course of deciding individual cases, actively 
pursued a role of developing the law. They have not publicly admitted that they were 
consciously taking on the role of developing the law, despite the fact that the drafters of the 
Convention arguably gave the tribunals a broader role than dispute settlement under the 
Convention and that individual judges have called on ITLOS to decide the cases in a way that 
contributes to the development of the law of sea. Nevertheless, for ITLOS, there are certain 
signs indicating that it sees itself as having a role that extends beyond just settling the disputes 
brought before it, to that of an institutional guardian. The general lack of pronouncement on a 
law development role, however, should perhaps not come as a surprise, given that ITLOS and 
Annex VII tribunals are still relatively early in the functioning of the UNCLOS system and the 
prevalence of the conventional view that law-making under international law lies in the hands 
of States. UNCLOS tribunal’s reluctance in this regard, however, did not mean that the tribunal 
in practice refrained from interpreting the rules and principles under the Convention in a manner 
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that contributed to the development of the law. In other words, the lack of explicit 
acknowledgment of a law-development role in the decisions themselves did not significant 
hamper the ability of UNCLOS tribunals to develop the law in practice.  
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CHAPTER 6    CONCLUSION 
 
The creation of a new dispute settlement system which constitutes an integral part of UNCLOS 
has widely been seen as a radical and progressive move. The innovative nature of this new 
dispute settlement system is manifested most prominently in the establishment of specialised 
dispute settlement bodies under Part XV, ie ITLOS, Annex VII and Annex VIII arbitral 
tribunals, as well as the compulsory jurisdiction conferred upon these bodies to interpret and 
apply the Convention. Even though the express task given to the dispute settlement bodies is to 
settle disputes arising from the Convention, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, as 
Chapter 1 argued, UNCLOS tribunals were also expected to assume roles that transcend the 
confines of settling concrete disputes. Given the nature of UNCLOS as a framework convention 
and the outcome of a negotiation process heavily based on compromise, resulting in many 
general and vaguely-worded UNCLOS provisions, Chapter 1 contended that UNCLOS 
tribunals were expected to clarify legal ambiguities and provide normative guidance to States 
in implementing the Convention in order to safeguard the uniformity and integrity of the 
Convention. In other words, the role of UNCLOS tribunals was to be that of an institutional 
guardian and as such, they were expected to clarify and develop the law under the Convention.  
On the basis of the working definition of judicial development of the law as the 
clarification of the law—encompassing specifically determining the status of certain principles 
of law, defining the scope of general principles and clarifying the normative content of vague 
terms—the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals were assessed in three main substantive areas 
of the law of the sea, namely the law on fisheries, the law on the outer continental shelf and the 
law on the protection of the marine environment in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. This last 
chapter seeks to provide, based on the preceding chapters, the answers to the research questions 
set out in Chapter 1, in particular, the kind of contribution that UNCLOS tribunals have made 
to the development of the law of the sea and the factors that impact the performance of 
UNCLOS tribunals in this process. 
 
I. TAKING STOCK OF THE CONTRIBUTION  
The types of contributions made by international courts or tribunals to the development of the 
law, as mentioned in Chapter 1, can be in three main forms, namely (i) confirming a rule of 
customary international law (ii) defining the scope of rights and obligations under UNCLOS 
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and (iii) giving meaning to vague terms under the Convention. The following summarises the 
contribution of UNCLOS tribunals in each of these forms.  
(i) Confirmation of customary international law 
In the course of hearing cases arising from UNCLOS, questions relating to whether certain rules 
or principles have attained the status of customary law have arisen. UNCLOS tribunals have 
taken the opportunity to deal with these questions, thereby contributing to confirming the 
existence of customary rules.  
ITLOS held in MOX Plant, Land Reclamation and the Advisory Opinion on IUU 
Fishing that the duty to cooperate had become part of general international law, and in the 
Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area that the obligation to conduct EIA was an obligation 
under customary international law. It is noteworthy that UNCLOS already provides for both of 
these obligations. Thus it was not strictly necessary for the tribunal to have taken the extra step 
to confirm the customary nature of these principles in order to apply them to the cases before 
them. The willingness of ITLOS to do so nonetheless was a welcome contribution to reinforcing 
the importance of these principles beyond the confines of the Convention.  
With regard to the precautionary principle, ITLOS did not acknowledge the customary 
nature of this principle in clear and explicit terms as was the case with the two abovementioned 
principles. However, despite the fact that UNCLOS itself does not provide for the precautionary 
principle, and its status under customary law has been subject to much debate,871 ITLOS still 
relied on the precautionary principle to prescribe provisional measures in one of its first cases, 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna Provisional Measure Order, albeit without referring to the principle 
by name. Further, in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the Area, it stated that ‘there is now 
a trend towards making this approach part of customary law’, which could be seen as one of 
the first endorsements of the customary nature of the precautionary principle at a time when 
other international courts or tribunals, such as the ICJ, WTO Appellate Body had the tendency 
to avoid addressing the issue. ITLOS’ decisions, therefore, added authoritative weight to 
affirming the customary status of this principle, or at least, gave it a much-needed push towards 
attaining this status.  
As is clear, UNCLOS tribunals’ confirmation of the existence of customary rules has 
been in the area of marine environment protection. The willingness of UNCLOS tribunals to 
read into the Convention principles which are not expressly provided for therein, such as the 
precautionary principle and the principle of due diligence, reinforces the significance of these 
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principles in the protection of the marine environment. This is particularly important as 
UNCLOS was negotiated at a time when international environmental law was still in its infancy. 
Thus despite its efforts to embrace a more environment-friendly approach to managing the 
oceans than that in previous law of the sea instruments, the drafters of the Convention could 
not have foreseen the significant efforts that have been made in the protection of the 
environment in more recent times.872 By confirming the status of these important environmental 
principles and reading them into the Convention, the tribunals have helped ensure that 
UNCLOS develops in keeping with important progress that been made in international 
environmental law since 1982.  
(ii) Defining the scope of States’ rights and obligations under UNCLOS 
UNCLOS is built upon the 1958 Geneva Conventions but has remarkable novelties, among 
which the most important includes the introduction of two new maritime zones, the EEZ and 
the Area, and the concept of the outer continental shelf. UNCLOS stipulates the nature of these 
new regimes, in particular the EEZ is ‘a specific legal regime’,873 the Area and its resources are 
‘common heritage of mankind’ under Article 136 UNCLOS. What these phrases entail and the 
scope of States’ rights and obligations in these new maritime zones nonetheless remain 
undefined. UNCLOS tribunals have had a significant role to play in this regard.  
First, UNCLOS tribunals have helped to define the extent of coastal States’ and flag 
States’ rights in relation to the resources in the EEZ. It is worth bearing in mind that the novelty 
of the EEZ regime lies in the fact it is a resource-oriented regime: coastal States have exclusive 
sovereign rights over living resources, while other States retain their high sea freedoms, except 
for the freedom of fishing. In Virginia G, as a matter of treaty interpretation, ITLOS gave a 
positive answer to the question of whether, as part of its sovereign rights in the EEZ, coastal 
States can regulate the bunkering of fishing vessels in its fisheries law. The implication of such 
a decision is that coastal States’ regulatory power in the EEZ extends not only to fisheries 
activities listed under Article 62(4) but any activity which has a direct connection with fishing. 
The scope of regulatory power of the coastal State is now broader than what might appear in 
the Convention, but this in fact reflects more accurately the practice that is taking place at sea, 
hence a new balance to be struck in the EEZ.  
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Furthermore, coastal States’ enforcement power in the EEZ has also been elucidated, 
albeit not to the same degree of clarity as with the regulatory power. By answering the question 
regarding the permissibility of the confiscation of vessels as an enforcement measure that 
coastal States can take against vessels fishing illegally in its EEZ, ITLOS made clear in Virginia 
G that these enforcement measures could go beyond those explicitly provided for under 73(1), 
but only insofar as it is ‘necessary’ to enforce their rules and regulations. Regrettably, ITLOS 
failed to provide guidance on how to determine ‘necessity’, leaving the term which is perhaps 
the most important in Article 73(1) entirely open-ended.874 What has emerged from Virginia G 
is that coastal States are not confined to taking the measures listed under Article 73(1), but that 
their discretion is also not unlimited. Coastal States bear the burden of proving that whatever 
measure it is that they wish to take to enforce their rules and regulations must be ‘necessary’.  
Finally, with respect to flag States’ obligations, even though UNCLOS places the 
primary obligation to conserve marine resources in the EEZ on coastal States, UNCLOS 
tribunals made clear that flag States also have to share this obligation. Notwithstanding the 
absence of such an obligation under UNCLOS, ITLOS in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing 
confirmed that flag States have an 'obligation to ensure' that vessels flying their flags do not 
conduct IUU fishing activities in the EEZ of another State. It did so by deduction from the 
general obligations of State parties under UNCLOS with regard to conserving and managing 
marine living resources and from the specific obligations imposed on flag States whose vessels 
operate in the EEZ of another State. ITLOS’ further elaboration of the measures to be taken in 
order to fulfil this obligation on the part of the flag State was highly significant because these 
measures redefine the balance to be struck between the rights and obligations of coastal States 
and those of flag States in the EEZ, thus clarifying what the sui generis character of the EEZ 
means in today's world. From a practical perspective, the imposition of obligations on the flag 
State with regard to IUU fishing is an important legal development in the face of prevalent and 
destructive fishing practices. 875  Even though UNCLOS does not provide for flag States’ 
obligations in this regard, by reading an ‘obligation to ensure’ into the Convention, ITLOS adds 
UNCLOS to the list of legal tools available to combat IUU fishing.  
Turning to the Area, one of the unique features of this regime is that non-State actors 
have the right under UNCLOS to participate in the exploration and exploitation activities in the 
																																																								
874 However, the individual opinions of some judges focusing on this oversight of the tribunals may provide some 
guidance on the different approaches to assessing whether the requirement of necessity has been met. See Chapter 
2, p 35–36.  
875 It has been estimated that about 95% of the capture fisheries take place within 200 nm of the coast, although 
the EEZs only account for 8% of the Earth’s surface and 36% if the world’s marine areas. Proelss (n 78) 410. 
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deep seabed, but they could only do so if they are sponsored by a State party to UNCLOS.876 
Article 139, while providing for the obligation of State parties in this regard, does not specify 
the nature of the ‘responsibility to ensure’ or what it requires on the part of the sponsoring State. 
ITLOS provided answers to both these questions in the Advisory Opinion on Activities in the 
Area and clarified that this ‘obligation to ensure’ meant that the sponsoring State had an 
obligation to ensure that the sponsored contractor complied with the obligations contained in 
Part XI. In terms of the nature of the obligation to ensure, it is an obligation of due diligence 
and an obligation of conduct. ITLOS also spelled out the kinds of measure required of the 
sponsoring State to comply with this obligation. These obligations were imposed on sponsoring 
States, but they can be extended to all States engaged in deep seabed mining in the Area 
In short, UNCLOS tribunals, by adopting a creative approach to treaty interpretation, 
have defined the scope of the coastal States' power in the EEZ, flag States' obligation in the 
EEZ and the sponsoring States' obligation in the Area when they are not spelled out in any 
detail in UNCLOS.  
(iii) Giving substance to vague concepts 
The preceding discussion shows that in defining the scope of application of various general 
rules, UNCLOS tribunals also clarified the meaning of important terms, such as ‘obligation to 
ensure’. Defining the scope of the State’s rights and obligations and giving substance to vague 
concepts are, therefore, not always distinct types of judicial contributions and they may be 
symbiotic. At the same time, UNCLOS is replete with general terms and vague concepts, some 
of which hold the key to the enjoyment of rights or performance of duties by the States. It is 
thus argued that giving substance to vague terms employed under the Convention should also 
be considered a separate contribution worthy of scrutiny in its own right. The most important 
contributions of UNCLOS tribunals in this category relate to elucidating the terms 'reasonable 
bond' in prompt release proceedings, 'genuine link' in establishing the nationality of vessels, 
and 'natural prolongation' in establishing entitlement to the outer continental shelf.  
 'Reasonable bond' is without a doubt the most important term in Article 73(2) which 
provides for the prompt release procedure under UNCLOS. The purpose of the prompt release 
procedure is to balance the right of the coastal State to enforce its rules and regulations in the 
EEZ and the rights of the flag State not to have its vessel and crew detained for an unnecessarily 
prolonged length of time. If one envisages the prompt release procedure as a scale to balance 
the rights of these two groups of States, ‘reasonable bond’ is the fulcrum on which this scale 
																																																								
876 Article 153 UNCLOS. 
201 
 
operates. The clarification of what would be considered 'reasonable' and what constitutes a 
'bond' is therefore crucial in the operation of prompt release proceedings. ITLOS has developed 
a list of relevant factors to assess the reasonableness of the bond imposed by the coastal State 
so as to provide guidance in implementing this article. This list has seen little change since the 
first cases and contains mostly quantifiable factors. Indeed, ITLOS made clear in Volga that the 
bond within the meaning of Article 73(2) should only be of a monetary nature. However, what 
is interesting is that the assessment of one of these factors, namely the gravity of the offence, 
has witnessed an important evolution over time. From taking into account only the penalty 
imposed under the domestic law of the coastal State in earlier cases, ITLOS progressed to very 
gradually taking into account coastal States’ international commitments in the conservation of 
marine resources. Hoshinmaru—the last prompt release case heard by ITLOS to date—clearly 
demonstrated the increased awareness on the part of the Tribunal of the significance of 
sustainable fishing. Coupled with ITLOS’ acknowledgment of the flag State’s obligation of due 
diligence over its fishing vessels in the EEZ as analysed above, it is expected that ITLOS’ 
consideration of ‘reasonable bond’ under Article 73(1) will continue to factor in international 
obligations to conserve marine resources, both on the part of coastal and flag States, in the 
determination of the gravity of the offence.  
The issue of the nationality of a ship is important as it provides the basis for the 
implementation of one of the most fundamental principles of the law of the sea, ie the principle 
of the flag State’s exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag. In M/V Saiga, ITLOS made 
clear that the requirement of a ‘genuine link between the State and the ship’ contained under 
Article 91 did not constitute a condition for a vessel to fly the flag of a State as has commonly 
been argued. What is crucial in the determination of the nationality of the ship is whether the 
ship has been registered in accordance with domestic law providing for ship registration. In this 
matter, the State has exclusive power. This, together with the principle of flag State’s exclusive 
jurisdiction, highlights the broad scope of power and wide margin of appreciation granted to 
flag States with regard to their vessels.  
Turning finally to ‘natural prolongation’, this term has long held a special position in 
the establishment of the outer continental shelf as the basis of a coastal State’s entitlement to a 
continental shelf beyond 200 nm. However, this term had never been properly defined either 
under UNCLOS or by international courts. ITLOS in Bangladesh/Myanmar, followed by the 
Annex VII tribunal in Bangladesh/India, clarified that the term 'natural prolongation' contained 
in Article 76(1) referred to the seabed that extends from the coastal State's land territory to the 
outer edge of its continental margin. This means that ‘natural prolongation’ has been subsumed 
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and is to be determined by the formulae that UNCLOS provides under Article 76(4) to identify 
entitlement. This pronouncement was the first time that an international tribunal spelled out the 
meaning of 'natural prolongation' under UNCLOS and more importantly, the legal basis for 
entitlement to an outer continental shelf.  
 Taking stock of the UNCLOS tribunals’ contribution to the development of the law of 
the sea, it seems clear that their contributions have not involved legal issues of a wide-ranging 
nature, but concentrated on new regimes and concepts which UNCLOS introduced into the 
corpus of the law of sea, including the EEZ regime, the outer continental shelf regime, the Area 
and marine environment protection. It should also be acknowledged that the significance of 
UNCLOS decisions seems to be at a micro rather than macro level: they have mostly been in 
the form of fine-tuning the provisions of UNCLOS by fleshing out the details of the vague 
provisions and defining the scope of the relevant principles. Even when some of the UNCLOS 
tribunals’ decisions were the first instances in which an international dispute settlement body 
addressed a particular legal issue, for example, flag State’s ‘obligation to ensure’ over vessels 
in the EEZ of another States in the Advisory Opinion on IUU Fishing and the relationship 
between delimitation and delineation of the outer continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal cases, 
the impact could hardly be considered to be ground-breaking, in the sense of introducing or 
bringing major changes to the substance of the law of the sea. The impact of UNCLOS 
tribunals’ conclusion is that of enabling States to grasp the extent of their rights and obligations 
and ensuring that UNCLOS is interpreted and implemented in a uniform manner. 
However, the level of clarification provided by UNCLOS tribunals to the law is not the 
same across these fields, nor within each field. The most significant contribution would appear 
to be in relation to the law on fisheries, but only to the extent of fisheries in the EEZ. By 
clarifying the scope of the coastal States’ and flag States’ rights and obligations in such a way 
as to reflect contemporary fishing practice and to take into account conservation demands and 
sustainable fishing practices, UNCLOS tribunals shed light on the balance to be struck in States’ 
exercise of rights and obligations in relations to fisheries resources in the EEZ. In contrast, 
UNCLOS tribunals missed important opportunities to put their stamp on the development of 
the law on transboundary fisheries. With regard to the law on the protection of the marine 
environment, UNCLOS tribunals’ decisions were significant in strengthening the status of 
important environmental law principles and confirming their applicability to both aspects of 
marine environment protection, ie the conservation of marine resources and prevention of 
marine pollution; but not in terms clarifying the content of these principles. Additionally, while 
UNCLOS tribunals were the first to delimit the outer continental shelf, many of the tribunals’ 
203 
 
conclusions were restricted to the particular circumstances of the cases. Thus, apart from the 
clarification on the meaning of ‘natural prolongation’ and its role in the establishment of the 
outer continental shelf, it is uncertain whether the tribunals’ findings will have a broader impact.  
Finally, UNCLOS tribunals’ creative interpretations have contributed to maintaining 
the relevance of the UNCLOS legal framework to the regulation of activities at sea. This is 
especially important given that UNCLOS was concluded more than three decades ago and a 
plethora of offshore activities are now taking place which the drafters did not and could not 
have envisioned. 
II. FACTORS OF IMPACT 
In an attempt to understand the performance of UNCLOS tribunals, Chapter 5 analyses four 
groups of factors which may have an impact on their law-development role, namely: (i) the 
jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals, (ii) the institutional design of UNCLOS, (iii) the 
interpretative methods that UNCLOS tribunals used in deciding the cases and (iv) the tribunals’ 
perception of their role. The first two factors may be considered objective factors, as they 
determine the space available for UNCLOS tribunals to engage in, and thus impact the ability 
of UNCLOS tribunals to develop the law. The remaining two factors are those that at the 
disposal of the tribunals, and so are more subjective in nature; they seek to ascertain some 
indication of the tribunals’ willingness to develop the law of the sea. As the analysis in Chapter 
5 clearly shows, the line between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is not one that is easy to maintain. 
For example, while the jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals is laid down by the 
Convention, determining how wide or narrow this scope stretches is a task that is, to a large 
extent, at the discretion of UNCLOS tribunals. However, taken together, these four factors help 
to shed light on the performance of UNCLOS tribunals in developing the law.   
The analysis in Chapter 5 shows that the compulsory nature of the tribunals’ jurisdiction 
facilitates their law-development role. This is even more so when the UNCLOS tribunals have 
had the tendency to reinforce their compulsory jurisdiction by restricting the applicability of 
the hurdles to jurisdiction. The only exception seems to have been that relating to States’ 
sovereign rights in the EEZ under Article 297(3), so the jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS 
tribunals did restrict the ability of the tribunals to deal with certain categories disputes of this, 
but not all dispute relating to coastal States’ sovereign rights. In respect of the institutional 
design of UNCLOS, it is clear that there are various actors in the field which have the power to 
develop the law of the sea. An analysis of the way in which UNCLOS tribunals interpret their 
relationship with these institutions shows that UNCLOS tribunals have not been reluctant to 
engage in the development of the law, even when the legal issues in question might fall into the 
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former’s area of expertise. There has, however, been some recognition of the boundaries of 
their role, which signifies possible restraint in the future cases. So far, UNCLOS tribunals have 
referred to the instruments produced by the abovementioned institutions in order to shed light 
on legal terms which also had a scientific meaning, or as evidence of the current practice in 
determining the scope of certain rules and principles under the Convention. The work of these 
bodies, therefore, has been used in a way as to facilitated the law-development role of the 
tribunals.  
Turning to the factors that impact willingness to undertake the law-development role, it is 
clear that while they have developed UNCLOS by interpreting the Convention progressively to 
include new practices that are not provided in its provisions, the tribunals did not consistently 
employ any particular method of interpretation to assist them in doing so. Even though the 
tribunals took into account subsequent agreements and practice in several cases, they did not 
acknowledge this interpretative technique nor the legal basis on which this technique was 
warranted. Finally, neither ITLOS nor Annex VII arbitral tribunals have expressly put forward 
the view that they have or should assume the task of developing the law, although in the case 
of ITLOS, individual judges have advocated that ITLOS should embrace its role in developing 
of the law of sea. UNCLOS tribunals are still keen to embrace their role merely as interpreting 
the Convention in order to provide guidance to States and other institutions in the 
implementation of the Convention. However, even when UNCLOS tribunals remain in denial 
of any law-development role that they might play, this did not impede them from deciding cases 
in such a way as to contribute to the development of different areas of the law of the sea.  
In conclusion, twenty years after the first case was brought to the UNCLOS dispute 
settlement system, UNCLOS tribunals have only dealt with around thirty cases, which have 
touched upon a limited number of legal issues.877 Notwithstanding this fact, this thesis has 
shown that ITLOS and Annex VII arbitral tribunals have made some important contributions 
to the development of several areas of the law of the sea. As a result, the role that UNCLOS 
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